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THESIS: The Case for Theological Ethics: - An appreciation of Emil 
Brunner and Reinhold Niebuhr as moral theologians. 
The purpose of this thesis is to test the hypothesis that Christian ethics 
is not merely a department of general ethics, but is essentially 
theological. The reason for choosing these two theologians is that Brunner 
is in danger of eclipse, and Niebuhr deserves to continue being widely 
read. The thesis attempts to exhibit the methods each used to clarify the 
Christian faith and relate it to selected structures of society. 
METHOD: The thesis proceeds thus: 
1) The first chapter is biographical and a study of their respective 
environments, as well as an appraisal of other theological and secular 
positions contemporary with them. 
2) The second chapter is an examination of how each dealt with the subject 
of nat ural law. 
3) The thesis moves on to examine their views on the questions of love, law 
and revel at ion. 
4) At this point the thesis deals with both theologians separately to 
evaluate their particular emphases. 
5) The final part of the thesis examines how each applied theoloogical 
issues to particular situations. Those selected are 'The State' and 'The 
Problem of War'. The reason for the choice is that both were writing at a 
particularly turbulent period of world history. This part of the thesis is 
descriptive and not critical and is intended to serve as illustrative of 
the methods they used to apply theology to social and political issues. 
1 
INTRODUCTION 
Christian social ethics is a complicated subject. First, there are many 
variations in the interpretation of a social norm. If ethics are to be 
applied to social institutions then they will vary according to the social 
environment. For example, we can suggest that democracy is a description 
of a desirable social and political system. That is not the same as 
asserting that it has particular ethical merit. It could be argued that a 
benevolent patriarchy has as much ethical value as a democracy, and in 
applying ethical theories to such a system, one would use different methods 
from those applied to a democracy. All methods of establishing order 
within a state are open to ethical enquiry. Totalitarianism runs the risk 
of power being abused, and democracy runs the risk of those in power 
manipulating a situation in order to retain power. It follows that those 
who write about social ethics must have a grasp of the various forms of 
social institutions in various societies. 
Secondly, the word 'ethics' presents us with complications. Ethics is 
basically an examination of the means whereby we can establish the 
realities of right and wrong, good and bad. Further, ethics needs to 
establish whether or not there exist univerally valid conceptions of right 
and wrong, or whether there are relativities which make some actions right 
some of the time, and the same actions wrong some of the time. If one 
concludes that there are in fact universal values, then one needs to 
examine the nature of the authority which codifies those values and which 
enforces them. Therefore, secondary to the subject of ethics, but 
important to it, is the subject of the nature and validity of authority. 
Apart from the suggestion that most people believe that there are such 
concepts as good and bad, there is remarkably little consensus amongst 
moral philosophers as to how to reach a conclusion. Between classical 
theories of natural law, and thorough-going existentialism, there is a wide 
range of ideas and methods which have formed the basis of some variety of 
ethical teaching. 
Thirdly, the use of the word 'Christian' in a study of social ethics does 
not in fact narrow the range of ideas very much. Within the traditions of 
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Christian moral teaching there have been as many schools of thought as 
there have been in the teaching of ethics as a purely philosophical, or 
secular exercise. This thesis sets out to discover, from the writings of 
Emil Brunner and Reinhold Niebuhr, to what extent Christian ethics is part 
of theology. The question that we are asking here is whether Christianity 
has a unique system in answering ethical questions, based on theological 
doctrine, or whether secular ethics can be used by theology to address the 
questions. Further, apart from the answering of specific questions, the 
thesis at tempts to deduce that the whole ethical 'process' is, for a 
Christian, different. From there we need to address the question which 
arises, which is that if Christian ethics is distinctively theological. 
does it have any application to those without faith? 
There are, I suggest, good reasons for choosing the writings of Brunner and 
Niebuhr. As we shall see in the thesis, both addressed themselves, as 
theologians, to ethics in particular. They were contemporary with each 
other, one in Switzerland and one in America. Both were 'Protestant', 
influenced by Lutheranism, liberalism, and the findings of nineteenth 
century Biblical criticism. They both steered a course between the 
thorough-going Protestant stance taken by, for example, Karl Barth, which 
insisted on all theories being dependent upon 'Justification by Faith' and 
'Revelation', only perceivable by the believer, and, on the other hand, the 
position taught by much of the Church, which depended on natural law as the 
ultimate determinant. They were familiar with each other's writings and 
had a great respect for each other - whilst not agreeing with each other 
all the time. We shall see that their disagreements were more about style 
and emphasis than about substance. 
One might expect that a thesis on ethics might give ethical answers to 
particular ethical questions. A comparison between two moral theologians 
might concentrate on how they apply their theology to moral issues. This 
thesis, however, is concerned, not with particular ethical questions, but 
with the theological thinking that forms the basis for answering such 
questions. It is true that all theories have to be tested and applied to 
particular issues. To that end, at the end of the thesis, I have examined 
Brunner and Niebuhr in their thinking about the 'State' and about 'War and 
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Pacifism'. These chapters are entirely descriptive and not critical. They 
are given as examples of how one might apply their particular theological 
views to social and political institutions. I have chosen these particular 
issues because of the turbulent period during which each of them wrote. 
They each experienced the rise of fascism and communism and events of two 
world wars. In any case, the Christian's view of 'The State' is of 
permanent interest. 
In dealing, then, with their theological writings, the point must be made 
that both were prolific. It would be impossible in a thesis of this scope 
to deal adequately with all that they wrote. Further, much has been 
written about them, and in particular about Niebuhr, who is still a 
theologian of considerable interest. I have therefore chosen themes common 
to both of them which I believe illustrate their concern to keep the study 
of ethics within the study of theology. Niebuhr's princip4! work on ethics 
is The Nature and Destiny of Man, which will be referred to frequently in 
the thesis. In this he sets out a doctrine of the nature of man - tainted, 
as he says, with sin, and his relationship through redemption with God. 
The parallel work of Brunner's with this is The Divine Imperative, arguably 
the most important work on the theology of ethics to have been published 
for a very long time. This will also be referred to frequently - and in 
particular the passages which talk of the 'Divine Human Encounter', 
(incidentally the title of another of his books which we shall examine) - a 
thesis which owes much to Martin Buber' s work I and Thou. 
As well as these there are other works which will be looked at in the 
course of the thesis, 
At this stage it is 
a list of which is to be found in the bibliography. 
relevant to point out certain titles that are 
significant. Niebuhr's Moral Man and Immoral Society was influential far 
beyond theological circles. Also significant were two books published soon 
after that. Reflections on the End of an Era and Beyond Tragedy are 
Christian interpretations of history - a life-long interest of Niebuhr's. 
An early work of his, Leaves from the Notes of a Tamed Cynic provide 
interesting insights into Niebuhr's thoughts - and the way in which they 
developed in his early years when he was a pastor in Detroit. Essays and 
articles about Niebuhr are still being published. Kenneth Durkin's Reinhold 
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Niebuhr <Geoffrey Chapman 1989) is a series of 
Niebuhr's development of thought, from primarily 
chapters 
that of 
which trace 
a political 
philosopher to that of a more consciously serious theologian. Niebuhr's 
shift in opinion over the years justifies the claim that he was more of an 
'organic' theologian that a 'systematic' theologian. In 1988 Larry 
Rasmussen edited and commented on a very useful collection of Niebuhr's 
writings which make a broadly similar point. Perhaps one of the most useful 
of recent books is that edited by Richard Harries, Reinhold Niebuhr and the 
Issues of ouJ' Time, a selection of essays by both British and American 
theologians which is consciously more 'theological' than some other works. 
I have given details of footnotes at the end of each chapter throughout the 
thesis. However, full details of the various publications are given in the 
bibliography at the end of the thesis. 
Brunner, in this country at least, has not received anything like as much 
attention and indeed is in danger of being eclipsed. This is 
unfortunate, since his writings on ethics are genuinely original, and I 
believe The Divine Imperative to be the best treatise on theological ethics 
to have been writ ten in this century - a claim I hope to justify in the 
course of the thesis. It may be that his rift with the mainstream of 
Zurich theologians in the nineteen thirties, and in particular with Karl 
Barth - an issue we shall examine - is responsible for his comparative 
decline in popularity and influence. 
THEMES 
I turn now to the themes I have isolated as being important in achieving 
the aim of arguing for a theology of ethics. In the first chapter we shall 
set the two writers in the context of other theological and philosophical 
thinking. This will be partly biographical, and partly an exercise to 
examine their relationship with other writers. It will also aim at 
identifying particular themes which they pursued. 
Following that there will be a study of natural law. This is because a 
great deal of moral teaching in the history of the church has been related 
to natural law. They both reject natural law as a basis for Christian 
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ethics - but since it has been, and still is, so influential, I feel it 
must be examined, and their handling of the issue must be examined. We 
shall see how they differed on this in some respects - although Brunner 
claims, as we shall see, that he was misunderstood by Niebuhr. 
The third chapter will deal with the relationship between 'love' and 'law'. 
This will include an examination into the concept of revelation, and, in 
particular, the possibility of a 'general' as well as a 'special' 
revelation - the point of difference between Brunner and Barth. 
The next stage of the thesis looks at Brunner and Niebuhr individually -
and attempts to pinpoint particular characteristics and emphases which 
contribute to their unique contributions to the ethical debate. 
Finally, as we have already explained, we look at two specific moral and 
ethical situations where their thinking is applied. Again, I stress that 
this is descriptive and not critical. 
I hope to demonstrate that both deserve comparison with each other, and 
also that Emil Brunner deserves wider readership than he currently enjoys. 
There are theologians who have a large posthumous following. Niebuhr is 
one, and I believe Brunner should be another. 
CHAPTER 1 6 
Emil Brunner and Reinhold Niebuhr: an explanation of the comparison. 
Five theologians, Barth, Brunner, Tillich, Bultmann and Niebuhr were 
contemporary with each other. All of them were born in the last two 
decades of the nineteenth century and all of them were original scholars 
with prolific writings and with international influence. Further, they 
were all Protestant, claiming to be strongly influenced by Luther and, to a 
lesser extent, Calvin. They all wrote in the wake of the movement of 
"critical" biblical scholarship and wer·e in that sense "modern". All of 
them wrote with Christology at the centre of their thought and the great 
Pauline doctrines of Justification by Faith, the Nature of Grace and the 
Cross were for them of paramount significance. 
They all experienced the twentieth century tragedies of war and the rise of 
totalitarianism, both fascist and communist. Niebuhr described fascism as 
"moral cynicism" and communism as "moral utopianism" < 1) A further common 
factor was the re-emergence of the emphasis on the concept of Revelation 
and the question that they addressed themselves to was not, primarily, what 
man should do in response to God - but what God has to say to man, and, 
through man, to the world. 
In a contribution to Kegley's The Theology of Emil Brunner, entitled "Some 
Questions on Brunner's Epistemology", Paul Tillich, describing a social 
occasion with Brunner in his apartment, has this to say: 
It seems to me that in spite of the many divergenc~.s which exist 
between you and Barth, and Bultmann and Niebuhr and myself, a kind of 
common ground in theology has developed in our generation. <2) 
Of these five, two, Brunner and Niebuhr, addressed themselves to the study 
of ethics in particular. Although they differed in their views in many 
respects it is important at the beginning of a comparison to note their 
similarities. In an autobiographical introduction to Kegley's Reinhold 
Niebuhr, His Religious, Social and Political Thought, Niebuhr says: 
"I may say that Brunner's whole theological position is close to mine, and 
that it is one to which I am more indebted than any other. I say this 
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though in recent years our respective treatment of the ethical problem has 
diverged rather widely, through his increasing adoption, and my increasing 
rejection, of the concept of 'Natural Law'". 
Natural Law is an important element in the debate on Christian Ethics. 
There have been those who reject it completely, and those who regard it as 
an essential element. We shall deal briefly with the history of Natural 
Law theory, and, in particular, with the way in which Brunner and Niebuhr 
handled it, in the next chapter. 
As well as this difference there is the accusation on the part of Niebuhr 
that Reformation Theology was not sufficiently dialectic, and that Brunner, 
and indeed Barth, who claimed to be dialectic theologians, were not, in 
Niebuhr's view, 'dialectic' enough. Niebuhr does not in any way throw away 
his Reformation heritage, neither does he blame it, but he believes that 
the truly dialectic nature of the Christian faith was not sufficiently 
exploited. On this point Niebuhr is very clear. 
of Man he says: 
In The Nature and Destiny. 
'Reformation insights must be related to the whole range of human 
experience more 'dialectically' than the Reformation succeeded in 
doing. The 'yes' and 'no' of its dialectical affirmations; that the 
Christian is 'justus et peccator'; that history fulfills and negates 
the Kingdom of God; that grace is continuous with, and in 
contradiction to, nature; that Christ is what we ought to be and also 
what we cannot be; that the power of God is in us in judgement and 
mercy; that all these affirmations which are but varied forms of the 
one central paradox of the relation of the Gospel to history must be 
applied to the experiences of life from top to bottom. <3> 
A further reason for justifying a comparison between Niebuhr and Brunner is 
their different environments - one in America and the other in Switzerland. 
Niebuhr owed a great deal to European dialectical theology, although it 
would be wrong to regard him as merely its American voice. In the context 
of early twentieth-century America, Niebuhr set himself the enormous task 
of bringing Protestant ideas and insights to bear on social and political 
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issues. The same is true of Brunner in the context of totalitarian Europe, 
and we shall see how their different interpretations of the value of 
'Natural Law' led them to their conclusions. We shall also see that, in 
spite of their differences, their closeness was more significant. This 
consisted of their Christocentric view of theology, the placing of theology 
at the heart of ethical questions so that ethics becomes theological rather 
than an 'extra' to systematic theology, and their similarities of view on 
the great issues of 'grace', 'justification' and 'love'. Further, both in 
their work ventured into the area of anthropology, perhaps more wittingly 
in the case of Brunner than in the case of Niebuhr. 
The major part of thesis will deal with the theological and philosophical 
basis of the thought of Brunner and Niebuhr. The last two chapters will 
give examples of their application of theory to practice. In view of the 
scale of the task it is intended to use two examples of a practical 
application in a descriptive manner. Clearly, since we are dealing with 
two major theologians, it will be impossible to examine all that they 
wrote, but it is the intention of this thesis to show that both placed 
ethics in the centre of theology, and also, by comparing the two, it is 
intended to demonstrate that Niebuhr, about whom much has been written, has 
a place in twentieth century Protestant Theology, outside the confines of 
Europe, and not merely as an American spokesman for European Protestantism. 
A further intention of the thesis is to demonstrate that, although Emil 
Brunner is somewhat in eclipse at present, yet his contribution to the 
ethical debate is too important to be lost completely. 
If we are to understand the similarities and differences of Emil Brunner 
and Reinhold Niebuhr, it is essential first to locate their work in the 
context of their lives. We now turn to their biographies, drawing out 
those details which are most relevant to our subject. 
EMIL BRUNNER was born in 1889 in Switzerland. He expressed great pride in 
his native country, remarking that it is the oldest republic in Europe, 
dating from 1291, and that it is the meeting place for much European 
culture, evidenced by the fact that there are four languages, French, 
German, Italian and Romanish. In order to express the degree of Brunner's 
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pride in his native country he interprets its structure in the following 
terms. 
The Swiss Federation forms a happy synthesis between the federal 
principle of the rural confederation and the majority rule of a modern 
parliamentiary. democracy. This connection makes possible a fruitful 
relationship between authority and freedom, thereby providing a 
harmonious compromise between group interests and the freedom of the 
individual (5) 
Thus Brunner was able to assess the nature of Swiss society by saying, 
In spite of modern industrialisation, the opposing interests of 
capital and labour did not produce a real class struggle, 
And again: 
In Switzerland we have a European microcosm in which Protestants and 
Catholics, rural and urban populations, Latin and German cultures exist 
side by side . (6) 
It is important to realise that in extolling the virtues of his own 
country, and in pointing to the strengths within it, Brunner did not in any 
way fall into the trap of equating it with the Kingdom. In his lifetime 
he was to see the danger of placing patriotism, and, in the case of 
Fascism, racism, into a prime area of thinking. His view of the State in 
relation to the Kingdom was, for Brunner, a very important insight and one 
which affected much of his thinking. He says: 
I am not unaware of the fact that we are 'strangers' in this world, nor 
do I say that the best of all solutions for our social problems is that 
same goal which is in the centre of the Gospel of the Kingdom of God. 
It is one of the basic errors of our time, a superstition of the whole 
of modern history, that a just and free order of society somehow comes 
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closer to the message of the Kingdom of God than the decisions on the 
individual, personal realm. The New Testament leaves us in no doubt on 
this point. It is indeed our duty to try to make the power of Christ 
operative in the socio-political realm as well as in others. However, 
in this particular area, the love commandment will, at best, find 
expression in a very indirect sense. This can take place much more 
immediately on the level of direct interpersonal relationships. This 
insight has become decisive for my whole thinking. <7> 
We shall see later in the thesis how Brunner placed emphasis on the 
'individual' and on the 'personal'. We shall also see how he translated 
this insight into his view of the 'State' as a concept, and in his view of 
the Christian's place in the State. 
Brunner's father was a schoolteacher and he was from a family of non-
believers. His mother, however, was a Christian and the family was drawn 
into the Religious Socialist Movement led by Christoph Blumhardt, Leonhard 
Ragaz and Hermann Kutter. The Church in Europe had just begun to take note 
.. 
of the Industrial Revolution. Kutter wrote "Sie Mussen" <They Must> in 
1904. This portrayed the Social Democrats as bearers of the Kingdom of 
God. Its message was a shock to the Church since in the prosperity of 
Switzerland scant attention had been paid to social, political or even 
moral issues. As a result of the book several pastors joined the movement, 
which claimed to differ from Marxist scientific socialism as well as from 
the American concept of a Social Gospel. Of the Religious Socialist 
Movement, Brunner had this to say: 
During my years of study this movement drew me into its orbit more 
strongly then the theological liberalism that dominated the scene.· <8> 
Brunner became a student at the University of Zurich, a place strongly in 
the critical tradition of theology. It was here that he sought 
a scientifically satisfying formulation of his faith. In philosophical 
terms he found this in Kant and he used the concept of "duty for duty's 
sake" as a formula for much of his reasoning. In this he was encouraged by 
Heinrich Barth, the brother of Karl Barth, whom he said he found much 
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easier than his famous brother, in terms of personal relationships. Later, 
in spite of the great respect that Karl Barth and Brunner had for each 
other, they were to differ deeply on the question of natural and revealed 
theology and the impassioned nature of their disagreement is well 
documented in Brunner's book Natural Theology, Comprising Nature and Grace 
and the response from Barth - "Nein". This issue will be examined later in 
this thesis. Suffice it to say at this stage that Niebuhr took Brunner's 
side in this dispute, in spite of Niebuhr's claim that the question of 
Natural Law had led to a departure from Brunner in his thinking. 
At Zurich Brunner ~tudied, along with philosophy, social economy. However 
his main concern during his studies was the Nature of God. His teacher, 
Kutter, was a scholar who probed deeply into the Lutheran tradition of 
theology, and who also made a study of the Greek philosophers, and in 
particular Aristotle. He made a point of synthesising Augustinian and 
Lutheran ideas with nee-Platonism. Brunner found this impossible to accept 
and he said; 
'As a result of being immersed in the thought of Martin Luther and 
becoming intimately acquainted with Kierkegaard, this synthesis was 
slowly but decisively dissolved. (9) 
In 1911 Brunner received his doctorate of Theology and in the same year he 
visited Berlin. On this occasion he met with Harnack, who is frequently 
described as the founder of liberalism in theology. Brunner has little to 
say of this visit, dismissing the experience in these words. 
Neither the theology of Harnack, nor the atmosphere of the great 
metropolis, nor the state of Wilhelm II made much impression on me. 
<10) 
This lack of interest is connected with his description, quoted earlier 
that the Religious Socialist movement was more powerful an influence on him 
than liberal theology. His views of this were to change after the outbreak 
of World War I, but at this stage, Religious Socialism was still the more 
attractive option. 
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A visit to England in 1913 and 1914 made a great impression on Brunner. 
Doubtless more would have been said about this period if it were not for 
the fact that the out break of hostilities between England and Germany 
interrupted the visit. During his time in England Brunner made contact with 
the Christian Labour Movement who had close ties with the Fabian 
Socialists. He translated speeches into German which were given at the 
annual Christian Labour Movement meetings at the Browning Settlement. The 
"Brotherhood" movement was thriving in England, and through this he met 
William Temple, with whom he was to form a life-long friendship. Temple, 
although later burdened with high office in the Church of England, retained 
a life-long conc~n, for the study of Christian and social ethics. It is 
interesting to speculate to what extent the thought of Emil Brunner -
clearly not matured at this stage - would have had on Temple had their 
meeting not been interrupted by war. Even so, there was a considerable 
exchange of views between the two in the 1930's. 
Also during this visit Brunner made contact with socialist leaders, 
including Campbell Bannerman. He also attended various courses and 
conferences organised by the "Christian Adult School Movement", and 
delivered a number of papers and lectures. Brunner sums up his experiences 
of his visit to England thus: 
"In the course of this work, <with the Christian Adult School 
Movement> my opposition to the atheistic, pseudo-scientific Marxism 
was intensified, rather than abated". (11) 
We saw earlier that the Religious Socialist Movement claimed to be 
different from scientific Marxism, and the growing influence of Marxism 
during this period probably accounts for Brunner's increased opposition to 
it. 
1914 saw Brunner as a Swiss soldier. His experience of European war made 
him lose faith in the Religious Socialist Movement, although his Christian 
faith remained strong. On his release from the army in 1916 he was 
appointed a pastor at Obstalden. Of this he says, "I was a Pastor with my 
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whole heart". There is a clue here to the claim made earlier that moral 
theologians are naturally more drawn to the world of people and real life 
in order to facilitate their observations and ethical perceptions. 
Likewise, Niebuhr spent the first thirteen years of his ministry as a 
pastor in Detroit, an experie.nce that was profoundly influential in his 
thinking. In the case of Brunner it must be said that although he was a 
proli fie writer and an undisputed academic, yet his interest in the world 
and in Church affairs continued throughout his life. Pastorally, 
internationally and ecumenically, Brunner was a considerable force - and on 
his retirement from his University post, he held office with the YMCA and 
spent time studying Church life in Tokyo. 
In 1917 he married Margril Lauterburg who was the niece of Hermann Kutter. 
After the birth of their first child, Margril enabled Brunner to take up a 
fellowship at the Union Seminary in New York. This was arranged by 
Professor Adolf Keller, largely as a result of Brunner's publications and 
experiences in England. This also was to have a profound effect on him, 
and linked him closely and permanently with the English speaking world. Of 
this visit he writes: 
In the autumn of 1919 I sailed from Le Havre for the first time to the 
New World. At this point in my life history I cannot avoid pointing to 
the way God's hand led me. For this year in America provided the 
foundation for my particular fruitful contacts with the English 
speaking world for the rest of my life. At the hospitable Union 
Seminary I was not much intrigued by the reigning theology <McGiffert's 
Ri tschlianism and W A Brown's Mediation Theology> but rather by my 
encounter with the American people. I was impressed by the particular 
character of their democratic institutions <to which, when viewed 
historically, we owe as much as they to ours) <12) 
The period in America led to a degree of isolation from the rising European 
theologians, and, in particular to the group in Zurich and Berlin. In this 
period many had come to realise that Religious Socialism needed to be re-
appraised. Such a re-appraisal went to the roots of the movement, which 
was the message of Christ itself. In this context and with this insight 
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Brunner encountered Karl Barth for the first time. Barth was at this time 
himself a Pastor in Switzerland. In 1918 he published his Romerbrief- the 
formidable commentary on Romans. Brunner says that he hailed it as a 
forceful confirmation of his own thoughts, and in his review of it in 
,, 
Kirchenblatt fur die Reformiet'c.t Schweiz he pointed to its epoch-making 
character. There were two reasons for his enthusiasm. The first was its 
examination of those doctrines which were to feature largely in Brunner's 
ethical analysis -justification by faith, the nature of grace and the 
atonement; and the second reason was because Barth came from the circle 
that included Blumhardt and Kutter - formative influences in Brunner's 
life. 
It was in 1921 that he wrote Experience, Knowledge and Faith, and in 1924 
there appeared his book Mysticism and the Word. This was a critical 
assessment of Schleiermacher, who in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century had broken away from the dry and imperious Protestant 
dogmatics, shifting the starting point from creeds and other official 
formularies to the nature of religious experience as present in 
individuals. In the same year Brunner was appointed Professor of 
Systematic and Practical Theology at the University of Zurich - a post he 
held until 1955. 
During this period Europe saw the rise of totalitarianism. Fascism and 
Communism were regarded by Brunner as equally evil and godless. Communism 
he saw as banishing the Church, and Fascism as manipulating it with 
powerful heresies. In both cases Brunner's condemnation lay in the fact 
that both taught that man is not responsible to God, but is to be regarded 
merely as a functionary of the state. Man, in Brunner's view, could only 
be judged from within the ecclesia. 
In 1932 Brunner published The Divine Imperative - his most important 
treatise on ethics. He complained at the time that the English translation 
of the title failed to express the double aspect of command and orders 
which were described by the title in German: "Das Gebot und die Ordnungen". 
The book was in fact confiscated by the Nazis and destroyed. It was to be 
published with ecumenical funding after the war. This book will form a 
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major part of this study of Brunner's ethical teaching. It is where he 
expresses the view that the fundamental question, "What should I do?" is a 
question which stands at the entrance to the Christian Faith, and that the 
man who has experienced God will never approach this question in the way 
that he would have done before his experience of God. This puts ethics 
firmly in a theological context. 
There followed a study of anthropology. Brunner said of this: 
"Every political and social system grows out of a particular concept of 
man." <13> 
This led to the publication of Man in Revolt, again confiscated and 
destroyed by the Nazis and subsequently published after the war. It is 
interesting to note that Niebuhr's major work, The Nature and Destiny of 
Man· was published eight years after Man in Revolt . Thus Brunner's 
deliberate study of anthropology preceded that of Niebuhr, and came after 
major theological works whereas until that time much of Niebuhr's 
writings were political and social. We shall note this later in the thesis 
when we examine the progress of Niebuhr's thinking. Philosophically, for 
Brunner, the Rationalism about "man" was overcome by the "I - Thou" concept 
rather than the "I - It" concept. In this he was greatly influenced by 
Martin Buber, and in 1936 Brunner published The Divine Human Encounte~ In 
this he saw religion, and subsequently ethics, as a result of an encounter 
between God and an individual. Here he places Biblical understandings of 
truth against Greek understanding. For Brunner, now it is God who 
communicates himself. This pits him against the Aristotelean and, later, 
Thomistic approach, and Brunner's use of •Natural Law' owes nothing to 
classical Catholic teaching. 
It is important to understand that Brunner, as well as being an academic, 
was also a Churchman. He was involved deeply in the Ecumenical Movement and 
in the domestic affairs of his own Church. He consistently claimed that his 
greatest delight was the pastoral ministry and his family, and this warmth 
in human relationships can be observed even when he tackles the most 
critical theological issues. An example of this will be seen when we look 
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at the controversy with Karl Barth on the subject of "General 
Revelation".It will be noticed that his dealing of the subject is a great 
deal less terse than that of Barth. 
REINHOLD NIEBUHR <1892 - 1971) 
The writings about Reinhold Niebuhr are almost as prolific as his own 
writings. He captured the imagination of many both within and outside the 
Church. Richard Harries describes him as the most influential theologian of 
the century in the realm of public affairs. He was admired by Adlai 
Stevenson and Arthur Schlesinger among others, and in Britain his admirers 
included Dennis Healey and Tony Benn. Richard Crossman said of him: 
' Moral Man and Immoral Society was one of the books which changed 
my life. It was the most exciting shock intellectually that I had as 
a young man, and I'm still recovering from i~ (14) 
Niebuhr was born in 1892 in Wright City, Missouri, where his father, Gustav 
was minister of the German Evangelical Synod. Niebuhr grew up as the 
"child of the manse". Niebuhr says that his father was the first religious 
influence in his life, combining a vital personal piety with a complete 
freedom in his theological studies. His siblings included Helmut Richard, 
likewise a distinguished theologian and ethicist; Hulda, a practitioner 
<and later professor) in Christian education; and Walter, who worked as a 
journalist and film maker, rather than in the ecclesiastical world. 
He studied at a seminary at Elmhurst and later at Yale University, where he 
received his MA before taking up duties which were to last for thirteen 
years as the pastor of an evangelical church in Detroit. These days are 
vividly recorded in his Leaves from the Notebook of a Tamed Cynic. As is 
often the case with diaries and notebooks, there is here a great deal of 
information which tells us of the kind of man Niebuhr was. There is a 
combination of modesty, and almost of confusion, about his worth as a 
pastor, coupled with a fearlessness when confronting issues which he saw as 
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having ethical implications. Thus he describes the reaction to an early 
sermon that he preached in his church. 
I preached a sermon the other day on the 'Involuntary Cross' , using 
the text of Simon of Cyrene bearing the cross of Jesus. A good woman, 
a little bolder than the rest, asked me in going out whether I had 
borne many crosses. I think I know a little more about that than I 
was willing to confess to her, or to the congregation, but her 
question was justified. (15)) 
Niebuhr was twenty three when that entry was made. 
A few years later, in 1920, another entry gives us a clue to Niebuhr's 
realisation of the necessity of placing ethics within the Christian Gospel. 
' I think that since I have stopped worrying so much about the 
intellectual problems of religion, and have begun to explore some of 
its ethical problems, there is more of a thrill in preaching. The real 
meaning of the Gospel is in conflict with most of the customs and 
attitudes of our day at so many places that there is an adventure in 
the Christian message, even if you only play around with its ideas in a 
conventional world. I can't say that I have done anything in my life 
to dramatise the conflict between the Gospel and the world, but I find 
it increasingly interesting to set the two in juxtaposition at least in 
my mind and in the minds of others. And, of course, ideas may lead to 
action. <16) 
Already, Niebuhr is setting out to discover ethical insights based on 
theological reflection. It happened during his years as a pastor, and 
supports what we have already said, that moral theologians are at home in 
the world of people in their normal environment. Ethics is concerned with 
choices that are made in the social and political structures of society, as 
well as within the context of the family, and the area of personal 
morality. 
Later still, in 1927, as Niebuhr came to the end of his pastorate in 
Detroit, he at tacked vigorously the "American Dream", in the form of the 
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Ford Motor Company. By this time it is clear that he has become vigorous, 
confident and influential in relating the world of industry and commerce to 
the issue of social justice. His entry reads thus: 
·'The new Ford car is out. The town is full of talk about it. 
Newspaper reports reveal that it is the topic of the day in all world 
centres. Crowds storm every exhibit to get the first glimpse of this 
new creation. Mr Ford has given out an interview saying that the car 
has cost him about a hundred million dollars and that after finishing 
it he still has about a quarter of a billion dollars on the bank. 
"I have been doing a little arithmetic and have come to the conclusion 
that the new Ford car cost Ford workers at least fifty million in lost 
wages during the past year ...... Mr Ford refuses to concede that he has 
made a mistake in bringing the car out so late .... But no one asks 
about the toll in human lives. (17) 
His next appointment was as Professor and Vice President of the Union 
Theological Seminary from which he retired in 1960. During his period there 
he married an English girl, Ursula Compton, who was the first woman to 
receive a first class honours degree in Theology at Oxford. She became one 
of his students, and then his wife. She was also a theologian of 
considerable consequence in her own right. In 1974, three years after 
Reinhold Niebuhr's death, Ursula Niebuhr edited a book entitled Justice and 
Mercy, which is a collection of his sermons and prayers. She did this, she 
said, because, although her husband's work had been very much in the field 
of social and political ethics, yet she wanted his prayers and sermons 
published, to show the religious context and reference of his social 
concern. 
Throughout his life Niebuhr involved himself deeply in the social, 
political and economic questions of his day. He became increasingly 
influential and in large measure this can be attributed to the fact that 
his thinking was "organic" rather than "systematic". He was captive to no 
particular school of theology and indeed claimed to have no interest in the 
nicer points of pure theology. Rather he adapted his thinking to the 
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rapidly changing world scene. The "American Dream", the two world wars, the 
rise of communism and fascism, the post-war nuclear capability were all 
scenes to which Niebuhr applied a Christian ethic which was Christocentric, 
dialectic and based on his study of the Nature of Man. We shall see, later 
in the thesis, and in particular when we study his 'theological 
pilgrimage', how he became more deeply theological with time. His major 
theological, as opposed to social and political works, were comparatively 
late. 
His book, Moral Man and Immoral Society is an essay in political ethics 
informed by his developing realism as a theologian. In the 1930's he was 
to the left of Roosevelt's "New Deal", and in the 1940's and 1950's he was 
the spokesman for the more liberal wing of supporters of national 
Democratic administrations and candidates. He was vice-chairman of the 
Liberal Party of New York State. Beginning as a socialist he moved away 
from all doctrinaire approaches to public issues to an acceptance of a 
mixed economy with great emphasis on the responsibility of the Federal 
Government for social welfare. He was one of the founders of "Americans 
for Social Democratic Action" and was a leader for many years of the 
Fellowship of Socialist Christians, which with his changing attitude 
towards socialism came to be called the "Frontier Fellowship". He edited 
its journal, "Radical Religion" which was later to be called "Christianity 
and Society". 
In his autobigraphical introduction to Kegley's book, Reinhold Niebuhr, his 
Religious, Social and Political Thought, Niebuhr makes no claim to be a 
theologian. He saw himself primarily as defender of the Christian faith in 
a secular age. He declined to defend himself against the stricter sets of 
theologians in Europe who claimed that his interests were apologetic and 
practical rather than theological. 
I have never been competent in the nicer points of pure theology; and 
I must confess that I have not been sufficiently interested heretofore 
to acquire the competence. < 18> 
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ORTHODOXY AND LIBERALISM: 
In this section of the chapter we shall look at the schools of theology 
which influenced Brunner and Niebuhr and attempt to discover where their 
sympathies lie. 
Emil Brunner, contributing to Kegley's book, is very generous in his 
comments on Niebuhr, but on the question of Niebuhr's frequent disclaimer 
of his being a doctrinal systematiser, Brunner has this to say. 
"Does one not have the right to expect of every thinking Christian - a 
a fortiori of every Christian thinker - that he be cognisant of what 
he has to hope for in Christ. To what extent there stands behind 
Niebuhr's 'eschatological symbols' a reality and what kind of 
reality - or whether perhaps these eschatological symbols are merely 
'regulative principles' in the Kantian sense- these are questions on 
which we should like to have him make a definitive pronouncement." 
( 19) 
Commenting on the friendship that Brunner enjoyed with Niebuhr, Brunner 
challenges the label "nee-orthodoxy" which had been given to the American 
theologian. He says, 
It is rather an unfortunate label, since in all the world there is 
nothing more unorthodox than the spiritual volcano Reinhold Niebuhr. 
(20) 
Brunner preferred the term "radical protestant", as a mark of a return to 
Reformation thinking and as a protest against the ruling thought-patterns 
of his age. It is true that Niebuhr himself disliked the term "nee-
orthodoxy" when it was applied to himself. The truth is, as we have said, 
that he was difficult to classify into any particular school or movement. 
Nee-orthodoxy represented a recovery of the classical Christian heritage. 
In Niebuhr's case this meant giving special at tent ion to such figures as 
the Hebrew prophets, Jesus and Paul, Augustine, the Protestant Reformers 
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and Kierkegaard hence orthodoxy but without the rigidity and 
exclusiveness and archaic world view that characterised much early 
Christianity - hence neo. 
Niebuhr also reacted against any suggestion that he was a "liberal" -
clearly a reference in his mind to nineteenth century religious liberalism, 
and yet his openness to change suggests liberalism at its best. Some of 
his polemics in theological terms were directed against Karl Barth, and in 
particular against Barth's rigid stance on revelation. The movement known 
as "dialectical theology" was known in America as Barthian theology. 
Brunner says of this that "Niebuhr has made out of the dialectical theology 
something quite new - something genuinely American". 
Harnack is frequently regarded as one of the founders of the liberal school 
of theology on the Continent. Brunner came across him in Berlin, although, 
as we have seen, he was not greatly impressed by him. However Harnack has 
this to say as a definition of liberalism. 
·The Gospel did not come into the world as a statutory religion, and 
therefore none of the forms in which it assumed intellectual and 
social expression - not even the earliest - can be regarded as 
possessing a classical and permanent character. As Christianity rises 
above all antitheses of the Here and the Beyond - life and death -
work and the shunning of the world - reason and ecstasy - Hebraism and 
Hellenism - it can also exist under the most diverse conditions, just 
as it was originally amid the wreck of the Jewish religion that it 
developed its power. Not only can it so exist - it must do so if it 
is to be the religion of the living, and is itself to live. <21) 
We saw at the beginning of this chapter that Niebuhr considered the 
Reformers to be not dialectical enough. Perhaps the clearest example of a 
Niebuhrian dialectical position is the opening sentence of the second 
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volume of the Gifford Lectures, published as The Nature and Destiny of Man. 
Niebuhr began the second set of lectures with this claim: 
·:fllan is, and yet is not involved in the flux of nature and time.·· 
<22) 
On this statement a helpful commentary is provided by Robert McAfee Brown 
in an introduction to a selection of Niebuhr's essays and addresses: The 
essential Reinhold Niebuhr. 
' Those who take the trouble to parse this statement theologically will 
discover that it makes perfectly good descriptive sense. We are 
involved in the flux of nature and time. We are born, we eat, we make 
love, we die. But it is also true that we are not involved in the 
flux and nature of time completely, for we transcend, in part at 
least, that very flux; we not only die but we know that we will die, 
we reflect on the fact, and we dread our own death. By the gifts of 
memory and anticipation we stand in some sense above our mortality and 
survey it. Birds and humans both sing, Niebuhr reflected, but birds 
do not write histories of bird music. That we stand at a unique 
juncture of nature and spirit, neither dimension of which can be 
collapsed into the other, is what distinguishes us from the rest of 
creation.· <23) 
The combination of dialecticism and liberalism can be said to be a powerful 
force in twentieth-century Protestant theology, and it is a great credit to 
theology that the doctrines of Man, of God, of Justification, of sin and of 
grace among others could be communicated with integrity. These movements 
arose out of the nineteenth century critical Biblical studies. The most 
important work of Niebuhr's in the field of ethics is The Nature and 
Destiny of Man. His writings were prolific and he preached ceaselessly in 
America and Europe, and in that book we have proof that Niebuhr's 
reluctance to admit to the title "theologian" is, in fact, mis-placed. The 
book is in fact the record of the Gifford Lectures which he delivered at 
the University of Edinburgh in 1939. In it he was concerned to prove that 
modern versions of man's nature and fate are at once very different from, 
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and yet very similar to, interpretations found in classical idealism, and 
that the Biblical view of man is superior to both classical and modern 
views. It is here that we see the pedigree of Niebuhr's thinking clearly. 
From the Bible, through St Paul, to Augustine and Luther, to its renewal in 
Twentieth Century America. His apparent lack of optimism in the nature of 
man was reinforced by his experience of Nazism and then Communism, "resting 
respectively upon the foundations of moral cynicism and moral utopianism". 
It is in this book, "The Nature and Destiny of Man", that we shall see just 
how important theology is in the field of ethics, and how "sin" and "grace" 
must be understood before a Christian answer emerges. Unlike Brunner, 
Niebuhr disclaims a knowledge of anthropology, and yet the book is 
anthropological in the same way as Brunner's Man in Revolt. Brunner's book 
appeared earlier, but shares with Niebuhr's the same view of man and his 
destiny. 
ETHICS AND THEOLOGY: 
So far, in this chapter, we have concentrated on biographical details, and 
on some of the various theological teachings that were contemporary with 
Brunner and Niebuhr. As we have seen, it is difficult to 'label' either of 
them accurately, but we have noted the principle influences that guided 
them. Here, we shall at tempt to discover their reason for placing the · 
subject of ethics within theology, rather than viewing ethics as a separate 
subject with theological connections. Here they have to answer critics 
from both the secular and the theological world. In the introductory 
autobiography in Kegley's Reinhold Niebuhr, His Religious, Social and 
Political Thought, Niebuhr answers his critics and the form and content of 
the answers form a basis for much of the content of this thesis. It is here 
that Niebuhr defends his theological stand against secularists, and also 
against those of Christian persuasion who hold to a more "Catholic" view of 
the debate and those on the "Protestant" side who would prefer a more 
traditional approach. 
First, he answers those critics, both secular and Christian liberals who 
criticise him for his preoccupation with the Christian doctrine of Sin, and 
his alleged over-emphasis on the corruption of human nature. The very title 
24 
of Brunner's work Man in Revolt suggests that there is here a great deal of 
common ground between the two. Here we see how a Christian view of man 
differs from a humanistic view of man - and particularly from a view of man 
as seen in classical philosophy. Niebuhr sees the crux of the argument 
lying within the question of whether God is a person who wills and loves, 
or whether He is too abstract to be ascribed personality. Whilst 
recognising the danger of too anthropomorphic a view of God, it must be 
said that to liken God to some rational structure of existence or to an 
undifferentiated ground of being, is more dangerous. Parallel with this 
argument is the question of whether the unique nature of man lies within a 
definition of man's dignity, and with the proof of his virtue, or whether 
it lies within his capacity for radical freedom. Here we must set the 
freedom of man within the context of those events and conditions over which 
man has no control, and therefore the radical nature of man's freedom means 
that man can rise above the limits of nature, and that he is not bound in 
his actions to the norms and universalities of reason. 
Still on this subject, Niebuhr defends the Genesis account of the Fall of 
man against its liberal critics, both Christian and secular. It is only 
the Biblical Christian account of man that sees evil as being at the centre 
of man's being, a fact which can be verified both by observation and 
introspection. The latter is particularly important since viewing man as a 
subject instead of an object, one sees a particular self, which does not 
match the idealists' view of man with its unanimously optimistic view of 
man's virtue- an object in nature which can be manipulated into socially 
approved norms. Within the Genesis story, the state of man is described 
within a dramatic-historical setting - and this gives a better account of 
the nobility and misery of man than that given by scientists and 
philosophers. Man can only be seen in such a dramatic historical setting 
because he cannot be coordinated into a form of coherence which precludes 
man's freedom and individuality. Therefore, even in the context of 
tyranny, it is not proper to equate a Biblical view of man with a 
humanistic view. Indeed, Communism, which ostensibly is devoted to the 
concept of the dignity of man, in fact manipulates man in a form of cynical 
utopianism. 
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Concerning the setting of Christian morality into a unique system, Niebuhr 
answers his secular critics who were shocked by an attack by a Christian 
leader on modern, liberal and secular society. Here he had to contend the 
sentimental view of man expressed in the "American Dream" which had been 
responded to by many Christians in the form of a "social Gospel". Many saw 
the Church as the chief support of a traditional society. This is linked 
with the danger of regarding religion as a means of making a people more 
biddable and more likely to respect authority. Whatever effect the French 
Enlightenment may have had on the idealists, these views must be severely 
questioned in the wake of two world wars and the threat of a nuclear 
holocaust. It is easy for a Christian to fall into the trap of conforming 
with a consensus, without seeing the value of the Gospel, with its power 
over sin. It is a matter of simple observance that whilst it is common for 
world leaders in the, so called, free world to pay lip service to religion, 
and to quote it to support their policies, one never hears them talk of The 
Cross, the Grace of God, the demonic power of sin, or any other of the 
definitive Christian perspectives. 
In arguing the case for ethics to be based in theology, and yet observing 
that ethical systems do exist which are not theological, or Christian, it 
is necessary to be aware of what comprises a liberal culture, and what 
theology can deduce from it. Modern culture has largely relegated 
religion, and dogmatic religion in particular, to the periphery of life and 
is outraged that it can be criticised by dogmatism - especially religious 
dogmatism. Both Brunner and Niebuhr see this. Brunner studied the rise of 
technology and suspected it. He saw that in a technological world men 
might indeed look for ethical standards - but ethical standards that are 
consistent with modern man's maturity as a scientific and empirical 
creature. In one of his Gifford lectures given at St Andrews University in 
1948 he had this to say. 
The crazy tempo of technical revolution can only be reduced to a 
degree which is socially and personally supportable, if the whole 
scale of values of European nations can be changed. As long as 
material values indisputably take the first place, no change for the 
better can be expected. 
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'The perversion of the order of means and ends was caused by the decay 
of the consciousness of personality. And this in turn was the 
consequence of the decay of the Christian faith. In our time manyhave 
come to see, and are ready to admit, that moral values ought to be put 
in first place. This insight is good, but not sufficient. Mere 
ethics has never displayed real dynamic. You cannot cure a demon ... 
ridden technical world with moral postulates. In contrast to mere 
ethics and morality, Christian faith has the dynamic of passion, of 
surrender and sacrifice. It is capable of turning man to the eternal 
end, of unmasking demonic sin and thereby banning it, which no 
enlightened education is capable of doing. <24) 
This is a powerful passage, and one which puts the human dilemma in a 
proper context. Putting the same argument, although in the context of 
empiricism generally, and not technology in particular, Niebuhr reduces the 
faith of modern man to two related articles, the idea of progress and the 
idea of the perfectability of man. This is likened to Renaissance thinking, 
where operations of reason are relevant to the processes of nature. 
Niebuhr quotes the Renaissance pride in discovering that "Mathematics 
unlocks the mysteries of nature". Indeed, Niebuhr asserts that in the 
empirical process one may imagine that one is engaged in a purely 
scientific inquiry, but in fact it is guided by a faith - faith, that is, 
in progress and perfectability. This, he says, "is no less dogmatic for 
being implicit rather than explicit, and it is no more true for being 
arrayed in the panoply of science." <25) He further argues that the fact 
that Communists should adorn their more explicit dogma with the prestige of 
science provides modern liberal culture with a caricature of its own 
beliefs. 
Theological, as opposed to secular, criticism of Niebuhr's and Brunner's 
position has been levelled by orthodox "Barthian" theologians on the basis 
that an analysis of the human situation was a tortuous way to return to 
faith, when faith is a mystery of grace, and there is no way of compelling 
faith rationally. In other words, what is the relationship between faith 
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and experience? To what extent must a moral theologian understand the 
working of man's mind in order to present God's will? 
It would seem that the task of a Christian apologist is to show alternative 
faiths to be mistaken to the point where men say, "Lord, to whom shall we 
go? Thou hast the words of eternal life". This can only happen when 
theology has grasped the nature and the probability of the alternatives. 
This may lessen the chance of Christianity being labelled "obscurantist" -
in the eyes of the scientist - and content to proclaim a Gospel of divine 
capriciousness. Undoubtedly, the scientist with his carefully thought out 
system of "causality" is likely to regard as unnecessary the whole question 
of mystery, eternity and salvation. Indeed the possibility of secular man 
delving into concepts such as "selfhood" and "the supernal" is diminished 
when he realises that the proponents of Christianity show a disdain for his 
preoccupations. 
Part of the problem here is not only that no faith is rationally 
compelling, but also that the Christian faith distinguishes itself from 
other faiths by being more explicit which could make it quite 
unacceptable to those schooled in a scientific ethos. This difficulty is 
not only experienced by scientists, but also by philosophers. Philosophy 
may well delve into the concept of mystery and even the supernal, but, 
almost by definition, it is an ontological enquiry. That it to say, it 
reaches to the mystery, whatever that may be, from the human mind outwards. 
The explicitness of the Christian faith is that it is "revealed" and not 
"discovered". This is in some ways a more serious dismissal than that of 
the scientist. Philosophies which emphasise ontological categories deny 
man his most important element - that is that he is a creature of history. 
His uneasy conscience is not an ontological fate - but a result of his 
historic egotism. In this same history Christianity discloses the nature 
of its Saviour. Ontologically it is absurd to say that "God was in Christ 
reconciling the world to Himself". If ontology, summed up in the apologetic 
that "there is that than which nothing greater can exist", defines God in a 
series of absolutes, then to ascribe to him "personhood" is nonsense. 
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Further, Christian faith asserts that the bridging of the gap between man 
and God is a historical event. Again, this cannot be rationally defended, 
and one is left with the evidence of Christian experience and the new life 
that it gives. Liberal theology has made the mistake in reducing the 
absurdity, from an ontological viewpoint, of God being involved in history. 
The result is a gospel consisting of "eternal principles", such as the 
transcendent value of the individual, and the brotherhood of man in love. 
However the Bible record is that we love one another "because He first 
loved us" - a historical happening. This is much more positive than the 
"ethical truism" that it replaces, and it forms a starting point for a 
Christian ethic. 
We are left with the view that man is a creature of history, and that he 
responds to event.s of history and that God reveals Himself in historical 
and dramatic events. The historical is not subject to the ordinary 
scientific tests of rationality. There is no pattern in history once one 
acknowledges the creative and unpredictable nature of man. Also an attempt 
to avoid "obscurantism" on the part of the Church in the matter of 
scientific discovery, should not result in a dissipating of principal 
Christian precepts. It may well be that the wise of our generation do not 
see the value of a non-rational faith contained in, and revealed in. 
history, and the Christian can take some comfort from the fact that the 
wise of Jesus' generation could not perceive the truth either. 
To summarise this we could say that on the one hand the Church must 
confront the new school of "reason", based on empiricism, with informed 
sympathy and understanding. It should not be tempted to put up defences 
which make nonsense in a post- Darwin world to the extent that it attacks 
honorable scientists and philosophers. Neither should it compromise to the 
extent that it loses the essence of its message, which is bound in history 
and enacted in the world. Reluctant as modern man may be to enter into an 
encounter with God, yet this is what he must do before he can experience 
the faith and before he can begin to make ethical choices which are in any 
way distinctively Christian. The Church must always be prepared to own up 
to its shortcomings, and to recognise that from time to time men have used 
Christianity in an idolatrous manner, and have resorted to a kind of 
29 
fundamentalist fanaticism instead of facing up to the questions as honestly 
as some men of science have done. 
Niebuhr has this to say. 
Christianity is, in principle, a religion of the spirit rather than of 
law. We are warned to 'stand fast in the freedom with which Christ 
has set you free'. St Paul means that no meticulous obedience to 
specific moral standards can be a substitute for the self's encounter 
with God, in which the pretensions and the pride of the self are 
broken and it is set free of self and sin. <26) 
. ...... . In the preface to rhe Divine Imperative Brunner writes: 
The question, 'What ought we to do?' is the entrance to the Christian 
faith. None can evade it who wish to enter the sanctuary. But it is 
also the gate through which one passes out of the sanctuary again, 
back into life. But the question has gained new meaning. No magic 
transformation has taken place within the sanctuary of faithi the 
human being who passes through those portals both on his way in and on 
his way out, is the same human being: erring, imperfect, weak. But 
something has happened to him within the sanctuary, which, although it 
has taken place in secret and is only partially visible to the eyes of 
the world, has made him a different person, something which has opened 
his eyes and his heart to a reality, which he never knew before: the 
reality of the living God ........ There he stands as one who has been 
touched by God, whose heart has been pierced by Him, as one who has 
come under the stern judgement of God and has tasted the divine mercy, 
as one who can never seek the meaning of life and the answer to that 
great human question anywhere else save 'there'. There he stands, 
this weak human being, in the midst of life, among other peoplei but 
because he comes 'from thence', he is now in another position in life 
and it is this which makes him a Christian. What this means for the 
answering of that question constitutes the subject matter of Christian 
ethics. <27) 
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Niebuhr and Brunner have this much in common. They both believe in the 
essential experience of the Divine Human encounter. With all their 
enlightenment, their "liberalism", their dialectic priorities and their 
understanding of the nature of reason and also of the critical 
understanding of scripture, they both hold to the essential historical -
dramatic events of faith. Ethics spring from the personal and individual 
encounters that take place between men and God. It is their task to pit 
this conviction not only against a cynical world of empiricists, but also 
against a Church which, in some areas, is authoritarian and which has 
inherited, along with the gospel, much luggage which belongs more properly 
to the Greeks who were contemporary with the New Testament. We shall see 
where they diverge, but on the important question: "Where does ethics 
belong?",they are of one mind, and this thesis will attempt to affirm that 
agreement and to show that it is the proper way for the church to deliver 
its ethical message. 
31 
Gordon Harland: The Thought of Reinhold Niebuhr p177 OUP 1960 
2) Kegley and Bretall ed. The Theo~pgy of Emil Brunner - article: 
"Some questions on Brunner's Epistemology.'' Paul Tillich 
3) Kegley and Bretall ed. Reinhold Niebuhr - His Religious, Social 
and Political Thought - LLT p507 
4) Reinhold Niebuhr: The Nature and Destiny of Man Vil 2 p204 
5) Kegley and Bretall ed. The Theology of Emi 1 Brunner p3 LL T 
6) Ibid p4 
7) Ibid p6 
8) Ibid p 6 
9) Ibid p 6 
10) Ibid p 8 
11) Ibid p 8 
12) Ibid p 11 
13) Ibid p 11 
14) Richard Harries ed. Reinhold Niebuhr and the Issues of our Time 
p i 
15> Reinhold Niebuhr: Leaves From the Notebook of a Tamed Cynic p9 
16) Ibid p27 
17> Ibid p123 
18) Kegley and Bretall: p3 
19) Ibid p86 
20) Ibid p83 
21) Adolph Von Harnack: quoted in Liberal Protestantism ed B. Reardon 
1968 <Series: A Library of Modern Religious Thought" Ed H Chadwick 
22) Reinhold Niebuhr: The Nature and Destiny of Man. vol 2 
23) Robert MacAfee Brown: The Essential Reinhold Niebuhr p17 
24) Emil Brunner: Christianity and Civilisation Part 2 p15 (1948) 
25) Kegley and Bretall p15 
32 
26> Ibid p22 
27) Emil Brunner The Divine Imperative. 
33 
CHAPTER 2: NATURAL LAW 
We saw at the beginning of this thesis that Niebuhr, in acknowledging his 
closeness to Brunner theologically, distanced himself from him in his 
treatment of the ethical problem on the basis that Brunner increasingly 
adopted the concept of Natural Law while he, Niebuhr, increasingly rejected 
the theory. (1), In this chapter we shall examine the concept of Natural 
Law, its history and the way in which both Brunner and Niebuhr treated it, 
as well as the way Brunner dealt with this particular criticism. 
It is important at this stage to note that Natural Law theories inevitably 
involve an examination of the concepts of "natural" and "revealed" 
theology, and "general" and "special" revelation. However we shall attempt 
to deal with Natural Law theories specifically and discuss the other 
issues referred to in the next chapter. I shall argue here that both 
Brunner and Niebuhr reached similar conclusions, in that they regarded 
classical natural law theories as sub-Christian when used as a basis for 
ethics. At the same time, they rejected the theory that Christian ethics 
are wholly the product of the doctrines of Revelation and Justification by 
faith. 
Natural Law can be described as a law which is universally and timelessly 
valid, seated within the nature of man. Those who hold to natural law 
theories would say that man has a capacity within his nature - that is to 
say within the fact that he is a man - to recognise that some acts are good 
and some are bad. The next step from that posit ion is to identify from 
that natural discriminatory capacity, particular "good" acts, and 
particular "bad" acts. Thus a code is developed and is validated by 
philosophical means. In order for this to happen, man has to use that 
faculty which, Aristotle claimed, places man apart from the rest of 
creation - "reason". Whatever philosophical tools are used the result is a 
code, or a law, based on man's innate moral capacity and the application of 
reason to that capacity. Another point must be made, which is that natural 
law implies a universal and objective view of the universe in all its 
natural forms. 
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This a position which was widely held by the Stoics, and epitomised in the 
works of Aristotle. 
of human reason. 
Indeed, Aristotle's Ethics are based on the supremacy 
·'Man is that living nature which possesses reason in its own right . 
(2) 
The rational nature of man is that which sets him apart and is that which 
forms the essence of man. In terms of ethics Aristotle singles out man as 
being unique in perceiving the nature of good and evil. Of virtue he says: 
The virtues come to us neither by nature nor despite of nature. But we 
are furnished by nature with a capacity for receiving them, and are 
perfected in them by custom. Again, in whatever cases we get by 
nature, we get the faculties first and perform the acts of working 
afterwards (3) 
Two other factors justify our examination of Natural Law, apart from the 
disagreement in the treatment of the subject between Niebuhr and Brunner. 
The first is an examination of the current popularity of Natural Law 
theories, and the second is the place that these theories have had in the 
formulating of Christian ethics in many parts of the church. 
To deal with its popularity, Gordon Harland has this to say: 
·Our age is experiencing a renewed interest in Natural Law. This is 
due in part to the catastrophic events of our time and the inability of 
prevailing philosophies to provide adequate insight or resource to cope 
with the terrible realities of this era. There is a very great truth 
in the recognition that all our values are relative and historically 
and culturally conditioned, which we overlook at our peril. But if 
what we call right and wrong, good and evil, true and false are only 
the product of a particular culture, then we are left with no basis on 
which to resist Communism or Nazism with anything like an unqualified 
"No11 , Faced with the unheard of atrocities of the demonic movements of 
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our time, the question of whether the distinction between right and 
wrong has any basis in reality has become a most urgent intellectual 
and social question· <4> 
A comment on this passage would include what Niebuhr had to say about 
empirical man being unlikely to delve into the concepts of the "supernal" 
(5). Modern man gives the appearance of being able to survive without 
"spirituality", but he has come to realise that society cannot survive 
without morality. He therefore looks to a source of authority which can 
explain moral standards and which can mark out the pitch within which human 
behaviour can be desc!f'Abed as tolerable. The plea for a strong lead can 
seem irresistible, and sections of the Church fall into the trap of 
responding to it validating natural morality with ecclesiastical 
authority, which has nothing to do with Christian ethics. The content of 
the Christian ethic is "love", and that content is the basis of all right 
decisions. Love is revealed supremely in Christ, and therefore the answer 
to a moral dilemma is "Christ crucified". This is a message that the world 
does not understand, any more than did the Jews and Greeks to whom Paul 
referred. 
Natural Law, then, places the Church's ethical message in something of a 
dilemma. It is true that the message which the Church has is that which 
has been revealed by God to the Church for the benefit of the world. But 
the message is a "whole" message and the task of the Christian ethicist is 
to work out a way of translating "love", an inter-personal quality, into 
the questions which arise in various social and political structures. 
The other factor which makes this examination important is the fact that 
natural law theories have been used extensively by sections of the Church 
in establishing a base for Christian ethics. Clearly these cannot be 
ignored, especially as Natural Law, when used as the basis of much Roman 
Catholic teaching has acted as the main point of dispute between Catholic 
and Protestant ethics. Vatican II has changed much of this, and we shall 
see later that the two sides have come much closer together. 
AQUINAS 
Aristoteleanism experienced a renaissance in the Middle Ages. By then 
Augustine had examined the concept of imago dei and had come to a more or 
less pessimistic view of the nature of man, redeemable only by Christ. He 
had seen that imago dei consists of man's relational being with God, rather 
than man's capacity for reason. The relationship between man and God, 
broken in "the Fall", could only be restored by faith in Christ. Thus he 
developed the Pauline doctrine of Justification by Faith. It was Augustine 
to whom the Reformers looked for their inspiration. However, in the Middle 
Ages, Thomas Aquinas seized on the Aristotelean formula and expounded a 
different doctrine. In terms of imago dei Aquinas asserted that at the 
Fall the "likeness" of God was taken away, but that the "image" remained 
intact. Man's reasoning is required to sustain the Image, but God's grace 
is needed to restore the likeness. Thus Aquinas does not dispense with the 
necessity of Grace, or the necessity of revelation, but his view of man is 
altogether more optimistic, and faith and reason must work hand in hand to 
establish the basis for Christian behaviour. 
Aquinas set out to reconcile the two concepts of law and liberty, using 
"faith" to comprehend liberty, and "reason" to comprehend law. It was 
directly from Aristotle that he drew the twin concepts of free speculative 
thought and of conduct based on the principle of the fullest self 
expression. 
The argument proceeds along these lines. Christian belief allows us to 
postulate a body of "natural law" which, whatever its immediate source, is 
of universal validity. It can either be implanted in, or made acceptable 
to, the normal human conscience. In spite of the variations in different 
cultures and generations, it is the case that - quite apart from the 
Christian revelation - the normal progress of human thought reduces all 
these variations to one more or less common standard. This general 
standard, common to all humans, including non-Christian communities, is 
commonly spoken of as the law of nature. 
On this Aquinas says: 
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'Reason naturally apprehends as good all those things to which man has 
a natural inclination. Good (in this sense, of that for which we have 
a natural inclination) is to be sought for, evil avoided . (6) 
Commenting on this passage, K. E, Kirk, an Anglo Catholic theologian writing 
earlier this century has this to say: 
According to this rule, self preservation, the reproduction of the 
species, the care of offspring and so forth, stand first among the laws 
of nature. In the second place come those "laws" which man does not 
share with the animal creation - to know the truth about God, and hence 
to shun ignorance, to live in society and hence to avoid those among 
whom one lives. Natural Law, in fact, means simply the satisfaction, 
in harmony with one another, of the natural human instincts, as much on 
their intellectual side as on their physical sides. A modern 
psychologist could scarcely better this statement•·. (7) 
Aquinas recognised that just as the Christian consciousness could not be 
satisfied merely with the cardinal virtues alone, so it could not be 
satisfied with this summary of Natural Law as being all that a Christian 
conscience is required to recognise. 
Natural Law is completed in Divine Law. <8> "The essence of the 
Divine Law is first of all that it is of internal conditions rather 
than of external acts, and secondly that it is the main a lex non 
scripta' <9> 
The essence is grounded in God and in the Divine wisdom. The Gospel 
precepts, for example the Beatitudes and the Decalogue, in their New 
Testament form are part of this new law, which is in essence a law of 
liberty. The ideal Christ ian then, is the one who, while fully possessed 
of the principles of morality, need never call them to mind. 
would spontaneously correspond with the Christian ideal. 
His actions 
To show the amount of support which this teaching receives, we can cite 
Kirk in his appraisal of these passages. 
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'It is~passages such as this that Thomas Aquinas shows himself to fall 
short neither of the thought of the New Testament nor of the highest 
Christian experienct: . <10> 
Aquinas had a pragmatic approach to the problem of ethical foundations, 
based on his skills as both a philosopher and a theologian. The Law of 
Nature, just like the imperfect revelation of the Old Testament, enjoins 
certain outward acts. These are first and foremost acts which lead to the 
receiving and maintaining of spiritual grace - the Eucharist, prayer, 
confession, absolution and so on. Grace is sacramentally infused. Natural 
Law is authoritative over the conscience, both in the complex of useful 
actions that benefit society, and also in the actions which increase the 
possibility of a life being more subject to the Holy Spirit. 
Further, Aquinas 
substantiate his 
used the 
theories. 
Aristotelean 
"Essence" is 
concept 
to be 
of "essences" to 
distinguished from 
"existence". Just as there is a difference between matter and form, so 
there is a difference between essence and existence. And yet essence and 
existence are present in the same finite being. The existence of something 
arises from the fact that there is an essence of it. The Essence "is that 
which is signified by the definition of a thing". <11>. In the case of 
material things, "the word • essence' signifies that which is composed of 
matter and form". <12> 
Existence, on the other hand, is the act by which an essence or substance 
is or has being. Aquinas says that existence denotes a certain act, for a 
thing is said not to exist by the fact that it is in potentiality but by 
the fact that it is in an act. Thus there is "in essence" natural morality, 
and there are in "existence" moral acts. Human reason is applied to the 
"essence" of morality to produce the moral act. One is form and the other 
is matter. One is potential and the other is act. The act cannot take 
place without the essence. The act is a revelation of the essence and the 
essence has no manifestation without the act. The essence is unchanging 
and static. Man can perceive and observe the act, and can use reason and 
intellect to grasp the essence. It is central to Thomism that the 
"essence" is unchanging, embracing both what something is, and what it 
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ought to become. This gives rise to an attractive body of moral 
certainties and formed a major part of Catholic moral philosophy for a long 
time. 
Commenting on Aquinas' theory, N.H.G.Robinson has this to say. 
In St Thomas there is to be found an impressive re-affirmation of the 
integrity of morality within the larger context of the Christian 
religion, although it is marked by the naturalism which also pervaded 
Greek thought . <13) 
Robinson continues to subject the Thomist theory to a consideration of the 
validity of different moral judgements on the same subjects in different 
cultures and at different periods. The concept of a static essence ignores 
the reality of history in determining different moral solutions. He claims 
that Thomism is an over-simplification of the problem. 
'Thus the medieval theory in thinking of natural morality as a corpus 
of laws is guilty of over-simplification in two directions. It misses 
the elusive unity that is characteristic of a moral code, and it fails 
to understand the complex relationship between one moral code and 
another. If, however, its mechanical method of "addition" is 
inadequate to the sphere of natural morality, it is no less inadequate 
- to say the least - to the sphere of total morality. To represent the 
moral component of the Christian revelation and the Christian religion 
as simply added to natural morality, divine law to natural law, is to 
mis-represent the real situation in not one way but in several' <14) 
It seems that Robinson is arguing that the mis-representation really 
consists of over-simplification of the issues. Thomism has survived not 
only in the Roman Catholic Church, but also in parts of the Anslican 
Church. In view of man's trust in the power of 'reason', Aquinas has 
obvious attractions. 
In considering both Brunner and Niebuhr, in their rejecting of Catholic 
teaching and of Thomism, it must be pointed out, in fairness to the 
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Catholic position that they wrote before the propositions of Vatican II, 
<1962-1965). 
At this point we should make a note of some of the reforms which have come 
about in Catholic moral philosophy in recent years, not that these make 
Brunner and Niebuhr's position invalid, but to show that the Catholic 
Church has moved considerably in their direction. Before Vatican 2, the 
Catholic church had become increasingly authoritarian, a position which was 
very influential in early twentieth century terms, and justified much of 
the European polemic against it. The increased authoritarianism coincided 
with the loss of the Papal States and the emergence of the Italian Republic 
in the middle to later nineteenth century. Pope Pius 1X <1846 - 1878) 
retaliated with a strong emphasis on papal authority in the sphere of 
church dogma, and his successor, Leo X111 <1878-1902) fought vigorously for 
the catholic guardianship of the world, in the face of the dangers, as he 
perceived them, of the rise of continental socialism and democracy. In 
1891, he published Rerum Novarum, in which he claimed that the welfare of 
the oppressed working classes could only be safe-guarded by the Catholic 
Church and its interpretation of Natural Law. He decreed that only Thomism 
could be taught in Catholic seminaries. Authoritarianism, which was 
historically associated with Natural Law, assumed more influence than the 
genuine attempts by the Catholic Church at social reform, and this can be 
seen by the enthusiasm on the part of Pius X1 (1922-1939) for the 
traditional concordats of church and state and by the manner in which, for 
example, he supported Franco in the Spanish Civil War. The attitude of the 
Catholic Church to the rise of fascism was therefore somewhat ambiguous. 
Vatican II marked a radical departure. The Catholic theologians of Vatican 
II responded very positively to the criticisms of traditional natural law 
theories. The era of enforced Thomism was over. Catholic theologians such 
as Charles Curran and Timothy E. 0' Connell recognised the need for a 
pluralism of philosophical approaches in man's quest for a better 
understanding of man and his reality. They recognised the misleading 
influence of Aristotle and the Stoic call for a rational man to fit in with 
a rational universe. O'Connell wrote of the "central openness of ourselves 
and the world". Reality is changing, evolving and historic. It was 
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inevitable that the Catholic Church should have to revise its traditional 
views in the light of contemporary culture and philosophical concepts. In 
this it was indebted to Catholic writers such as Jacques Mari tain and 
Heinrich Rommen who had dealt with natural law and the philosophy of 
religion in terms which more closely reflected mainstream thinking in 
European and western philosophy. 
Within the Catholic Church, natural law theories, though not totally 
rejected, have been radically changed. Nat ural law is seen more as a 
"project" than as an absolute. Although it would be naive to assume that 
Vatican 2 could transform everything, the importance of natural law in the 
moral debate has been diminished somewhat. It has certainly not, however, 
been eliminated. 
Natural Law combined 
revelation and grace. 
the appeal to reason with an understanding of 
Its biggest danger was that when reason is used for 
any understanding of the nature of man, inevitably a law, or a code, 
emerges. However free the human conscience may appear in its redeemed 
state, inevitably the code becomes an essential part of the institution 
which promotes it, and a church emerges which is authoritarian and binding. 
This is exactly the polemic which Paul waged and which Jesus himself waged 
in his dealings with the Pharisees. 
BRUNNER'S CRITICISMS OF NATURAL LAW 
On the two points of authority - a necessary companion of law - and 
conscience, Brunner has this to say. 
We have heard much of a "demand for ethics". If by this is meant that 
it is necessary for Christendom to be continually considering this 
question, and a sign of poverty and bewilderment if it can give no 
clear answer to it, then that "demand" is only too plainly justified; 
for no clear answer has been given for a long time. But this demand 
may be - like the cry for a strong man - merely an expression of 
shrinking from a responsibility, which desires an authoritative 
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promulgation of a law which will settle all difficulties once for all, 
which will lay down beforehand what everyone has to do or leave undone; 
the demand for the doctrinal authority - binding on the conscience - of 
the Roman Catholic Church. <15) 
Brunner argues that the infallible criterion of a protestant ethic is this: 
Does it claim to give that answer, or does it refuse to. By this, Brunner 
means that the answer to the demand for ethics should not consist of a 
collectiono of certainties which are reinforced by authority. If 'the 
demand for ethics' means a demand for an answer to every ethical question 
which settles all ethical difficulties, then a Protestant ethic is one that 
is born out of a refusal to answer the question in that way. 
On the subject of the conscience Brunner is equally adam~t. He does not 
see it as that which has to be eased and quietened by the infusion of grace 
in a gradual and sacramental way, nor as that to which the power of reason 
and rationalising should be applied. 
Conscience is not 'the voice of God', as it used to be described in 
the Theology of the Enlightenment, and as it has since been regarded by 
popular natural theology ...... For the sinister thing about conscience 
is that primarily it has nothing to do with God at all. That it 
attacks men like an alien, dark, hostile power, as it has been 
represented in ancient . myths and by the great poets of ancient and 
modern times who in this respect are so much wiser than the 
philosophers. <16) 
Brunner describes conscience as that which makes man feel alienated, that 
things are out of order, that he is disturbed and injured. But conscience 
does not tell a man from whom he is alienated. Conscience is the 
realisation of shortcomings in relation to the upholding of a law. 
Legalism and conscience go hand in hand. 
Conscience does not face sin as though it were that part of a man 
which has remained sound, but it is itself deeply involved in sin. 
Indeed, it is that which most separates man from God, which drives man 
most of all in his loneliness away from God ·. <17) 
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Here the divide is very clear. The Protestant ethic dispenses with 
classical theories of Nat ural Law, and also dispenses with conscience as 
the criterion by which the effectiveness of Natural Law is measured. 
Much of Brunner's writings about natural law consist of his criticism of 
the Catholic Church's failure to recognise the existence of "relative" as 
opposed to "absolute" natural law. We shall deal with the question of 
'relativism' and 'absolutism' in more detail when we examine Brunner's 
writings about natural and revealed theology, and about 'special' and 
'general' revelation. 
Vatican II has to some extent dealt with that criticism. But it is here 
that Brunner notes that Aquinas went back to Aristotle and not to Augustine 
in his search for a doctrine of natural law. Therefore much official 
Catholic teaching has been pure Aristoteleanism, whereas the main influence 
on the reformers was Augustine, whose natural law theories were so much 
more flexible. In this he cites Luther, who used the doctrine of natural 
law, but not as a law or a principle. On the contrary, Brunner says, 
Luther was fully aware that from the point of view of actual history it is 
irrational in character. 
This same passage constitutes a defence of Brunner's position in the face 
of Niebuhr's criticism that he leant too heavily on the Lutheran teaching 
about natural orders. Thus he argues that existing forms of society, 
especially the state and the family, are divine institutions, but in their 
concrete forms are products of a rational process which means that they 
share both in the sinfulness of the world and in the Divine will. 
According to Luther, natural law is concerned in so far as emphasis is laid 
on the fact that the knowledge of the immanent legalism within these 
concrete spheres is predominantly a matter of reason, and is only 
indirectly con~erned with faith. 
'What God requires for the ordering of society cannot be rationally 
deduced from a rational syste~ but it can only be discovered on each 
particular occasion, in obedience to the revealed will of God, by means 
of the reason <18> 
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It is this subjection of reason to revelation that makes traditional 
theories of natural law untenable. Indeed it must be argued that, for a 
Christian, any binding law which depends on human reason for its validity, 
is a contradiction in terms. Brunner argues that the Christian must seek 
the will of God in each situation, knowing that God will reveal his will to 
those who seek it. This is the unique position of the Christian, that he 
is subject to the overriding purposes of God which will be revealed to him 
as part of the process of redemption. 
If Brunner writes like this we shall need now to discuss the substance of 
Niebuhr's accusation, and Brunner's defence on this subject. 
NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL ORDERS. 
The clue to the disagreement between Niebuhr and Brunner on the question of 
Natural Law lies in the German title of Brunner's The Divine Imperative. 
The German title Das Gebot and die Ordnungen expresses the two ideas of 
"command" and "orders". Thus Brunner makes a defence of himself against 
this particular criticism. 
•; fhe commandment <of God) stands above the orders of creation, and on 
the other hand these are to be understood as pointing only to the 
commandment of the moment . <19) 
Brunner uses the term "orders" in the way it was used by Augustine and 
Luther. The word which Luther used and which Brunner adopted was 
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"Schopfungsordnung". This variously translated as "order of creation", 
"created order", "natural order". In expounding this concept, Brunner 
consistently places "order" beneath "command". The three propositions that 
are put forward to head up his chapters on "orders", all make the point of 
stressing the Divine initiative. This can be seen by examining his chapter 
headings. 
'God gives us our calling, and requires from us the fulfilment of the 
duties of our calling. <20) 
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As Creator, God requires us to recognise and adjust ourselves to the 
orders he has created, as our first duty; as redeemer, as our second 
duty. He bids us ignore the existing orders, and inaugurate a new line 
of action in view of the coming of God.· <21) 
'·The divine command is only perceived if we take account of its 
threefold law; the laws of official duty, by which external community 
is maintained; the absolute law by which we recognise the lack of 
community; the law of love, whose function is to instruct the believer 
in his right personal relationship with his neighbour.· <22) 
This proposition is justified by saying that God the Redeemer is the same 
as God the Creator, but that his works in the two capacities differ. As 
Redeemer He can only work where His word is heard, that is, in faith. As 
Creator and Preserver He works even where men do not know Him at all. 
Brunner points out that the Order in Creation works in sub-human life, and 
he quotes the "lilies of the field which He clothes so gloriously, and the 
fowls of the air whom He feeds". Similarly the orders work in man and are 
fulfilled in man, in a biological sense, unconsciously and involuntarily. 
But he says: 
The ultimate, real meaning of the Orders can only be perceived where 
God is recognised as Creator and Redeemer, in faith, through His Word. 
But the Orders themselves are the subject of a purely rational 
knowledge. Even the most primitive heathen knows something of these 
orders. . <23) 
From this point Brunner points out that the concept of "orders" permeates 
the whole of life, and that it is impossible to contemplate the wedded 
state, the family, civilisation and culture, in the nation and in the 
state, and finally in the Church without these being supported by orders of 
the most varied kind. In this, Brunner is closely following Luther, who saw 
a continuing order starting with the family, the community, the state and 
finally government as part of the same creative process. 
Lest it be thought that the distinction between Natural Law and Natural 
Orders is somewhat semantic, we must repeat that Brunner firmly believed in 
the concept of "Command" as the priority, and that the "command" is a 
personal one arising from a Divine human encounter. 
With much of this Niebuhr agrees. His main point of disagreement is that 
he feels Brunner has not taken sufficient account of history in both its 
liberating and corrupting sense, and also that he feels the Reformation 
rather too slavishly regarded the State as being "ordained" of God, and 
failed to give the subject of the "order of the state" sufficiently 
dialectic attention. Created order must be seen in the context of human 
history. Thus he says with regard to Brunner's examination of the "orders 
of creation": 
··rn all this one follows Brunner's exposition gratefully for he has 
given us many fresh insights into the intricacies of community life and 
the life of the Christian by applying Reformation principles to modern 
problems . (24) 
Niebuhr concedes that the concept of orders reminds us that all is 
corrupted by sin and that there is no sample of the original purity. Both 
firmly reject Thomistic interpretations of imago dei, and therefore the 
most classical concepts of Natural Law. 
continues: 
But on the same subject Niebuhr 
It is difficult to find this normative principle because man is a 
historical creature, and there are no purely "natural" forms in his 
life which have not been subject to both the freedom and the corruption 
of history (25) 
At this point, when we show examples of the use of the concept of "orders", 
it is important that we do not look too closely at the issues themselves -
but only at their participation in the "orders" concept. 
As an example of an order in Creation, Brunner cites marriage, and, in 
particular, monogamy. The intention within a marriage is indissolubility. 
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The nat ural evidences for that consist of the, roughly, equal numbers of 
males and females in the population, and the fact that each child that is 
born is the result of a union between a man and a woman. To make the 
"order" effective it needs love. On this, both "natural order" and 
"natural law" theories agree, although Brunner says that from the point of 
view of the Divine order of creation, we can see marriage as an ideal -
which may in fact never correspond with reality. True, marriage is a 
primordial and perennially valid human community, validated by scripture 
and falling within a natural order. But even scripture allows for divorce 
"for the hardness of your heart", and Brunner acknowledges that there are 
ocasions when a divorce is ethically more in line with natural order than a 
marriage, for example, without love. 
At this point Niebuhr questions the whole concept of natural order. 
·, It is just in this ideal example of the nat ural order <in which, 
incidentally, Catholic Natural Law and the Reformation concepts of the 
natural order agree) that prompts some questions about the validiity of 
the concept. Undoubtedly every Christian would agree that the 
indissolubility of the marriage bond is the ideal solution for the 
actual intimate mergence of two lives, spiritually and physically. But 
this mergence is not a fact of nature, but an achievement of history, 
and is tolerable only when grace sustains the partnership .... If we move 
from the problem of the indissolubility of marriage we find that 
everything is touched by history and is relativised by historical 
circumstances. <26) 
We can see how a pattern is emerging in which Niebuhr is the pragmatist and 
the one most aware of history, while Brunner is still firmly in a 
Reformation frame of mind. Both acknowledge the supremacy of grace in 
these situations, but Niebuhr is suspicious that the line between natural 
law and natural order is too thin. Both concepts contain an immutability 
which has not taken account of historical development. Both leave little 
space for truly dialectic thought which, Niebuhr insists, is the hall-mark 
of Reformation re-thinking. 
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It may be that here there is a degree of mis-understanding betwen the two. 
Brunner, as we shall see, insists that historical situations make the 
concept of a rigid law unacceptable. When we come, later in the thesis, to 
examine the particular emphases of both writers, we may see that the effect 
of history on Brunner was different from the effect of history on Niebuhr. 
Brunner was a product of a long and consistent history of Lutheran 
development, whereas Niebuhr was something of a pioneer, in his own 
country, when it came to a vigorous exposition of protestant theology. 
Brunner makes a specific defence of this accusation which is worth seeing. 
·I have always thought that Niebuhr's identification of my social 
ethics with the Roman Catholic doctrine of Natural Law was a false 
interpretation of my intentions. In The Divine Imperative' and, more 
strongly, in lust ice and the . Social Order · I have always emphasised 
that the orders of creation are always to be discerned anew from the 
historical situation, and therefore may never be considered as rigid 
law. They are a revolutionary as well as a conservative principle". 
(27) 
Here Brunner is distancing the orders from law. It is open to question to 
what extent history has the power to change order, or whether history is 
itself a more important force than order. It would be difficult to deny 
that there is an order of creation, and although it may be inadequate to 
apply to it the philosophical tools that can produce a Christian ethic, yet 
at the same time to produce a Christian ethic without reference to God, the 
Creator, would leave us with a system of ethics which is capricious and 
open to the corrupting forces, as well as the liberating forces of 
historical events. It is here that Niebuhr needs to argue even more 
strongly for a dialectical base, and disagreeing with Brunner on this 
particular issue leaves him open to the charge of one-sidedness in his view 
of "order versus history." 
On the question of marriage which we have just examined, Brunner does not 
produce a "hard line" conclusion even with his references to the natural 
order contained within marriage. He cites Mark 10: 2-12 as an example of 
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the derivation of the sex relationship from the given facts of creation, 
and therefore its elevation to a normative ethical principle. 
··Not out of agape but out of this material principle is monogamy 
established as the idea of marriage, but this may not be interpreted, 
as do Roman Catholic ethicists, as law. Jesus does not mean to say 
that marriage is legally undivorceable. His words give an explanation 
of the essence of marriage based on the will of the creator, and they 
are therefore not to be understood as law . <28) 
We have already noted that the particular genius of a Protestant ethicist 
is to translate theological concepts into social and political structures. 
It is because that is the purpose of ethics that the question of natural 
law, natural order and historical influences is a vital question to 
resolve. 
It is here that Niebuhr criticises the Lutheran tradition of applying 
natural order to every form of community. Luther saw authority as expanding 
from that of parent, to family, to clan, to nation. But, Niebuhr contends, 
the authority of government should not be derived from the authority of 
parent. 
The chief and the king have historically elaborated forms of power and 
authority and John Locke was quite right in challenging the idea that 
Government had an inherent authority on the basis of natural order. 
(29) 
Brunner, on the other hand, follows the Reformation idea that the State has 
a negative function of preventing anarchy. He sees the Christian's place 
in a state as a "calling", and his question is not "How shall I alter it?", 
but, "How can I serve in it?" The question arises, therefore, whether 
Brunner's formulation of ethics opens him to the accusation of complacency 
in the face of tyranny. Niebuhr comments on this that we should see 
anarchy and tyranny as the "Scylla and Charybdis" between which mankind 
must steer towards justice, fearing the one evil as much as the other. 
Niebuhr considers the attitude of Luther, and by implication, Brunner to 
the status quo as "slavish". 
Here we can see something of the national differences between the two. 
Brunner was a thorough-going "Old'' European Lutheran. Switzerland provided 
for him the most stable and traditional of European values. The progress 
of the medievalism of Luther and the Reformers had been gradual, and 
Brunner was able to adapt Luther's thinking to his own milieu, and, indeed, 
to regard it as essential in opposing the twentieth century rise of fascism 
and communism. Niebuhr, on the other hand could not escape the 
biographical-historical fact that he was at the same time a thoroughly 
North American citizen and thoroughly a child of the Protestant 
reformation. There was a conflict implicit in this situation, augmented by 
the fact of a war with the father land·. Luther's theology of the nature 
...... 
of man, his sinfulness and the "fall" did not attract much sympathy in the 
"brave new world", and Niebuhr was therefore something of a rarity in his 
expounding of this theology in the midst of the "Great American Dream". He 
saw himself as one who has apprehended the essence of the European-ma1ie 
tradition, without in the process imbibing its historical accidens. His 
ethics consist of a constant dialogue with the American assumptions, and 
his personal history gave him a wholly different perspective from that of 
his European contemporaries. 
In the context of the application of the concept of natural order to the 
idea of the state, Niebuhr and Brunner diverge as far as they do on any 
subject. Niebuhr dismisses the idea as, at best, minimal. 
'It establishes the foundation as the law of love furnishes the 
pinnacle for the moral life. Between the minimum and the maximum, we 
must reach the hazardous and relative standards of justice which must 
be more flexible than Catholic Natural Law theories allow and it must 
have more body 
theory permits . 
in its conceptions of justice than the Reformation 
(30) 
Brunner does not see justice in such an elevated way. 
imperfect quality and never a final principle. 
Rather, it is an 
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From the point of view of the Christian faith no idea of perfect 
justice can be conceived. For in its very nature, justice is imperfect. 
Only those whose minds are not aware of love can speak of justice as 
ultimate ..... It is qualified by two concepts; by the sovereignty of God, 
which also stands above his law, and by the love of God which administers 
His law, and at the same time overcomes it. (31) 
To summarise the dispute we can say that Brunner distances the concept of 
natural order from the Catholic doctrine of Natural Law. He places them 
firmly under the command of God. It is a very "theocentric" concept of the 
ethical question, and leaves room for rational thought within each 
situation. Niebuhr plac~s more emphasis on the flexible nature of history 
which tempers the power of natural order. 
THE CASE AGAINST NATURAL LAW THEORIES. 
Both Niebuhr and Brunner agree that if Natural Law theories are made up of 
timelessly valid ethical demands, then this has to be opposed. This is 
inseparably bound up with the Thomistic and Aristotelean system, and 
foreign to a New Testament orientated thinker. In spite of their 
differences, the two writers are in broad agreement, although they deal 
with the subject in different ways. In Niebuhr's case, much of his writing 
is a polemic against systems and theories which differ from his conception 
of "love" as the ultimate law and norm. In an at tempt to correct these 
various theories there is a danger that he may over-correct. One therefore 
has to examine his polemic against one theory and compare it with his views 
on a contrasting theory in order to discover his essential position. It is 
here that the dialectical structure of his thought is helpful. 
An example of this is his polemic against the Catholic position on 
morality. In stressing the need to argue for the case of the "law of 
love", he finds that the Catholic moralists tend to absolutise aspects of 
medieval culture in their interpretations of natural law. He believes that 
they are too rigid in their application of the natural law to the endless 
complexities of social life. However, in his polemic against the Catholic 
52 
position, he draws back from dispensing entirely with natural law, or, at 
least, natural morality. The concepts of absolutism and relativism come 
into play, and he is left with the task of applying the "law of love" to 
these same complexities of social life. Thus he says: 
There must be some way of resolving the debate between legalists and 
relativists which will refute the legalists whenever they make too 
sweeping claims for fixed standards of conduct and which will, at the 
same time, avoid an abyss of nihilism on the edge of moral relativism. 
(32) 
He wages a polemic against sections of the Protestant movement, and in 
particular against Karl Barth, which compels him to accept that there is a 
limited truth in the natural law concept. He concedes that there is a 
"permanent structure of human personality", <33> and that there are moral 
principles which are known apart from revelation. Thus he writes: 
Karl Barth's belief that the moral life of a man would possess no valid 
principles of guidance if the Ten Commandments had not introduced such 
principles by revelation is as absurd as it is unscriptural. <34) 
To support this assertion Niebuhr quotes Romans 2: 14; "For when the 
gentiles which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the 
law, these, having not the law are a law unto themselves." Niebuhr is 
attacking Barth's exegesis in his commentary "Epistle to the Romans", the 
major commentary referred to earlier. This is but one example of the 
complexities of Niebuhr's thinking on this subject. It has the merit of 
opening one to the alternatives, and of highlighting his conviction in the 
transcendent freedom of man and the infinite flux of history. This 
polemical method is used throughout his treatment of the subject. He 
applies his arguments against Natural Law theories to his concept of 
justice, a polemic which is not only directed against Karl Barth, as we 
have seen, but also against Marxism, Catholicism and "enlightenment" 
theories. 
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Of Marxism he says: 
·Marxist theory as usual detects the taint of interest in theories 
other than its own. But it also has the equivalent of a "natural law". 
In that law the dominance of the ideal of equality is, for instance, 
clearly "ideological". It is informed by a justified resentment of the 
poor against inequality, but it fails to recognise the inevitability of 
functional inequalities in society··. (35> 
It is the pretended finality of natural law to which Niebuhr objects most 
strongly. This is not merely because of its lack of space for human 
freedom and the application of love which has to be seen in a non-legal 
way, but also because it raises ideology to a degree of pretension which he 
sees as an illustration in history of the way in which the force of sin 
lays claim to sinlessness. If natural law is final and timeless in its 
application, then one would need to question the need for redemption. 
Salvation could be acquired by a more rigorous insistence on the demands of 
natural morality. He makes a few concessions to the catholic position when 
he compares it with Marxism, but his criticism is essentially the same. 
Catholic theories of natural law are no less pretentious than secular 
theories, even though they subordinate the virtue of justice, enjoined 
in the natural law, to the virtue of love, achieved by grace. 
According to the Catholic theory natural law is part of the "divine" or 
the "eternal" law which is manifested in human reason. The endless 
relativities of historical rational perspectives are obscured. This 
uncomfortable claim for an essentially universal reason is the basis 
for the remarkable degree of certainty with which Catholic moral 
theology is able to define justice and injustice in every possible 
situation. ' <36> 
In this, Brunner would wholeheartedly agree, and his polemic against the 
catholic tradition is based on the same argument. <See note 11 in this 
chapter) 
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There is a degree of approval of the Marxist analysis in that Niebuhr 
agrees that the pretended purity of laws and concepts of justice owe as 
much to the power of the dominant elements in society which enforced these 
laws, as to the purity of natural law itself. It is no coincidence that 
the height of natural law teaching by the Catholic church in the middle 
ages coincided with its considerable temporal as well as spiritual power. 
He says: 
'The requirements of natural law in the medieval period were obviously 
conceived in a feudal society; just as the supposed absolute and "self 
evident" demands of eighteenth century natural law were bourgeois in 
origin·. <37) 
Having suggested in this section that Niebuhr did not entirely dispense 
with natural law we need to look into this particular chink and see what 
theories would more radically dispose of it and in what way Niebuhr retains 
an element of it. As late as 1967 Niebuhr published "Christian realism and 
Political Problems", and an essay in that, entitled "Love and Law in 
Protestantism and Catholicism", deals with the issue comprehensively. This 
issue is important in theology in view of the particular moral issues of 
our gene~ation. There is a tendency for theology to centre, in its search 
for an a moral answer, on one of three positions. Either it can depend 
entirely on the existential moment, aware of what Niebuhr calls the flux of 
history, or it can centre exclusively on the doctrine of Justification by 
Faith, or again it can strengthen the implications of traditional natural 
law theories. An answer is needed to this dilemma and the Church needs to 
be clear in its understanding of its ethical base. If we discount the two 
latter positions, which for the sake of identity we can call respectively 
''Barthian" and "Catholic", we are left with the existential perspective. 
In as much as it is fair to describe Niebuhr as a theistic existentialist, 
it will easily be seen that in comparison with a thorough-going atheistic 
existentialist such as Jean-Paul Sartre, Niebuhr is an essentialist in his 
view of the nature of man. Sartre points out that in theism "The 
individual man is the realisation of a certain concept in the divine 
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intelligence". <38> This is a result of the doctrine of creation. The 
theory of natural law has been built into this as man is seen as possessing 
an "essence", and that this "essence" in man is also implied in God's 
purpose for His creatures in their final redemption in Christ. Man, if 
viewed as a creature of God, or as a redeemed creature in Christ, has an 
essential nature. It is this "essentialist" view of man which has given 
rise to theories of natural law even in cases where there is no admitted 
theism, an example of which has already been provided in Niebuhr's comments 
on Marxism. Indeed it is a western tradition to ascribe to man an 
"essential" nature. 
Compared with this, Sartre suggests that man has no essential nature. 
There is nothing behind him, or before him, which makes him this or that 
kind of person. Man is merely what he chooses to make himself. "Opto ergo 
sum". For Sartre there is no explaining of man's nature by reference to a 
fixed and given human nature. There is no pre-existent value or essence or 
structure of reality, or God, which justifies choice in an ethical sense. 
Man is totally free, and is in no sense "essential". Rather, he is totally 
"existential". Whether or not the idea of freedom as explained by Sartre 
constitutes the beginning, if not the end, of an "essence" within man, it 
has to be said that he has emptied nearly everything out of the traditional 
descriptions of the nature of man, from the Stoics to the nee-orthodox 
theologians of our generation. 
Niebuhr's contribution is by comparison positively "essentialist", and his 
genius is that he uses the law of love as the ultimate sanction and is 
thoroughly aware ofthe indeterminate and infinite changes brought about by 
individual circumstances. Self-transcendent freedom forms part of the 
"essential" nature of man, and serves as a rigorously revised basis on 
which to build natural law theories. We have seen how his polemic is 
directed towards many opposing theories. The task that he set himself is 
to prove all alternative theories wrong, so that the nature of man can be 
discovered which will satisfy New Testament and Reformation ideas. To sum 
this up, we can say that if we regard man as a created being, and a 
potentially redeemable being, then natural law inevitably exists - but not 
in the timeless and invariable way in which it has been widely taught. 
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We saw earlier that there has been an emphasis, on the part of Brunner, on 
the Lutheran concepts of the "Orders of Creation", and an emphasis on the 
part of Niebuhr on the influence of history and the infinite changes which 
it brings about. History is seen as both corrupting and liberating. 
However, the difference between them is very much one of emphasis rather 
than principle. Brunner fully recognised the influence of history in 
negating the claims of natural law theories to have timeless and unvarying 
value. Making a distinction between "absolute" and "relative" theories of 
natural law, he has this to say about "absolute" theories. 
·This conceals secret tensions. On the one hand, its applicability 
depends upon the fact that its content is not only universally valid 
but that it can be universally perceived, and is to be affirmed by 
every rational being. History, however, shows that this is not the 
case at all. Quite reasonable people (and nations and periods) have 
regarded as "good" things which are totally different from each other, 
and do so still at the present day. Here we see the original fiction 
of Aristoteleanist anthropology; the doctrine of a universal reason. 
In theological language it means that the failure to recognise the fact 
that, through sin, even the original rational nature of man has been 
altered, and has been affected by the contradiction, <Romans 1: 21) is 
suppressed. <39) 
Brunner agrees with Niebuhr that the supreme Christian standard is love, 
which is not a law. Therefore every law is relative and not absolute. If 
the supreme and the ultimate is Divine Love, which cannot be conceived 
legally, then justice must be seen as relative to it. It is not absolute. 
Whatever may give evidence for the love of God, or whatever may reflect it, 
it is relative to it. This is not to say that law and justice are 
meaningless, but that if the absolute law is the same as love, which is not 
a law at all, then no concept lower than love - which means all concepts -
can be fixed in any absolute law, or in any absolute "Natural La~'. 
Brunner further argues that an insistence on the concept of absolute 
natural law ignores history. 
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·It was only too evident that absolute natural law, with its abstractly 
egalitarian content, could be applied to historical reality, and that, 
if it were applied, inevitably its effect would be in the highest 
degree destructive and unjust." <40) 
To summarise, both Niebuhr and Brunner agree that traditional doctrines of 
a universally and timelessly valid Natural Law are sub-Christian, in the 
sense that they do not start at the beginning of the question. The question 
must be based on an awareness of sin, an experience of redemption and a 
reception of the Divine will. It is an essential part of Reformation 
teaching that man stands before God as an individual, and that God will 
reveal His will to man as an individual. Whatever natural orders there may 
be, based on the truth that God is the creator of all things, and whatever 
natural law there may be, it is merely relative to the law of love, and 
carries none of the authority of the decision made by the Christian in 
response to God's love. 
From here, we shall look into the relation of natural morality to general 
revelation, bearing in mind their rejection of Natural Law in its classical 
form. 
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CHAPTER 3 LOV~ LAW AND REVELATION. 
The debate on the classical theories of Natural Law which Niebuhr and 
Brunner held may well represent the extent of their disagreement with one 
another. However they dealt with identical issues in ways different from 
one another in many instances. In order to come to a similar conclusion 
about different theological and ethical issues they used different routes. 
Niebuhr concentrated on his emphasis on the flux of history, indeterminacy 
and transcendent freedom, all of which we noted in his treatment of the 
natural law question. Brunner, on the other hand concentrated on a more 
"scriptural" foundation with a particular emphasis on the concept of the 
"Divine Human Encounter", a theme much influenced by Martin Buber. 
The fact that they both opposed the classic theories of natural law and yet 
both acknowledged the existence of a natural morality leads us to start 
from this point to examine the nature of Christian love, of the law of 
liberty, and of the revealed events in history which form the basis and 
content of their Christian ethic. For both of them, then, the idea of a 
moral choice being the result of a static natural law is unsatisfactory, as 
is the view that moral decisions are the product of the existential moment, 
or indeed wholly the product to be found within a solution of justification 
by faith. 
For Brunner and Niebuhr the solution lies in an understanding of the 
relationship between love and law, and in the manner in which love has been 
revealed. In this chapter we shall examine the claim of Brunner and of 
Niebuhr that without the revelation of God in Christ, and without the 
revelation of the love of God on the Cross, there is no Christian ethic. I 
propose to examine the way in which each tackled the subject of the 
relation of love to law, including comments that they made about each other 
on that subject. After that I propose to examine the 'I-Thou' theories of 
Brunner, based on the teachings of Martin Buber, and also on the debate on 
'Nature and Grace' which marked the departure of Brunner from Karl Barth, 
and which is important for its examination of general revelation. 
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The Christian ethic proceeds from a man allowing himself to be placed 
within the activity of God. Brunner says: 
· The good is that which God does; the goodness of man can be no other 
than letting himself be placed within the activity of God. This is 
what believing means in the New Testament. And this 'faith' is the 
principle of ethics. "Whatsoever is not of faith is of sin." <Rom 
14: 23). (1) 
Since we have pointed out, in the first chapter, and in the study of 
Natural Law, that Brunner and Niebuhr derived their ethical teaching from 
the New Testament, through St Augustine, Luther and the nineteenth century 
critical school of theology, it will be necessary to see what the New 
Testament has to say about love specifically, and also how its teaching can 
give rise to such descriptions as transcendent, indeterminate and final. 
First, the commandment to love one's neighbour as oneself gave rise to the 
question, "Who is my neighbour?" <Luke 10: 29) Jesus declined to answer the 
question and instead told a story that described neighbourliness. It was 
made clear in the story that one did not have to know one's neighbour, but 
that one did have to be a neighbour. At the end of the story Jesus asked a 
different question from that asked by the young man. He asked, "Which of 
the three proved to be a neighbour?" In this, the original question was 
radically transformed. The Samaritan phenomenenon was, moreover, a hint of 
universalism in love. Kierkegaard's commentary on this is: 
·Christ does not talk about knowing one's neighbour, but about oneself 
being a neighbour, as the Samaritan proved himself one by his 
compassion. For by his compassion he did not prove that the man who 
was attacked was his neighbour, but that he was the neighbour of the 
one who was assaulted." 
So love is un-claiming, and non-resisting. A Christian seeks not his 
own good, but the good of his neighbour· . (2) 
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The New Testament teaching on love is that it drives the self into 
anonymity, that it requires no reciprocation, or requital, that it is 
universal in its application, that it fails to recognise either friendship 
or enmity and that it drives the Christian into a state of neighbourliness, 
not as an abstract ideal, but as a response to being loved by God. That is 
the distinctive nature of Christian love. We love one another "because He 
first loved us". 
Further, Christian love takes no account of feelings, preferences, emotions 
or taste. When told to love one's neighbour as oneself, one is not 
commanded to love oneself, but such love is for the self inverted We noted 
in the first chapter of this thesis that it was Kierkegaard who persuaded 
Brunner that there was no real synthesis between Augustinian and Lutheran 
ideas on the one hand, and neo-Platonism on the other. Therefore, 
Kierkegaard's writings on this particular subject are relevant to the 
understanding of Brunner. 
NIEBUHR ON ' LOVE AND LAW' . 
The New Testament version of the Decalogue is the root and source of the 
debate. "Thou shalt love .... " immediately presents us with a dilemma. 
"Thou shalt" implies a law, and love transcends any law and cannot be 
defined within a legal framework. Niebuhr describes this as a conflict 
between the "push of duty" and the "pull of grace". <3> If the law of love 
comes to us a "Thou shalt", then it is obviously a law. Subjectively, 
Niebuhr argues, we can have a sense of obligation to others without a 
definition of specific obligations. Love is the summary of all our 
obligations. On the other hand, if love means a perfect accord between our 
obligations and our inclinations, then duty is not felt as duty. In fact, 
"We love the thing that thou commandest". There is something Kantian here, 
except that Kant would disregard the second aspect of love, and claim the 
sense of obligation in its most universal sense is identical with the law 
of love. 
Niebuhr continues his examination by quoting Luther, who, in his exposition 
of the life of grace, left "law" and "conscience" behind, along with sin 
and self. Luther's view was that the freedom from the sense of"ought" is 
an ecstatic experience in which the individual can rise above every kind of 
prudence and feel at one with Christ, motivated by nothing other than 
gratitude for divine forgiveness. He further quotes Emil Brunner who, he 
says, "stands in the tradition of Luther when he also emphasises this 
transcendence over the 'ought', and declares that 'If we ought, it is a 
proof that we cannot'". (4) Commenting on that he suggests that while not 
so impotent as Brunner suggests, pure obligation is more impotent than is 
generally recognised. He cites the ineffectiveness of purely moralistic 
preaching. 
The complicated relationship between law and love in both the objective and 
subjective senses is demonstrated by the contrast between the conception of 
the identity of love and the sense of obligation on the one hand, and the 
contradiction between them on the other. Niebuhr questions whether the 
Lutheran ideal can be achieved in any way outside the "common grace" of 
family love, or the occasional ecstatic experience, which is not really a 
description of even the life of the most dedicated Christian, and in any 
case, Luther asserts that man is "simul justus et peccator". It is a 
matter of universal observation that if man remains a sinner, then he must 
feel the constant pressure of anxieties and tensions, as well as the 
knowledge that he must forget himself if he is to help others. Clearly, 
there are some aspects of the law of love which belong more to the realm of 
duty than to the realm of Grace. The injunction, "If you love them who 
love you, what thanks have ye" <Matt5: 46) points to the universal 
obligation that we have. 
·Our concern for those beyond our circle, our obligation to the peoples 
of the world and the community of mankind, comes to us very much with 
the push of the "ought", against the force of our more parochial habits 
of grace (5) 
It is observable that purely moralistic teaching can be very tedious, and 
at the same time, Christian teaching about love can itself be loveless. 
The tension in the phrase "the law of love" arises, because · on the 
subjective side love is a curious compound of willing, not by the strength 
of our will, but by the strength which enters the will by Grace. 
Niebuhr asserts: 
Thus 
"This defect in the liberal protestant attitude towards love is the 
subjective aspect of its lack of a doctrine of Grace." (6) 
Objectively there is a danger of a lack of distinction between love and 
justice. In both these cases there is perhaps a failure to recognise the 
force of self-love, and man must recognise that Grace has meaning when life 
is measured at the limits of human possibilities, and it is at this point 
that man recognises that he "ought" to perform acts beyond his capacity for 
willing. These acts can only be performed by the strength man is given by 
the love of others, and, more importantly. by the Grace of God indwelling 
man's spirit. 
In an essay entitled Love and Law in Protestantism and Catholicism Niebuhr 
explores the relationship and examines the ways in which love can be seen 
to be transcendent over law. The tension between the concepts of love and 
law can briefly be summarised as the problem of the relation of duty to 
grace. 
It is worth quoting Kierkegaard on this point. 
"A man would no more be able to live exclusively according to the 
highest Christian concepts all the time, than he would be able to 
live by eating only at the Lm-d' s Table". <7) 
"his is a polemic for grace and the transcendence of love over the "highest 
hristian principles". In spite of the influence that Kierkegaard had over 
·unner it has to be said that there is a contrast of views here. This 
ises from Kierkegaard's distinction between the love of a person in his 
queness, and love in its universal sense. Whereas Brunner, as we shall 
regards love as the direct product of the "I - Thou" encounter, or, as 
title of his book terms it, "The Divine Human Encounter", Kierkegaard 
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sees love as that which regards the loved "self" as anonymously as 
possible. 
'Christianity has not come into the world to teach you how 
specifically to love your wife or your friend, but how in common 
humanity you shall love all men. Love is a matter of conscience and 
hence not a matter of impulse or inclinatior .. <8> 
Brunner would not accept the distinction between universal and unique love 
and he would not place love in the area of conscience. 
criticises Kierkegaard>n this point. 
Niebuhr similarly 
Kierkegaard, despite his existential understanding of human selfhood, 
presents a legalistic version of universal love in his "Works of Love" 
according to which the love of a person in his uniqueness of a 
particular relation (as wife or husband for instance) has nothing to do 
with Christian love·. (9) 
Niebuhr's view is that the universalistic dimension of the love commandment 
is both within and beyond the love commandment as law. It represents the 
outer circumference of the totality of our obligations to our neighbours 
and to God. 
It includes all of them, but goes beyond anything that can be 
defined. · <10) 
Likewise Tillich, in his book, The Protestant Era, comments: 
'I have given no definition to love. This is impossible, because there 
is no higher principle by which it could be defined . <11) 
Paul Ramsey enters into this controversy and defends Kiel-kegaard in an 
article on N~ebuhr in Kegley and Bretall' s book. He agrees that in one 
I 
chapter of Kierkegaard s book Works of Love, he rhapsodises about the world 
"shalt" in the love commandment. 
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"But this is because he knows that love is the highest law, not 
materially beyond all law." ( 12) 
Ramsey suggests that Niebuhr proved to be most helpful in his clarifying of 
the relationships between love, the natural law for freedom, and the 'first 
ethic' based on determinate aspects of human nature and society. The 
- . - . ) 
'second ethic', in Kierkegaar9' s terms is that which transcends abstract 
Kantian norms - or indeed universalities of natural law based on fixed 
structures of human nature. Ki~~egaard's contribution to the debate is to 
suggest that, in Christian love we close our eyes to every preferential 
relationship and then open them and "love the man we see". This is a 
definition of the material meaning of the law of love. Niebuhr clarifies 
the relations between such laws as the law of love and the intimate, 
preferential loves which clothe us in our daily life. 
In the essay previously mentioned, Niebuhr points to four aspects of 
Christian love which, he says, make the point that if the problem of love 
and law is parallel with the relation of duty and grace, then, materially, 
the problem is the relation between love as the sum and total of all law, 
and love as defining indeterminate possibilities - transcending law. This 
raises the question of the extent to which man has an essential nature to 
which his actions ought to conform, and at the same time has the freedom to 
transcend structures, to stand beyond himself, and beyond any particular 
social situation. Every law is subject to indeterminate possibilities 
which in fact exceed any definition of the "ought". And yet man is not 
totally free of definition, for the indeterminate freedom is in itself a 
part of man's essential nature. 
The first aspect of the transcendence of love over law which Niebuhr cites 
is "Universality". The freedom of man over historic situations means that 
his obligation to others cannot be limited to partial communities of nature 
"'7:> 
and history. ("If ye love them that love you - what thanks have you? 
Mt.5: 46) 
This comes to us in the form of law. Indeterminacy in the sense of 
universality presents itself to us as an obligation, as we have seen. 
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-This first element in the universality of love has already been 
described as being, in one respect at least, within the limits of law. 
For it describes the sum total of all our obligations to our fellow 
men without specific detail. It may come to us subjectively in the 
force of obligation in opposition to more parochial forms of love 
which are nourished by common grace . (13) 
Niebuhr quotes the Catholic teaching on celibacy and virginity as an 
example of the Church's interpretation of the idea of love as universal. 
The institution of the family is, in his word, destroyed, so that there 
may be no impediment to uni versa! love. This is an example of the Stoic 
influence on Catholic teaching, for Stoic natural law theories assume a 
determinate human freedom and equate the fixed structure of nature with the 
less fixed structures of human nature. Niebuhr's view is that the 
universalistic dimension of the love command is, in short, both within and 
beyond the love commandment as law. 
Niebuhr identifies the second aspect of this transcendence as love as 
sacrificial . Here it is recognised that the self has freedom over itself 
as contingent object in nature and history. The question of the 
preservation of self in history becomes problematic. Further, the love 
commandment promises fulfilment through self-giving. "Whosoever loses his 
life shall find it". The 'agape' of Christ is defined as sacrificial love 
- the love of the Cross. "And walk ye in love even as Christ has loved you 
and given himself for you" <Eph 5:2>· 
Sacrificial love represents the second pinnacle of love, which 
represents both the completion and the annulment of love as law. It is 
the completion of the law of love because perfect love has no logical 
limit short of the readiness to sacrifice the self for the other . (15) 
Since sacrificial love takes no account of prudence, and no calculation of 
mutual advantage, it falls outside the realm of law or code. You cannot 
formulate the sacrificing of one's life as an obligation, and so law, in 
the determinate sense, must stop with mutual love and distributive justice. 
Justice implies that the self regards itself as equal to the group involved 
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in the procedure of justice. The pursuit of justice is a form of love 
since the interests of neighbour are involved, and yet it falls short of 
ultimate love because self-interest is involved. The same argument holds 
true of "mutual" love. 
love, from mutual love. 
You cannot distinguish ultimate, or sacrificial 
There is no real line that can be recognised. 
Similarly, even on the subjective side, the distinction is unclear since 
total love may in fact be the result of a sense of obligation - and 
therefore a response to a law or sanction. The truth is that sacrificial 
love transcends the line of mutual love. It also redeems it, since without 
an element of heedless, or unprudent ial love, mutual love and the pursuit 
of justice would degenerate into carefully calculated self interest. Thus 
the relationship which Niebuhr sees between heedless love and mutual love 
is a dialectical relationship. They are not separate, but involved with 
each other in their difference. 
It is here that Niebuhr seeks to use the concept of love, as opposed to 
law, to apply the Christian ethic to institutions as well as to 
individuals. He criticises traditional Protestant theories of love and 
justice, again on the basis that there is not sufficient dialectical 
content in the relationship. 
In Luther's doctrine of the 'two realms' justice is consigned 
completely to the realm of law. There, nothing is known of Christ, 
even as in the realm of the Kingdom of Heaven nothing is known of law, 
conscience or the sword. The law in such a rigorous dualism does not 
even contain within it the desire to do justice. It is no more than a 
coercive arrangement which prevents mutual harm . <16) 
Niebuhr describes the Reformation teaching on love and justice as a form of 
complacency or even defeatism, because of the apparent impossibility of 
establishing a more perfect justice which overcomes the inequalities of 
both nature and history. On this point he criticises Brunner for, as he 
sees it, Brunner's separating love from justice in too extreme a fashion. 
-This has prompted Brunner to speak of the hardness of every scheme of 
justice and of making too rigorous a separation between love and 
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justice. Love is reserved purely for personal relations, and the 
'orders' seem designed only for the sake of order and a very rough 
justice. Any extant scheme of justice is, of course, very rough, judged 
by the standard of love. But the standard of love should not be merely 
a principle of indiscriminate judgement upon any and all possible 
historic systems. It should also be a source of discriminate judgement 
upon various systems of justice. For justice is the servant of love 
and there are more indeterminate possibilities of justice approaching 
the standard of love than Brunner realises. It is insufficient, for 
instance, to speak of the necessary hardness of penal justice when 
secular penology has psychiatrists to act as amici curiae to the court 
in dealing with child delinquency, a perfect example of a more living 
contact between love and justice than Brunner assumes. 
I suspect that Luther's doctrine of the two realms plus the influence 
of Martin Buber' s great work 'I-Thou' have persuaded Brunner to make 
this too radical distinction between the personal and the 
institutional, and to reserve love only for the realm of the personal, 
indeed individual, relations· (17) 
When we come to examine Brunner's contribution to this subject we shall see 
that there is indeed a more 'inter-personal' emphasis, but we shall also 
see that Brunner in no way neglects the task of bringing institutional life 
within the scope of a Christian ethic - and one dominated by the value of 
love. 
The third aspect of love which makes it transcendent is identified by 
Niebuhr as 'Love as forgiveness.' He writes: 
Forgiveness has the same relationship to 
sacrificial love has to distributive justice. 
completion and an annulment of punitive justice·. 
punitive justice as 
Forgiveness is both a 
(18) 
Here again Niebuhr presents the dialectical relationship between the two. 
Forgiveness completes justice because it looks into causal preconditions, 
extenuating circumstances and all the other factors which move the concept 
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of justice to a state of being remedial rather than punitive. At the same 
time it annuls punitive justice in the sense that Jesus recommends loving 
one's enemy, and points to the mercies of God, which extend to the just and 
the unjust. The parable of the labourers in the vineyard presents us with 
a situation where the divine mercy is challenged for being unjust, and 
defended, because it exceeds justice. 
the paradox of mercy and judgement. 
The doctrine of atonement contains 
~There is no nice discrimination of merit and de-merit in forgiveness, 
any more than there is a nice discrimination of interests in 
sacrificial love. Here law is transcended. Forgiveness seems to be 
purely in the realm of grace·. <19> 
However, Niebuhr argues, even forgiveness comes to us partially in the 
category of love as law. "If we forgive not men their trespasses, neither 
" will our heavenly Father forgive our trespasses. <Matt7: 14-15). So we owe 
our brother our forgiveness 
forgiveness of us. 
but as a grateful response to God's 
The fourth and final aspect which Niebuhr cites in his demonstration of the 
transcendence of love over law is the idea of love as "standing in the 
place of the other". Again there is a problem here in relationships between 
various concepts and it can only be described in a dialectical way. First, 
the definition is that there is here a pinnacle of grace in the realm of 
love where the relation between persons is such that one individual 
penetrates sympathetically and imaginatively into the life of another. 
Since this describes the ordinary possibilities of love, above the level of 
justice as defined in natural law, this aspect of love is not among the 
counsels of perfection in the Catholic Church. 
Rather, this love is the substance of Suber's exposition- 'I-Thou', and of 
-"" Brunner's11 Divine Imperative~ Niebuhr criticises both on this count: 
1 It is wrongly interpreted as the very substance of the realm of love. 
For in that case love does not include the general spirit of justice, 
which expresses itself in the structures, laws, social arrangements and 
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economic forms by which men seek to regulate the life of the community 
and to establish a maximum of harmony and justice . <20) 
We are again at the point where there is a divergence between Brunner and 
Niebuhr. Brunner holds that love is 'essentially inter-personal', as we 
shall see, and Niebuhr that it can be translated into human structures and 
institutions. It is important to note their similarities here. Each 
strongly defends the principle of justice, and each has similar conclusions 
in the realm of justice. The question is whether or not agape is directly 
translatable into various situations outside the close relationship of 
people. 
Hence Niebuhr writes: 
' Brunner is in great error when he interprets an act of personal 
kindness as more "Christian" than a statesmanlike scheme in the 
interests of justice. 
things" is capricious. 
of justice· <21) 
Brunner's dictum that love "never seeks great 
It separates love too completely from the realm 
Niebuhr's view is that if you confine agape to interpersonal relations, 
then love ceases to be relevant to the problems of man's common life. And 
yet within the various structures of life, whether they are fixed by 
justice, or by custom or even by legal enactment, then the indeterminate 
possibilities of love, in the individual encounters which take place in the 
system, do affect the result. 
Human actions can to a degree corrupt even the highest structure, and 
partially redeem even the worst structure. Kindness, or envy, or 
generosity or greed can affect any institution. The fact that slavery is 
wrong does not alter the fact that a slave's life can be made more 
tolerable by a generous master. Indeed Paul's view on slavery as recounted 
in Philemon suggests that the total change of heart that two Christians 
experience, one a slave and one a master, is in fact more powerful than the 
abolition of slavery as an institution. However, it still remains true 
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that the institution was wrong because of the disproportionate amount of 
power exercised by some, and the probability of its corrupting force. 
It is where love and law are seen in this light that the whole question of 
grace, 
a law. 
as a force, is seen. To love one's neighbour as oneself is indeed 
It means an individual experience in which one penetrates deeply 
into the life of another and at the same time stands outside in reverence 
before a mystery which one has no right to penetrate. It is a law in the 
sense that the indeterminate freedom of man, which is part of his essential 
nature, requires that human relations should finally achieve that goal. 
But it is also a matter of grace since no sense of obligation can provide 
the forbearance and imagination by which this is accomplished. 
These categories which Niebuhr identifies are useful in an analysis of the 
relationship between law and love. Nobody can deny the existence of law, 
but it is legitimate to question its fixity. If love transcends law, then 
law itself, whether by legal enactment, scriptural injunction or merely 
custom, must be relegated in the Christian ethic to its proper place. That 
it to say it must be seen as something within the activity of love - or to 
put it another way, within the activity of God, the author of all 
righteousness. 
BRUNNER ON LOVE AND LAW 
Brunner tackled the same question and his conclusion was similar to 
Niebuhr's, although he used a different method and approach. In his 
definition of love he used the concepts of eschatology and revelation, and 
in his description of the application of love, and its relationship to 
justice, he drew on the "I - Thou" concept which was central in his 
thinking, and which was the result of the influence on him of Martin Suber. 
He further set this argument within his concept of "command". Thus he 
writes: 
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The Command of God, so far as the subject is concerned, requires one 
thing only: existence in love, but this implies the existence of every 
virtue·. <22) 
In order to establish a Christian ethic without resorting to the 
traditional natural law theories, positive theological suggestions must be 
examined - and if we are to discover the validity of Christian ethics 
within theology itself, then it is all systematic theology that must be 
searched, starting with the Doctrine of God and working towards the 
doctrine of Grace, of revelation, of justification and so on. Brunner, who 
unlike Niebuhr made no self - deprecatory remarks about his worth as a 
systematic theologian, explored the possibility in all his works - not 
least in his two volume - Dogmatics.; 
Christian Doctrine of God. 
,, and, in particular in his The 
Anders Nygren, the author of the book Agape and Eros commented on Brunner's 
contribution in this way, 
·The problem of the doctrine of God is to a high degree the problem of 
the relation between the Christian revelation of God, and the 
philosophical concept of God. Few contemporary theologians have 
comprehended the problem involved in the relationship as clearly as has 
Emil Brunner. He shows an extraordinarily penetrating grasp of the 
fatal role which nee-platonic ontology has played in the Christian 
doctrine of Goci . <23) 
It is this placing of ethics closely at the heart of systematic theology, 
and at the same time recognising the existence of natural morality and 
'general' revelation that makes Brunner's contribution so valuable, if not 
unique. 
Brunner's teaching on the subject of Divine love and its relationship to 
human love is contained within his systematic theology, and, in particular 
in his The Christian Doctrine of God. Brunner here is conscious of the 
fact that the Divine love, in its essence, is something totally different 
from the human love. This is linked with Brunner's insistence on 
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revelation and therefore is another vindication of his view that 
Christianity is not ontologically perceived, but is revealed. 
All we can say at best is in the form of parable. It is not that we 
already know what 'love' is and then can apply it to God. Rather the 
situation is this: that the 'idea', the understanding of love - the 
'agape' of the New Testament - can only be understood from what 
happens in revelation. The story of revelation, Jesus Christ, the 
crucified really defines the meaning of the new conception: love, 
which is 'agape'. Love is the self-giving of God; love is the free and 
generous grace of the one who is holy Lord. (24) 
Brunner is here stating clearly that love and revelation belong together, 
and that all features of the Divine love have to be drawn from the 
Revelation. This love is bound up with revelation and it does not define 
itself in intellectual terms - but in an event. We have here common ground 
with Niebuhr who sees the value of the scriptural revelation as being a 
preferable explanation of the nature of man and of God than any other. Even 
the 'fall' of man is couched in historical-dramatic terms. Brunner argues 
that only in the 'event' of Christ -the Cross- do we find the love that 
is truly causeless, unmotivated, incomprehensible. It springs solely from 
the will of God Himself - that is from his incomprehensible will to give 
his very self to us. On the point of ethics, in relation to this, Brunner 
makes the point that the love of God is not an ethical quality. 
·Actually, the moral law does not come first but se>~ond. It does not 
come before, but after the love which is given to us. ' <25) 
In asserting the transcendence of love over all virtues and possibilities, 
Brunner argues that love, in this sense, is not a human possibility at all, 
but is exclusively possible to God. 
Love is an 'ultimate' eschatological possibility, for it will be the 
last thing when everything else, even faith, has vanished. (26) 
Brunner continues by saying that the only way love can be achieved is by 
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allowing oneself to be loved by God, and that therefore the only way 'good' 
can be understood is from the point of view of justification. This clear 
reference to revelation - allowing oneself to be loved by God - and to the 
love of Christ who on the Cross brought about our justification, distances 
Brunner once more from the Thomistic view of 'virtues'. Brunner criticises 
the whole medieval system of morality on the basis that it "turns a quality 
which depends for its very existence on the reality of the Divine action, 
into a human quality". <27> 
Having therefore placed the concept of love as a revealed and divine 
substance, Brunner can go on to demonstrate that the Divine Love is the 
only possibility of human loving. It is only possible to love when we feel 
ourselves to have perceived divine love, and so the law of love is that we 
should abide in his love. 
In His prophetic message, Jesus summons men to love! The apostolic 
exhortation, which points back to the gift of God in Christ, summons 
men to live in love, or, still more plainly, to remain in love. · <28> 
Being in love is interpersonal, and we cannot obey a command to love God 
without first being loved by God. Brunner describes the commandment to 
love God as that which transcends the contrast between mysticism and 
morality. 
It is the summons to remain within the giving of God, to return to Him 
again and again as the origin of all power to be good, or to do good. 
There are no other virtues alongside of the life of love·. <29) 
Note must be made here of the essentially scriptural view which Brunner 
held. He places great emphasis on the Johannine tradition of mutual love, 
and mutual indwelling, as well as on the Pauline teaching on love. "Have 
this mind in you, which was also in Christ Jesus" <Phil 2:5). Brunner does 
not at this stage appear to struggle with the contradictions which Niebuhr 
idebtified as the "push of duty and the pull of grace". Placed in the 
context of Revelation, law and love become easier to reconcile because love 
is interpersonal, and love is revealed by God in Jesus Christ, and so the 
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command "to love" is really a "God view" of the human response to His love. 
Simply, you cannot love, no matter how powerful is the command, unless you 
are in love. God is in love with man. God initiates this love and in 
response to that initiative, man obeys the command. This is the force of 
the argument that virtues, understood in a Christian context, consist not 
in "doing good", but in "being good". 
"I - THOU" 
We have mentioned the influence of Buber in Brunner's thinking. It is in 
his description of "A life in love" that this influence becomes very 
powerful. 
-Community means life with the 'Thou'. From the ethical point of view 
the secret of faith is this that the individual self loses its 
loneliness, that the 'I' breaks through to the 'Thou' ....... that the 'I' is 
liberated, that this insane egocentric! ty has been healed, because the 'I' 
has been forced to admit the 'Thou'· . (30) 
This then is what happens when a man obeys the command to love his brother. 
Having admit ted the 'Thou' he finds that there is not now one central 
position in life - the self - but two. The self - 'I'- and God -'Thou' -
and so he can love with God's love which is now part of the self. 
This is the miracle, that the water has flowed upwards: no longer am 
'I' the central point in my life; there are now always two central 
points. The self no longer merely regards life from the point of view 
of the 'I', but also from the point of view of the 'Thou' <31> 
Therefore in love, a person is always presented to one as a whole. You can 
only love a 'whole' person. To approve of any particular quality in a 
person is impersonal and neuter in character. This is an impersonal form 
of community, in knowledge, which is among the natural forms of community 
for definite purposes - but love does not merely amount to sympathy with, 
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say, another's mind, but takes in all of him. This is why it is difficult 
to define or to outline all its rules. The more abstract and the more 
impersonal a relationship, then the easier it is to formulate rules whereby 
you can control it. Law, Brunner says, only exists where there is 
something which can be isolated in an abstract manner. The more abstract 
and the more impersonal, then the easier it is to formulate laws. 
But love itself cannot be defined except in negative terms. Love is life 
itself without all the corruptions that cling to it in the form of sin. 
This is the meaning behind the hymn to love in lCor• 13. Thus we cannot 
abstract from our neighbour certain elements, such as physical attributes, 
mind, or even environment, and love them- because love meets the 'Thou' 
and meets it in totality. Therefore there are no other virtues alongside 
love. Justice, truthfulness and all other desirable qualities within our 
personal relationships are all within love, and not an alternative or an 
addition to it. 
·Love must always be the motive, even where the outward contact has to 
be determined by justice. The actual character of our duties is 
always determined by our calling, and therefore by justice; but justice 
should never be the actual motive'. <32) 
The 'I - Thou' concept is valuable in a definition of love. If one sees 
that the 'Thou' comes to the 'I' as an act of revelation, and that the 
'Thou' comes to the 'I' as total love- the love of the Cross, then it is 
revelation and justification which transform us and which begin the ethical 
solution. Love brings the 'I' and the 'Thou' together and since the 'I' is 
now dwelling with the 'Thou', it is the two centres of being which form the 
'I' and that meets the 'Thou' in community. So the encounter in love in 
the community regards another individual as one who is conscious of an 
individual life and who is conscious of one's own individual life. It is an 
encounter of listening and sharing. Also it is an encounter with a whole 
being, including the elements of sin that exist in all of us. Love does 
not concede to the sin, but it does accept fully the 'Thou' who contains it 
- just as the 'Thou' who comes to us, accepts the 'I' in its unredeemed 
state. 
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SUMMARY OF THE LOVE-LAW DEBATE: 
The differences between Niebuhr and Brunner on this issue are typical of 
most of their differences. Niebuhr is more adventurous perhaps, and more 
inclined to take account of indeterminate possibilities. Doubtless his 
American environment had some bearing on this, but as has been pointed out, 
he was a lone voice in America in his espousal of Reformation principles. 
Niebuhr confesses that theology becomes for him meaningful when he tackles 
ethical questions, and he is as close to Brunner as he is to anybody in his 
treatment of ethics. 
Both share a common disagreement with Karl Barth on the question of natural 
morality and the nature of Revelation. Brunner's debate with Barth is what 
we shall deal with now, because Revelation is the fundamental vehicle for 
Christian insight, and grace is more important than law in determining the 
Christian basis for ethics. It is a major part of the importance of Brunner 
and Niebuhr that they found a position between thorough-going 
existentialism on the one hand, and solutions based entirely on 
Justification by Faith on the other. In spite of Niebuhr's criticism that 
Brunner was too hidebound in Lutheran traditionalism to apply his ethics to 
common life, we shall see that that is in fact an unfair criticism. It is 
perhaps more true to say that Brunner used systematic theology more 
consciously than Niebuhr, and therefore his conclusions were perhaps more 
cautious. Indeed it is a criticism of Brunner on the part of Niebuhr that 
he <Brunner> accepted too many of Barth's pre-suppositions in his debate on 
nature and grace. He therefore concludes that although he believes Brunner 
to be right, yet he lost the argument. Niebuhr is far more content to 
accept the dialectic of the reality of grace and the reality of nature, a 
sort of ontological dilemma, where he criticises Protestant theology for 
refusing to recognise the 'point of contact'. However we must take account 
of the fact that Niebuhr in his New World context did not have to grapple 
with the possibility of 'natural theology' being attached to a political 
ideology and, therefore, undergirding its racial theories. 
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NATURE AND GRACE 
No account of Brunner's writing on the subject of law and revelation would 
be complete without a mention of the debate that took place between him and 
Karl Barth on the subject of Nature and Grace, and of general and special 
revelation. This debate became famous, and Brunner's departure from Barth 
on what was seen as a most important issue may have some bearing on the 
fact that he <Brunner) is not as widely read today as I believe he deserves 
to be. The debate between Brunner and Barth is so well documented and 
reported that it is not intended to concentrate on the debate as such, but 
rather on Brunner's view of Nature and Grace as they are applied to social 
ethics. The reply by Barth, "Nein", is terse and strong in its rebuttal of 
Brunner's views. 
The argument begins with the concept of the revelation of God in creation. 
The world, Brunner says,is God's creation, and just as the artist is known 
by his works, so the spirit of the creator is in some way recognisable. 
The praise of God through his creation is an integral part of the Christian 
liturgy, and scripture upbraids man for not acknowledging it. 
Therefore it seems to me a queer kind of loyalty to Scripture to 
demand that such a revelation should not be acknowledged, in order that 
the significance of Biblical revelation should not be minimised . <33) 
Brunner argues that the creation of the world is at the same time a 
revelation - a self communication of God. 
Nowhere does the Bible give any justification for the view that 
through the sin of man this perceptibility of God in his works is 
destroyed, although it is adversely affected ........ Sin makes man blind 
to what is visibly set before our eyes. <34) 
Brunner compares this with the conscience, which here he defines as the 
consciousness of responsibility. Using the same kind of logic, Brunner 
says: 
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'Only because men somehow know the will of God are they able to sin. 
Scripture testifies to the fact that the knowledge of the law of God is 
somehow also knowledge of God. <35) 
From this point he posits the idea of two revelations. This is where 
'natural theology' is defined. The first revelation is a 'general' 
revelation, in creation, and from this comes the revelation of the 
consciousness of responsibility. The second revelation is 'special' 
revelation, the result of the historical facts of Jesus. 
Brunner admits that the pressing problem is to examine the way in which the 
two revelations are related. He says that the first answer is; 
· .... for us sinful men, the first, the revelation in creation, is not 
sufficient in order to know God in such a way that this knowledge 
brings salvation· . (36) 
The third concept, after the two concepts of revelation, is the concept of 
'preserving grace'. This means the manner in which God is present to his 
fallen creature. 
Again, Brunner admits to the danger of such a view. To argue for nat ural 
theology, natural morality and general revelation, and then to add the 
argument of preserving grace, places Brunner's theology at a sort of 
frontier, where he is challenging, or appears to be challenging, the 
concept of particularity. "No man can come to the Father but by Me", is a 
statement that appears to have little room for natural theology, and 
bearing in mind Brunner's Lutheran and Augustinian background we shall need 
to see how he reconciles the two. The answer will lie, as we have already 
noted, in the importance he places on the ethical question as a prime 
question, and as a 'point of contact'. 
Of 'preserving gracd he says': 
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'Preserving grace is a concept of quite undoubted biblical dignity. It 
is necessary to emphasise this specially, as it is, in a manner of 
speaking, a dangerous concept, For from it our thinking can easily 
slip into a pantheistic doctrine of immanence ..... Only in the light of 
the revelation in Christ is it possible to speak correctly of 
preserving grace. But the Christian is now under the serious 
obligation to speak of it - by way of thanksgiving. That God is so 
good that he makes his sun shine on the evil and on the good, that he 
gives us life, strength and health, in short the whole sphere of 
natural life and its goods - all that must be included in the concept 
of preserving grace or- as it is therefore called - general grace. In 
the faith of Christ we know that even before we knew the saving grace 
of Christ, we lived by the grace of God, i.e. by the 'preserving' grace 
of God, without properly knowing it . (37) 
The important point to note in this is Brunner's insistence that although 
he argues for the existence of natural theology - this time in the form of 
'preserving grace', yet he also argues that this is not perceivable without 
the benefit of the special revelation in Christ. In other words, 'special' 
pre-supposes 'general' revelation; but although 'general' revelation thus 
exists without 'special' revelation, it requires 'preserving' grace to make 
ordinances understandable to man. 
Within the sphere of this preserving grace belong, above all, those 
'ordinances' which are the constant factors of historical and social 
life, and which therefore form a basic part of all ethical 
problems. (38) 
As an example of ordinances he cites matrimony. He says that this is a 
'natural' ordinance because the possibility of, and the desire for its 
realisation lies within human nature, and because it is realised to some 
extent by men who are ignorant of God revealed in Christ. 
This is a powerful argument for the influence of natural theology in 
ethical ideas. Although Niebuhr, as we saw in the Natural Law debate, 
criticised Brunner for his emphasis on the Lutheran concept of 'orders', 
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yet on the subject of the application of grace to the 'constant factors of 
historical and social life', he comes very close to Brunner when he 
describes the love of family as an example of 'common grace'. At least he 
accepts the principle of common grace - which he describes as that which 
nourishes our more parochial forms of love - and is insufficient to nourish 
our obligation to love in a universal sense. (See note 13>. 
From this point Brunner proceeds with an investigation into the concept of 
"imago dei", steering a course between Stoic ideas which speak of a 'divine 
spark' within man's nature, and the wholly Barthian view of man as 
naturally totally depraved. He says that there are two aspects of the 
image of God, one 'formal' and the other 'material'. Not ice here that he 
does not distinguish, as Aquinas did, between 'image' and 'likeness'. The 
formal aspect is that he is by nature a man, and nothing has removed that 
certainty. The material is that which has been lost in the fall. The 
formal definition of the 'image of God' is 'the point of contact' with the 
revelation of God. Man is receptive of words and the fall has not done 
away with that. Barth argues forcefully that there is no natural 'point of 
contact' between man and God except in Christ. Christ is the sole 
mediator, and without Christ there is no vestige of the image of God in 
man. But Brunner says: 
This possibility of man's being addressed is also the presupposition 
of man's responsibility. Only a being which can be addressed is 
responsible, for it alone can make decisions. Only a being that can be 
addressed is capable of sin. But in sinning, while being responsible, 
it somehow or other knows of its sin. This knowledge of sin is a 
necessary presupposition of the understanding of the divine message of 
grace. It will not do to kill the dialectic of this knowledge of sin by 
saying that knowledge of sin comes only by the grace of God. This 
statement is as true as the other, that the grace of God is 
comprehensible only to him who alreay knows about sin. The case is 
similar to the divine ordinance, or the law. Natural man knows them 
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and yet does not know them ....... Sin is always in the sight of 
God--. <39) 
Brunner continues the argument in a dialectic vein, thereby confounding 
Niebuhr's criticism that European Protestant theology is not sufficiently 
dialectic. In sin there can be no knowledge of God, for the true knowledge 
of God is the abolition of sin. This dialectic, Brunner says, must not be 
one-sidedly abolished. On the contrary it must be strongly insisted on. 
For only in this dialectic does the responsibility of faith become clear. 
He who does not believe is himself guilty, and he who believes knows that 
it is pure grace . 
. :we have said that materially there is no more imago Dei, whereas 
formally it is intact. Similarly we must say that materially there is 
no point of contact, whereas formally, it is a necessary 
presupposition. The Word of God does not have to create man's capacity 
for words. He has never lost it. But the Word of God itself creates 
man's ability to hear it in such a way as is only possible in faith. 
It is evident that the doctrine of 'sola gratia' is not the least 
endangered by such a doctrine of the point of contact. <40) 
The argument is powerful, and the defence of the doctrine of 'sola gratia' 
is important. The divide between Brunner and Thomism is, in fact larger 
than that between Brunner and 'Barthianism'. There is no doubt in Brunner's 
view, or in Niebuhr's, of the power of sin, and of the effectiveness of 
Grace. There is no doubt either about the uniqueness of revelation in 
Christ and the power of the Cross. The difference between Brunner and 
Barth lies in the concept of natural morality, natural theology and natural 
revelation. These are all very different from 'natural law', but Barth 
sees them as the beginning of a slippery slope. He rigorously condemns the 
concept of the 'point of contact', and questions whether, beyond obvious 
common sense, Brunner is suggesting that man is acting in concert with the 
grace that comes to him in revelation. If that is so, Barth argues, "What 
of 'sola scriptura', 'sola gratia'? Also, as we have seen, he argues that 
all revelation is 'saving', and that which is not saving is not revelation. 
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However, Brunner persists in his concept of the 'point of contact'. He 
argues that it includes not only the humanum in its narrowest sense, but 
everything connected with the 'natural' knowledge of God. 
A man without conscience cannot be struck by the call- 'Repent ye and 
believe the Gospel'. <41) 
Natural man's knowledge of God and of the law and of his own dependence may 
be very confused and distorted - but it is the necessary, indispensable 
point of contact for divine grace. 
The final point to examine in Brunner's defence of natural theology is his 
concept of 'orders'. We shall deal specifically with this concept in detail 
at a later stage, but where it affects his perception of natural theology, 
we can examine it briefly at this stage. Mention was made in the 'natural 
law' section, of the danger which Niebuhr considered Brunner risked in his 
emphasis on orders. Barth similarly criticised this concept, although from 
a different view point. Brunner says: 
Barth poi~d out to me the political danger of Gogarten's doctrine of 
the ordinances. His verdict was that in that concept there was hidden a 
whole political and cultural programme of a distinctively authoritarian 
stamp. Events have proved how right he was.' . <42) 
He then proceeds to justify his ideas, not this time, by pointing out his 
emphasis on the reality of history, as he had done with Niebuhr, but with 
demonstrating that he had always taught that there are two ways to conceive 
orders. One is strictly conservative and authoritarian, a stance which 
Brunner roundly condemned in the introduction to The Divine Imperative. 
The other, which might be called revolutionary or conservative with equal 
justification, is a refracted concept of orders, corresponding to the 
refraction in the theologia naturalis of the Reformers. He makes the point 
that the theologiaris attitude to theologia naturalis decides the character 
of his ethics. Historically, it may be said that the concept of the 
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ordinances of creation has been regulative for Christian ethics from the 
beginning to the time of the Enlightenment, in all matters connected with 
the problem of society as such - i.e. in the doctrine of the ministry, 
secular vocation, matrimony, the state and so on. 
Christian social ethics throughout the centuries may be defined as the 
doctrine of the love founded in Jesus Christ, and of its function in 
society, 'according to the divine institution of the latter'. 
'Social ethics are therefore always determined as much by the concept 
of the divine grace of creation and preservation as by that of the 
redeeming grace of Christ. . (43) 
Natural theology is therefore also of decisive importance for the dealings 
of Christians with unbelievers. There is clearly a warning here that true 
principles could be betrayed, but the task, however, remains. 
· Theologia naturalis, imago Dei, and responsibility are the centre on 
which everything turns. What is central is not dogmatics, nor 
eristics, nor ethics, but solely the proclamation of the word of God 
itself. But a true understanding of theologia naturalis is of decisive 
importance for all three, and also for the manner of proclamatio~ . <43) 
The nature of the dialectic content of Brunner's view on this can best be 
seen if we quote him in the same thesis. In spite of his arguments for 
natural morality and his insistence on the concept of the 'point of 
contact', he says, and Barth makes a point of quoting him as saying: 
'We are concerned with the message of the sovereign, freely electing 
grace of God. Of his free mercy God gave to man - whose will is not 
free, but in bondage - His salvation in the Cross of Christ, and by the 
Holy Spirit who enables him to assimilate this word of the Cross . <45) 
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CONCLUSION: 
To summarise, we are left with the situation that both Brunner and Niebuhr 
accept the existence of natural theology, but that Niebuhr does not accept 
all of the 'Barthian' presuppositions which Brunner accepted. Both also 
accept the function of Grace in determining the nature of Christian 
thinking - as opposed to classical theories of natural law. Further, they 
see revelation as the means whereby men are made conscious of God and of 
His command. Therefore, Revelation, Nature and Grace are the components of 
the means of establishing a system of Christian ethics. Most important is 
the agreement between Brunner and Niebuhr on the question of the concept of 
the 'point of contact'. Niebuhr says: 
'Protestant theology is wrong in denying the point of contact 
•• (Anknupfungspunkt) which always exists in man by virtue of the residual 
element of justitia originalis in his being. <46) 
The debate about nature and grace, particularly between Barth and Brunner, 
re-defined 'orthodox~ and although Niebuhr addressed himself to the same 
question, one must remember that, for him, the Reformation tradition had to 
be expressed in a specifically New World context, and that means that there 
was no way in which, as in Europe, 'natural Theology' could be used in 
political ideology to undergird its racial and other theories. In fairness 
to Barth, that was a very major concern of his, and it is true that 
Protestant theology did not effectively counter the rise of European 
Fascism as well as it might have done. 
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CHAPTER 4 PARTICULAR EMPHASES OF BRUNNER AND NIEBUHR 
INTRODUCTION: 
At this point of the thesis we shall look at Brunner and Niebuhr separately 
and examine particular emphases which they employed. We have already noted 
that their different environments influenced them and there was a definite 
divergence in a number of issues which concerned not their conclusions, but 
their approach to the problem. 
However their similarities are more marked than their differences. We can 
summarise this on the evidence seen so far in this thesis in this way. 
Both avoided too radical an approach to the question of ethics. In spite of 
their common rejection of classical natural law theories they both accepted 
the possibilities of natural morality and natural theology. Both accepted 
that ethics is integral to theology, and not an addition to it, and that 
Christian ethics is distinct from any other system. Both rejected nee-
platonic and ontological approaches and both placed at the centre of their 
teaching the Cross, and the nature of Grace. 
We shall first examine some of Emil Brunner's particular characteristics, 
starting with this observation. One of the main reasons for his 
comparative eclipse in recent years may well be his disagreement with Barth 
on the question of natural theology. Barth, as we have seen, took a 
particularly radical stance on that question. Certainly, the point that 
the acceptance of 'natural orders' can give rise to unacceptable forms of 
authoritarianism is valid and, in our times, important. Barth wrote in the 
context of the rise of European Fascism, and there are similar! ties today 
in the situation in, say, South Africa. There are those who have found 
Barth's radicalism here of great value. It is also possibly a defence 
against the emergence of a liberation theology. Until recently, that is to 
say, until the findings of Vatican 2, Thomism can be said to have given 
rise to an authoritarian church. And Luther's concept of 'natural orders' 
was set in the context of medieval society with its built in power 
structures 
authority 
and patterns of 
is that it can be 
authority. 
said to 
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for 'grace'. 
Further, the tainting of man with sin is such that human authority is bound 
to be corrupting as it exercises its functions. Therefore to postulate 
natural orders runs the risk of encouraging unacceptable forms of 
government and power. 
However, the argument concerning nat ural orders and nat ural law is not 
rendered valid, or invalid, merely because of observation. Validity, in 
this sense, is not empirical, but theological. Brunner defended himself 
against this accusation when it was made by Niebuhr, as we saw in the 
chapter on 'Natural Law'. Also, to accept completely the stance that 
Barth held, is to ignore the powerful arguments about the 'point of 
contact', the awareness of sin and the concept of preserving grace. In 
short, to postulate a system of ethics based entirely on justification by 
faith and revelation, is open to the charge of being as narrow as Thomis~ 
Thomism lacks the scope for appreciating the liberating and transcendent 
features of love and grace in the natural realm. Barthianism lacks the 
sense of universalism that is implicit in all New Testament statements of 
ethics. The point that Niebuhr and Brunner are making is that there is a 
dialectical relationship between natural theology and the special 
revelation of God in Jesus, and between the preserving grace which God 
showers on all people, irrespective of who they are, and the grace by which 
we are saved, and which motivated the sacrifice on the Cross. 
EMIL BRUNNER'S PARTICULAR EMPHASES. 1. THE DIVINE HUMAN ENCOUNTER 
Paul Tillich has this to say of Brunner: 
In perhaps his most suggestive book, The Divine Human Encounter, 
Brunner developes a theological epistemology which seems to me both 
biblical and existentialist, and, most important, adequate to the 
subject matter with which theology has to deal;. (1) 
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The subject of the Divine-Human Encounter is dealt with in three other of 
Brunner's works. They are The Divine Imperative, Man in Revolt and a 
series of essays entitled God and Man. It is apparent from the titles of 
these books - all comparatively late in his work - that Brunner continued 
to concern himself with what we may call the human side of the principle of 
dialecticism. We saw, early in this thesis, evidence to suggest that a 
moral theologian tends to be more aware of the realities of human life, and 
the dilemmas facing the Church, than other theologians. There is a 
difference of interest here again between Brunner and Barth. Barth laid 
stress on the 'freedom of God' from all forms of natural theology, 
including that of Brunner, while Brunner in turn worked out the general 
principles of anthropology as over and against what he thought of as false 
doctrines of man, including those of Barth. Brunner felt that Barth had 
done injustice to the biblical doctrine of the responsibility of man. In 
the preface to Man in Revolt, he says: 
'with the publication of this book I hope I have redeemed the promise 
made in the foreword to the second edition of "Nature and Grace", 
namely, that only a completely theological anthropology, which begins 
with the central truths of the Christian faith - the Trinity, Election, 
Incarnation - and is directed towards the final redemption, will be in 
a position, without causing any misunderstandings, to show clearly my 
concern, as against Karl Barth- namely, man's responsibility (2) 
The fact is that Brunner, in order to maintain the concept of human 
responsibility, uses categories of recent existentialist philosophy whereas 
Barth claims to have cut himself loose from all philosophy in general, and 
existentialism in particular. Brunner asserts that he has no quarrel with 
ordinary anthropology and frankly continues to use Kierkegaard's notion of 
the individual. 
It is with the help of this notion alone, he argues, that we 
understand and maintain human responsibility. 
notion, he adds, we know that the man whom 
By the help of this 
God created is both 
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individual and humanity. In the individual, the particular and the 
universal are brought together. <3>. 
We have already examined the influence which Martin Suber had on Brunner, 
summed up in the "I-Thou" concept. The Divine Human Encounter is Brunner's 
development of that thesis and he applies it to a wide range of theological 
principles, not least that of Christian ethics. We shall see in this 
section the importance attached to this concept. It would be fair to say 
that, for Brunner, the idea of the 'personal' and the 'individual' is 
paramount. It is here that he shows himself to be a true disciple of 
Reformation theories. One of the main polemics of the Reformation was the 
'individual' response of man to God- and the 'individual's' accountability 
to God- and the 'individual's' access to the "Throne of Grace". 
Brunner's teaching on this runs throughout his works, and we shall see that 
the concept of the 'individual' is central to his systematic theology -
and, in particular, his Doctrine of God, and it is taken up in his ethical 
teaching, forming a major part of his work •'The Divine Imperative(·. This 
is said to demonstrate that for Brunner, systematic theology and ethics are 
one and the same thing. 
It is only in the notion of the individual, argues Brunner, that we have 
the true understanding of personality. Man is created that he may become a 
personality. In Ghrist, as the true universal, and the true particular, 
the ideal person stands ever before him. It is only the Bible which 
correctly states the nature of man, in its dialectical treatment of 
'creation' and 'fall', We have already seen in this thesis, in the first 
chapter that Niebuhr also states that the Genesis myths present a more 
accurate and believable doctrine of the nature of man than philosophy, 
psychology or any political system. The historic - dramatic form of the 
fall of man is a more satisfactory answer. Man's life is subject to 
history in its corrupting and liberating forms. (4) 
'To know oneself as existing in the contradiction, so that the 
contradiction is one that affects all, and, further, to know that the 
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contradiction really goes through oneself, through one's centre, one's 
reality, and finally, to know that in this knowledge one does not flee 
out of the reality of existence, but, on the contrary, only thus 
attains true reality to know oneself in such a fashion is to know 
oneself as a sinner. This is the specifically Christian and Biblical 
contribution to the self-knowledge of man. <5> 
In this Brunner and Niebuhr are of one mind. It is important to emphasise 
that in the basic question of 'sin' and its place in the nature of man, 
both agree. Brunner continues with his emphasis on 'personality'. This is 
described in terms of its relationship to God and its relationship to the 
concepts of sin and the fall. 
"The Bible speaks of sin, because it speaks of man as the creature of 
God, and of God as the Lord of rna~ <6> 
God and man cannot be mentioned together without taking account of sin and 
of the fall. It is an essential part of the relationship, and an essential 
part of the Lordship of God over man that man has sinned. It is true that 
God is Lord of the atoms - but He gets no recognition from them. Only 
through man's recognition of Him does He appear Lord over him. Brunner 
argues here strongly against ontological systems when he asserts that 
philosophy and science know nothing of this. Such systems are centred on 
man. They work out their systems, naturalistic, idealistic, or even 
romantic, but in these systems they never meet God. Through a system one 
never comes into contact with reality. 
This point is taken up in his work Mysticism and the Word Brunner is here 
dealing with the 'subject - object' relationship and here he offers some 
quite new thinking on the question. It is when one takes into account the 
fundamentals of the Christian doctrine of man, its relationship to the 
doctrine of sin, and their relationship with the doctrine of God, that one 
can forcefully argue the case for ethics to belong firmly within theology 
and nowhere else. We shall quote Brunner at some length on this because it 
is at the core of the entire thesis. 
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"Naturalistic and idealistic systems of psychology, of ethics or of 
epistemology all deal with the ordinary 'subject object' 
relationship and thus miss real contact with personality. Dealing, as 
they do, with a priori epistemological and ontological principles, 
these systems have no eye for God and for His relationship with man. 
They know nothing of Jesus Christ and His Kingdom, and thus fail to 
understand the true nature of reality. The Bible, therefore, must be 
the source and norm of all theology. By faith alone can we know 
reality and God. In thought we deal with 'something' - in faith we 
deal with God. 
A 'something' I can control and possess. It does not really change me 
by taking me beyond myself. It has come forth from myself. But when 
God speaks to me, He changes me. He turns about the whole of my 
existence; He lifts me out of myself and breaks my loneliness. The 
monologue of my existence becomes a dialogue. Thus the 'subject -
object' relationship has disappeared and I stand personally before 
God. . . . . . . . I know God in His love, and knowing God in His love, I 
know myself as addressed by God. God's Lordship over me is at the 
same time His fellowship with me - and through this fellowship alone, 
I have my being . (7) 
It is this passage, which is echoed in The Divine Human Encounter, in 
Brunner's Dogmatic~ and again in The Divine Imperativ~ that suggests that 
Brunner has steered the right course between Barthianism and natural law 
theories. It is scriptural, and it takes proper account of alternatives. 
David Cairns has contributed an appreciation of Brunner in Kegley and 
Bretall' s work. He refers especially to this part of Brunner's teaching 
and demonstrates just how central it is in his systematic theology by 
quoting from his book Dogmatics. 
Cairns points out that the phrase "to know God" is existential and not 
theoretic. It is a knowledge of and not a knowledge that. That is to say, 
knowledge of God is mediated through historic events, and through 
revelation. Thus of his knowledge of God Brunner says: 
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'When God the Lord meets me in Jesus Christ, I know that He is the 
Creator and that I am His creature. And conversely, only in this 
encounter do I know that I am His creature· . (8) 
This is an existential form of knowledge. It is not acquired through 
ratiocinative processes, but through experience and through revelation. 
Brunner would say that there is no doctrine of God without the experience 
of Him. In the Bible God is always mentioned in relation to community and 
to activity. He is not a philosophical concept or the result of man's 
thinking. 
Brunner's Christian .tectri_ne_ pf _Man .continues in the same style. 
In Jesus Christ, God meets me as the one who gives Himself freely to 
me, and at the same time, claims me entirely for Himself, as Holy Love. 
As such He reveals Himself to me, but in so doing He reveals me at the 
same time to myself in the original nature He has given me ..... Once 
more both are linked in co-relation. It is one and the same thing to 
know of the holy loving God, and of this human nature of mine as it 
springs from the Creator's hand• (9) 
And so the Christian doctrine of man is bound up with the 'individual' and 
with the 'personal' concepts which are so central in Brunner's teaching. 
Further there is a integrated approach to the whole problem. The nature of 
God, the nature of man, the nature of sin and the doctrine of creation are 
all part of the same doctrine. Man's ethical response is also part of that 
doctrine. Brunner is powerfully arguing the case for the Divine 
Initiative. And so the human response is part of the nature of God. How man 
responds is in relation to how God is. 
Response", Brunner writes: 
In a passage headed "A Living Free 
God wills to have a creature which does not reflect to Him His glory, 
as the other created beings do, as the mere object of His will. He 
desires an active and spontaneous 'reflection'. He, who creates 
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through the Word, who creates as Spirit, creates in freedom, looks for 
a reflection that is more than a reflex, an answer to His word, which 
is a free act of the Spirit. Only thus can the love really impart 
itself as 1 ave. For love can only impart itself when it is received 
in love. That is why the creaturely existence of man is, in essence, 
freedom, selfhood. ". <10) 
2 THE CALL 
Brunner's work, The Divine Imperative, which, as we saw in the first 
chapter, is an unsatisfactory translation of the German title, "Das Gebot 
und die Ordnungen", is his major work on Christian ethics. The title 
expresses his concern with two major concepts- 'command' and 'orders'. 
In the chapter on Natural Law we dealt at some length with the concept of 
'orders', and here we shall examine what Brunner has to say about 
'command', or 'calling'. Again this is part of his preoccupation with the 
idea of the 'personal' and the 'individual'. The Divine Imperative is a 
major work not merely because it is one of Brunner's longest books, but 
because it is arguably the first treatise on ethics from a Protestant 
standpoint for very many years, and it has not been replaced with anything 
as weighty. True, it has much in common with Bonhoeffer's Ethics, with the 
writings of Karl Barth, and, of course, with Niebuhr's The Nature and 
Destiny of Man, although the last named is probably better compared with 
Brunner's Man in Revolt, in view of the considerable anthropological 
insights common to both .. The Divine Imperative combines systematic theology 
with ethical principles. It puts ethics firmly at the 'entrance' to the 
Christian faith and asserts that no doctrine of God is satisfactory without 
a corresponding ethical response. 
In a section entitled 'The Calling', a reflection of the German Das Gebot, 
Brunner asserts at the beginning: 
"God's command is wholly personal. 
God never requires 'something in 
Therefore it is wholly concrete. 
general', He does not issue 
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proclamations, nor does He set up any kind of programme. He never 
issues commands into the air - with the idea that any one may hear 
them who happens to feel like it! He tells me, or us, or you, as 
definite persons to do some definite thing. (11> 
At this point Brunner makes a concession to fact that a general sort of 
law, like a general sort of grace, has its place in the Divine purposes, 
and that this forms a basis whereby the individual is able to hear the 
Divine command- but the command itself is personal. The 'calling' is what 
represents the difference between legalistic morality and Christian 
morality. The first element of the call is that a Christian is called to 
be God's. The Creator has turned towards the creature. "I am the Lord thy 
God". 
31: 3) 
<Exodus 20: 2) "I have loved thee with an everlasting love (Jer. 
"I have called thee by name, thou art mine". <Isaiah 43: 1) So 
'calling' is the expression of election. The first element of the 'call' 
is that we are elected, and the divine grace is communicated to Christians. 
The individual is now called to be with God. 
The second element of the 'call' is that we are called to serve Him. 
Again, this is not a universal law but a personal command. Each individual 
Christian is called to serve. Brunner says that the personal call is the 
word of the Holy Spirit, and that obedience to it is part of it. 
'To hear this call, really and truly, and to obey it, actually means 
the same thing. If I do not obey the call then I have not really heard 
it aright. Obedience is grace, and grace is obedience··. <12) 
There follows a section where Brunner identifies this call with man's 
justification, and where he asserts the sufficiency of grace, so that man 
is called personally where he is and as he is. The call represents the 
'new garments', and no work on man's part can achieve what God has achieved 
in His calling of man. He then says - and this is the heart of his ethical 
teaching: 
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This expresses one of the most profound truths of ethics, indeed one 
of the most profound truths which have ever been conceived by the mind 
of man, namely the idea of the 'Calling', which is so characteristic of 
the thought and teaching of Paul and Luther. When Luther drew forth 
this forgot ten truth from beneath the rubbish heap of the 
ecclesiastical ethic, which had been corrupted by Aristotelean and 
ascetic ideas, it was an act of significance for the whole of world 
history, an act of overwhelming importanct,'0 • <13) 
To justify such an apparently extravagant claim it is necessary to remind 
oneself that in the Middle Ages the term 'vocatio' was applied to 
monasticism and when later it was applied to those living in the world it 
pre-supposed a clerical 'caste'. The medieval idea of 'classes' was only 
broken down by Luther's revival of the teaching of the 'priesthood of all 
believers'. Indeed Luther used the word 'Beruf', calling, as an expression 
of the new view of life in the world. Calling, in the Reformation, became 
'secularised' as opposed to 'clericalised'. 
Further, in this section, Brunner claims that this idea of the call is an 
immediate consequence of the doctrine of justification by faith. God wills 
to allow a sinful man, in all his sinfulness, to work for Him. There is no 
abstract law that can depreciate the service rendered by sinful man. The 
only form of 'hallowed service' is that which has been called by God, and a 
service rendered by 'pure' agents, within conditions actually 'pure', does 
not exist. 
Within the concept of the personal and concrete 'call' one must take 
account of the concept of divine providence. For God to call a man in his 
sinfulness and to challenge him to obey the call where and as he is, is not 
to say that God has no knowledge of what has been previously done. Nothing 
that happens, happens without the knowledge of God. There is nothing 
capricious or accidental about the state of a man and it must be said that 
the Providence of God governs the world and not just His followers. 
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Here Brunner says that the introduction of the concept of Providence into 
ethics is a process that must be handled with great caution, for it has 
done a great deal of damage in this sphere. His argument centres on the 
idea of the time ahead and the time in the past. It runs thus. Providence 
threatens to justify the status quo and to paralyse the moral will. This 
is not the fault of providence but the result of a misunderstanding of the 
nature of the ethical moment. The difference between the time past and the 
time ahead is that one can merely contemplate the time past and can 
exercise no ethical power over it. 
future, though, is not decided and 
It has already been decided. The 
one is called to an act of decision. 
Therefore, ethically the two times are different, although one does not 
know this 'theoretically'. Theoretically, all one can do is to 
contemplate, and so the future can become the past. So theoretically the 
future can be 'killed' by it being regarded as already fixed. Ethically, 
one should stand between the times and realise that the present is the time 
to which God has brought us, and the present is when God commands us to 
act. God wills one to act at a particular time and in a particular place, 
conscious indeed of the past, but not responsible for the past. In spite of 
the sinfulness of the present, God 'covers' it with His forgiveness and the 
place and the time are pure. A Christian has thus received the 'call' to 
be God's and also the call to serve God- and this is 'pure'. 
·The place is 'pure', no matter how bad it may be in itself. It is 
'pure' through the call of God. And this paradoxical purity, this 
making holy of that which is in itself unholy, through God's forgiving 
call: this is the Callin~ <14> 
It is because of the power of the call and its presence here and now in the 
sinful state of man, that man can act in good conscience. One can only act 
in good conscience by faith - and so 'the call' and 'justification by 
faith' are intertwined. A man who has not experienced this justification, 
who has not been a part of the Divine-Human encounter cannot live without 
an uneasy conscience. In religious circles, Brunner says, two alternatives 
are inevitable. The first is monasticism, a denying of all the world's 
pleasures in order to find purity, and the second is a kind of compromise 
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morality enjoined on the great majority of people, and sustained by 
sacramental feeding with regular absolutions and so on. 
Also, there is no real refuge for the morally earnest man who has not 
experienced justification. The person who sees it as his mission in life 
to 'clean up' the various parts of society which do not conform to his 
moral view, is a person who in the process loses the secret of living and 
becomes cynical or hostile. Such a person is ignorant of the nature of sin, 
and the fate of some of the very 'best' of people can be a lapse into a 
sort of modern fanaticism. 
Brunner says: 
The idea of the 'Calling' makes short work of this fanaticism and the 
spirit of hopeless acquiescence to which it leads. Here what matters 
most is not the improvement of one particular place in the world, of 
conditions and circumstances - although such procedure has its own 
secondary importance - not the search for 'the right place for me', 
but the thankful acceptance of the place, at which I am now set, from 
the hands of Providence, as the sphere of my life, as the place in 
which I am to meet my neighbour in love. The idea of 'Calling' makes 
us free from all feverish haste, from bitterness, and from the 
inevitable and hopeless resignation of the reformer· . <15) 
This passage is worthy of careful consideration, not merely because it is a 
sound polemic for 'the Call' in the face of providence, and the 
impossibility of morality without justification; and not merely because it 
uses the concept of time and place in ethics to assert an existentialist 
position, but because it could well be one of the main passages in this 
book which led to its being declared illegal by the German authorities. It 
contains a scarcely concealed attack on the philosophy of National 
Socialism in Germany at that time, with its fanatical reforming zeal and 
its quest to create a pure race for the Fatherland. It is worth noting 
that in our generation there are those 'radicals' who have a zealous 
appetite for reform who, from the point of view of a Christian, should be 
challenged with the 'Call', and the reality of the individual and personal 
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response to God, in ethical terms. In this passage, Brunner is not merely 
asserting a Protestant position as opposed to a Catholic position. He is 
also asserting what he sees as the only Christian answer to the emergence 
of fanaticism in public life. We have already seen that the Word of God is 
given to the Church for the world - and the Church must give an answer to 
the movements in the world which lead to tyranny and oppression. Brunner 
is saying that the answer lies in the concept of the 'personal', the 
'individual' and the 'call'. 
Still on the subject of the 'call', Brunner points to other dangers which 
are the result of a mis-conception. The very term, 'calling' has become 
debased in ordinary use. It has come to mean merely the following of a 
particular occupation, and one's share of duty which falls to the lot of an 
individual in the whole economy of labour. Also, in theological terms the 
term has been open to abuse - primarily because of a lack of understanding 
of the nature of justification by faith, but also because of a warping of 
the Lutheran idea whereby people discovered a new respect for the economic 
and social spheres of life as a result of Luther's teaching on 'calling'. 
Brunner explains it this way: 
The point is that here, world pessimism has been overcome, while at 
the same time, the radical corruption of the world and the absolute 
character of the divine law are recognised. All that Luther cared 
about was to secure the possession of a good conscience in one's 
calling, and to do away with the unsatisfactory alternatives: 
renunciation of the world, or compromise. · <15> 
Brunner is here pointing out the danger of what is frequently called the 
'Protestant work ethic' which has elevated capitalism to the level of an 
ideal and has disregarded the inequitable results of various capitalistic 
systems. He cites the evils of unemployment as an example of this. 
The answer to the dilemma here lies in a more eschatological understanding 
of the concept of the 'call'. What distinguishes the Christian concept 
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from the secular concept is that the Christian is called, not only into the 
world, but out of it as well. It is true that God calls man in the world, 
but He also calls him to his Heavenly Kingdom. The call is to a particular 
place in the world. It is concrete, it is personal and it is compelling -
but it is also to work in the Lord's Vineyard, and to do one's duty as an 
act of obedience to the call, is to be a citizen of the coming Kingdom of 
God. 
'The Here and Now constitute the necessary narrowness, the vision of 
the coming Kingdo~ the necessar~ breadth for right action within the 
calling. If there were no narrowness, action would be fantastic, 
unreal and fanatical. If there were no breadth, action would 
degenerate into the self complacency of the Philistine, with an utter 
absence of tension. To be 'on the spot' -working with the eternal end 
in view - that is Christian action within the 'Calling'. <16) 
SUMMARY 
We have cited only a few of Brunner's particular emphases, but they are, it 
is argued, sufficient to show that he has an original and valuable 
contribution to make to the debate. He has vigorously re-appraised Luther 
and clarified many of the misunderstandings that have arisen in Protestant 
circles. His particular strengths are his insistence that ethics belongs at 
the heart of theology, and that it comprises a vital element in our 
understanding of the nature of God. Also we must cite his emphasis on the 
importance of the individual. In so doing, he has elevated man to the 
level of an heir of God, and not merely a creature. The Divine~Human 
Encounter is vi tal not only to man, but also to God, and within it comes 
the ethical response. 
I believe that it is fitting in this summary to comment on Brunner's 
'style'. Mention was made in the first chapter about the contrast between 
him and Barth. The quotations from 'Jhe Divine Imperative which we have 
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noted suggest a very fine literary style and also point to a very strong 
sense of reverence, awe and wonder. One cannot escape the conclusion that 
Brunner writes, not merely employing his scholarship and intellect, but 
also his personal convictions. Both his style and his personal history, 
which show intimate knowledge of the Church at every level, convince us 
that we are dealing with more than just a theologian. His subject matter 
is not just something he examined and analysed, but is also his personal 
conviction. This is another justification for a comparison between him and 
Niebuhr. Niebuhr similarly demonstrated personal involvement in his 
subject matter and was a most enthusiastic proclaimer, both in the spoken 
and the written word, of his convictions. It was this that made Brunner 
describe him as a 'volcano' , and it was Brunner's convict ions that led 
Niebuhr willingly to identify himself with so much of what he wrote and 
said. In concentrating on ethics as a major study, both men thought out 
their theology in a world context. They were able, more than most, to 
explore the dialectic of 'being like Christ', and knowing that it is 
impossible. 
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CHAPTER 5 THE PARTICULAR EMPHASES OF REINHOLD N~EBUHR: A POLITICAL 
AND THEOLOGICAL PILGRIMAGE 
We noticed in the first chapter of this thesis that Niebuhr's thinking was 
described as "organic" rather than "systematic". We noticed that he was 
captive to no particular school of theology, and that he adapted himself to 
the rapidly changing world scene. It is, therefore, more difficult to 
identify the particularities of Niebuhr's work than it is to identify those 
of Emil Brunner. Brunner was more consciously a systematic theologian 
whose ethical studies lay at the heart of his theological thinking. While 
maintaining a radical position which lay between the extremities of 
Barthianism and Thomism, nevertheless he was more satisfied with his 
Lutheran heritage than was Niebuhr. Further, Niebuhr addressed himself 
directly to the politicians, industrialists and power groups of his day. 
In this, his writings were proli fie, and although his claim was that 
theology and Christian insights are essential in the formulating of a 
coherent and pracdcal political and social philosophy, yet his impact on 
the political world was, arguably, greater than that of any churchman of 
this century. The nearest parallel is probably William Temple. In this 
part of the thesis we shall attempt to explain the reasons for his 
influence, which is remarkable when one considers the conscious secularism 
and the idealised liberalism that were constituent parts of the "American 
Dream". 
We are dealing here with only one of the many aspects of Niebuhr's work. 
There are compelling arguments for choosing other particularities, such as 
his view of history, the flux of time, his existential insights, his 
doctrine of the nature of man and so on. However here, we confine 
ourselves to a brief examination of his political influence, and our study 
will be based on essays and lectures published as The Church and the Modern 
World. 
NIEBUHR'S POLITICAL PILGRIMAGE 
Although it would be impossible to determine the particular events which 
changed Niebuhr's thinking, it is true to say that there are at least three 
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distinct stages of his political philosophy, each merging imperceptibly 
into its successor, which justify the sub-title "Pilgrimage". 
Much of his early writings can be termed "pre-theological". It was not 
until the middle of the nineteen thirties that Niebuhr wrote explicit 
theology, as opposed to political, social and philosophical works with 
Christian insights. It would be wrong to underestimate the theological 
perceptions of these early works - but the theology was more implicit 
than explicit. In his pre-theological works, Niebuhr identified himself 
with the conventional 'liberalism' of American society. During the years 
of his pastorate in Detroit where he witnessed and commented on the 
exploitation of the labouring classes in the industrial system, he accepted 
many of the liberal presuppositions of his generation. Their emphasis on 
support for the League of Nations, racial tolerance and sympathy for the 
labour unions coincided with his own. Mention was made in the first 
chapter of this thesis of these views, which are vividly recorded in his 
lL b k fa Tamed Cynic;A major theme of this book is his 
· eaves From the Note oo o 
criticism of Protestantism on the basis that it emphasised the metaphysical 
at the expense of social ethics. 
'Sermon after sermon, speech after speech is based on the 
assumption that the people of the Church are committed to the 
ethical ideals of Jesus and that they are the sole - or at least 
the chief - agents of redemption energy in society. It is very 
difficult to persuade people who are committed to a general ideal 
to consider the meaning of that ideal in specific situations· (1) 
As an example of his identification with liberal presuppositions we can 
quote from the same work. 
•'Look at the industrial enterprise anywhere and you find criminal 
indifference on the part of the strong to the fate of the weak. 
The lust for power and greed got gain are the dominant note in 
business. An industrial overlord will not share his power with the 
workers until he is forced to do so by tremendous pressure~ (2) 
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This stage of Niebuhr's thinking culminated in the publication in 1932 of 
Moral Man and Immoral Society, and, in 1934, of Reflections on the End of 
an Era. By this time he had virtually abandoned his liberal views and for 
a time looked towards Marxism as a more attractive option. It was not 
until 1935 that Niebuhr started to write serious theology and by then his 
concept of the transcendent, and of revelation, the nature of man, grace 
and redemption were demonstrated as answers to the many questions raised in 
his earlier writings. However, until then, Niebuhr can be described as a 
political theologian progressing from one set of presuppositions to 
another. His preoccupation with justice and equality naturally led him to 
contemporary political ideals, and it is worth remarking that in the West 
many of the intelligentsia and, indeed, many of the senior politicians of 
the post war era courted Marxism in the nineteen thirties. 
We shall at this stage briefly isolate the main theses of Moral Man and 
Immoral Society, and of Reflections, and we shall attempt to demonstrate 
how Niebuhr moved from there to the end of the decade when, just before the 
outbreak of World War 2 in 1939 he delivered the Gifford Lectures which 
were to be published as The Nature and Destiny of Man . It is worth 
recording that as early as 1929 Niebuhr expressed his doubts about liberal 
tenets, and in 1936 in his journal he enumerated specifically six articles 
of the liberal creed which, he said, blinded it to the world. These were: 
1. Injustice is caused by ignorance and will yield to education and 
greater intelligence. 
2. Civilisation is becoming gradually more moral. 
3. The character of individuals, not social systems, will guarantee 
justice. 
4. Appeals to brotherhood and good will are bound to be effective 
in the end, and if they have been ineffective to date, we need only 
more and better appeals. 
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5. Goodness makes for happiness, and increased knowledge of this 
will overcome human selfishness. 
6. War is stupid and will yield to reason. (3) 
This represents Niebuhr's most concrete rejection of liberalism, although 
there were other creeds to reject before he set about the theological 
examination of the Nature of Man. From what we have learned about Emil 
Brunner, there is no doubt that he would have rejected this liberalism 
equally forcefully. Essentially, liberalism, as represented in these 
propositions is an Aristotelean viewpoint. The emphasis on 'reason', and 
the achievement of 'goodness' are precisely those categories that offended 
against Brunner's and Niebuhr's conception of the source of a Christian 
ethic. 
MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SOCIETY 
This is the book which has become, perhaps, Niebuhr's most famous, and 
which influenced many western political leaders. The most celebrated 
thesis of the book is that "the group is less moral than the individual", 
which militated against prevailing liberal optimism. However, the other 
theses are equally important and represent much of Niebuhr's total view of 
the nature of man. Consistent with his dialectic emphasis, Niebuhr, in 
this book, isolates three 'ambiguities' in addition to the question of man 
and society. 
The first is the ambiguity of power. The political debate is, he says, 
more about a contest for power than about theories. The argument 
represents a clash of wills rather than a clash of minds. A recurring theme 
is that nobody willingly relinquishes power, and, therefore, the political 
system is dominated by the interest of groups - largely economic groups. 
This, in turn, gives rise to injustice, because predominant power groups 
appropriate rewards and privileges to themselves. Unequal power gives rise 
to unequal justice. However, power, Niebuhr argues, is not intrinsically 
evil. Indeed it is necessary to establish unity and order in a community 
and also to effect social change and thus to achieve a more tolerable 
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justice. He condemns the hypocrisy of those who condemn power which is 
achieved by revolutionary means, while at the same time implicitly 
supporting the power which keeps their privileges intact. Niebuhr thus 
defends the possibility of legitimate revolution in the interests of 
justice. He used a similar argument later to justify the use of force 
against fascism. 
The second thesis is the ambiguity of reason. This, like power, is capable 
of both positive and negative applications. On the one hand, reason is 
that which, in man, is the central principle of human creativity, morality 
and hope. Man can, 
mortality. On he 
Ar i st ot el ean manner, 
by reason, study his own nature, and can fear his own 
other hand, far from being a noble gift in the 
Niebuhr sees it as that which unjustly rationalises 
dubious actions in pursuit of its own interests. 
The very forces which lift man above nature, give natural impulses a 
new and more awful potency in the human world. Man fights his battles 
with instruments in which the mind has sharpened nature's claws. (4) 
It is at this point that Niebuhr sowed the seeds for his later and more 
fundamental theological thinking. Man's awareness of himself generates the 
will for power, and from there the subsequent idolatry of 'self', the group 
that he terms 'pride', and that which constitutes the major ingredient of 
social sin. Niebuhr's political philosophy is now merging into a form of 
theology which embraces the subject matter of Christian social ethics. 
The third ambiguity is that of religion, which at this stage of his 
thinking lacked the concept of a response to Divine presence and revelation 
- a major thesis in his work The Nature and Destiny of Man. Here he 
describes religion as a "sense of the absolute", almost defining it as a 
human projection. Ambiguity arises from the fact that it is difficult in an 
enlightened society to project religious ethics which will affect social 
structures and institutions from a base where the source of the ethic is 
'personal'. Modern man, in spite of his ethical sensitivity, finds 
difficulty in coping with this category, and sees religious morality as 
essentially 1 personal 1 • This is something of a blow to those Christian 
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moralists who, recognising the undoubted moral resources of religion, hope 
to demonstrate that here are the resources for social redemption. But if 
this demonstration is unqualified, then modern man will be scornful about 
something which he sees as not relevant to the urgent political and 
economic tensions of the day. 
'There are constitutional limitations in the genius of religion which 
will always make it more fruitful in purifying individual life, and 
adding wholesomeness to the more intimate social relations, such as 
the family, than in the problems of the more complex and political 
relet ions of modern society. The disrepute in which modern religion 
is held by large numbers of ethically sensitive individuals, springs 
much more from its difficulties in dealing with these complex problems 
than from its tardiness in adjusting itself to the spirit of modern 
culture. A society that is harassed with urgent political and economic 
problems is inclined to be scornful of any life-expression which is 
not immediately relevant. (6) 
This leads to a reflection on the dialectic of transcendence and immanence, 
which became fundamental for Niebuhr's later interpretation of revelation, 
judgement and grace. 
The theme of the immorality of groups runs throughout the book and is 
explicit in the title. The distinction between 'individual' and 'group' 
virtue is one that Niebuhr liked to emphasise in order to counter 
optimistic liberal views about collective behaviour. His thesis therefore 
is that there is no self-transcending consciousness in a group, and the 
'ruling clique' or 'oligarchy' does not represent the whole in self-
awareness but only one faction of it. Further, each individual 
conscience sees itself as 'moral' when it subordinates itself to the 
interests of the larger group. Therefore, the individual can be cajoled 
into subordination and can unwittingly contribute to the hypocri~y and 
egotism of the group. It is worth quoting Langdon Gilkey on this 
particular point. 
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Groups therefore claim to represent universal values, and thus can 
they keep the moral assent as well as the egoistic devotion of their 
members. Needless to say, this analysis of egoism, universal claims 
and hypocrisy laid the foundation for the later categories of idolatry 
and self-deception so crucial to Niebuhr's theological interpretation 
of sin, an interpretation which included both individual and corporate 
human existence. Here, however, this analysis is largely confined to 
his description of nations and of privileged classes <7> 
It is clear that Niebuhr is referring here not to nations, but to classes, 
and, like Marx, he concludes that economic power is central to social 
power, and this in turn leads him to analyse the solution in Marxist terms. 
The communist oligarch is seen as less of a menace than the capitalist 
oligarch since he possesses only political power, whereas the capitalist 
oligarch possesses both political and economic power. Niebuhr seems at 
this stage to be saying that in spite of the many errors in Marxism, it is 
a social philosophy that a Christian social ethic must fully take into 
account. 
On the question of the relationship of power to justice Niebuhr has this to 
say. 
·Only the Marxian proletarian has seen this problem with perfect 
clarity. If he makes mistakes in choosing the means of accomplishing 
his ends, he has made no mistake either in stating the rational goal 
toward which society must move, the goal of equal justice, or in 
understanding the economic foundations of justice. If his cynicism in 
the choice of means is at times the basis of his undoing, his realism 
in implementing ethical ideals with political and economic methods is 
the reason for his social significance. (8) 
However, in spite of his apparent approval of Marxism - and this is brought 
about as much as anything by his nat ural 'tilt' towards the poor- Niebuhr 
dismisses it as the ultimate answer. The powerfulness of his dismissal is 
grounded in the substance of his criticism. He does not say that Marxism 
is wrong because it is merely social, and lacks religion, but because, on 
the contrary, it is fundamentally a religion. 
It is more than a doctrine. It is a dramatic, 
religious interpretation of proletarian destiny". 
and to degree, 
(9) 
a 
He expands this point in Reflections, published the following year. Here 
he says: 
It, <Marxism) detests Christianity with all the hatred of one religion 
for a rival, and of irreligion for religion.· <10) 
As the nineteen thirties progressed, this was to become a developing theme 
for Niebuhr. He saw Marxism as being based on a myth held in faith, and 
thus, like all religions, ambiguous because of its lack of self-criticism. 
Its dogmatism ignores the dangers of political power, and because it is 
saturated with many illusions, not unlike the liberal ideal, and because it 
is obsessed with the claims and prejudices of its own class, then it has no 
pity for, or understanding of, other groups and classes. This thinking led 
him to dismiss Marxism in the end as 'Moral utopianism', and by the end of 
the decade he ranked it, along with fascism, as a dangerous and destructive 
creed- the one 'utopian' and the other 'cynical'. 
REFLECTIONS ON THE END OF AN ERA 
Many of the themes in Moral Man and Immoral Society are continued in this 
work and expanded. The thesis of the conflict of interest and of power, 
and the thesis that reason , in his words, "is the servant of impulse 
before it is its master" (11) as well as the thesis that in collective 
behaviour reason serves largely to rationalise group egotism, are all 
developed. However, Niebuhr enters into the field of the philosophy of 
history, and even makes predictions based on historical evidence. For 
example, he predicted that the rise of fascism would lead to a victory for 
socialism throughout the west. He saw fascism as a deperate attempt by the 
capitalists of the world to woo the workers away from communist ideals, and 
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therefore as another example of the way in which those who hold power will 
use all means to preserve it. Throughout the book there is a foreboding of 
tragedy. The movements both on the left and on the right are reduced in 
Niebuhr's thought to being struggles either for power, or for the retention 
of power. No social or political system exists which is able to contain 
this process, and he finds all the accepted solutions as inadequate. 
'With rather pathetic irony, modern civilisation proceeded to tear 
itself asunder in its conflicts between nations and classes, while 
modern culture dreamed of perpetual peace:. <12) 
Reflections can be seen as that work of Niebuhr's which provoked his deeper 
theological thinking. It is greatly to his credit both as a man, and also 
as a serious theologian that he deeply concerned himself with all social, 
political and philosophical theories before his theology opened the way to 
a more satisfactory answer. It cannot be said of Niebuhr that he was in 
any way 'obscurantist'. He argued from strength and he claimed that his 
theological writings appeared in order to make sense of the confusions and 
irrationalities of common experience - confusions which the categories of 
liberal theory were quite unable to handle. It is after this that he began 
to use theological symbols, and his developed thought represented a co-
relation between the 'facts of experience' and the cohering power of 
theological symbols. It is therefore at this point of his 'pilgrimage' 
that Niebuhr moves towards systematic theology. But it is worthy of 
comment that his pre-theological works have survived and are still current. 
Even standing on their own they have deep significance, if only because 
they raised questions and isolated dilemmas that are still recognisable. 
But it is the understanding of the nature of man, the reality of sin, 
redemption, grace and revelation, that makes sense of these dilemmas. 
Christian Social Ethics must cope with acknowledging the problems as well 
as with suggesting a solution. 
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THEOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS 
We have seen that Niebuhr's writings were prolific, and any attempt to 
trace his theological development as it affected his political philosophy 
necessarily implies a selective process. We shall see his distinctive 
emphases if we focus on theological response to Marxism and liberalism, his 
doctrine of the nature of man, and his views on the correct responses of 
the church. However, with his abandonment of liberalism and Marxism in the 
middle of the nineteen thirties it is possible to see the alternatives 
which he projected by studying parts of his major work, The Nature and 
Destiny of Man. In 1939 Niebuhr had come to a systematic approach to the 
study of the nature of man. The theme was expounded in other journals and 
addresses which he gave, and we shall also look at essays and addresses 
that he delivered in the immediate post war period, when the tragic events 
of that confontation made him far more positive in his rejection of 
political solutions. 
Although we have seen that Niebuhr displayed some sympathy for Marxism as 
an alternative to liberalism it proved to be a transient ally. No doubt 
his 'tilt towards the poor' motivated this attraction, but his rejection of 
it was on philosophical grounds and, later, on historical grounds. It is 
important to note the historical context of his thought. In the nineteen 
thirties the deep economic depression cast a shadow over the western world 
and capitalism was seen as being 'played out', with Marxism in the wings as 
a credible alternative. This was the period of Roosevelt's New Deal which 
Niebuhr criticised as being insufficiently radical - perhaps not taking 
into account the pragmatism required of a politician to effect even that 
much ref arm. 
To deal with his philosophical, and, indeed, theological criticism of 
Marxism we can go back as far as 1935. In his journal "Radical Religion", 
Vol 1 <1935) he deals with the danger of an unreserved acceptance of 
Marxism on the grounds that it lacks the dialectic between nature and 
spirit and between freedom and necessity. The article is addressed to 
church pastors, , many of whom had strong Marxist sympathies. 
·.In one's reaction to the sentimentalities of liberalism one should not 
not capitulate to Marxist dogma lest we find that liberal faith of a 
not very unique Christian quality is being supplanted by a radical 
faith, more realistic in its analysis of immediate social issues, but 
even less Christian in its total insights into life. 
In the same article he examines the nature of the struggle for power in 
societies and comments that the Marxist illusion results from equating 
class conflict with human rivalry, whereas the truth is that the struggle 
for power endlessly elaborates itself as a expression of human finitude and 
sin. He later commented on the theory that classnessness would eliminate 
the problem of power, by describing this as a hopeless Utopianism. 
Historically his criticism was supported by his observations. 
commented unfavorably about the Russian experiment. 
Here he 
'Marxism's notion that evil would disappear once capitalism is destroyed 
is just as completely negated by the facts in Russia, as the liberal 
notion that education can lift men completely out of their economic 
circumstances and prompt them to act as discarnate spirits, filled with 
goodwill alone, is negated in our own society· . 14 
During all this period the one strand of thought which ran through the 
pragmatic phases and cant inued into his mature theological phase was his 
awareness of the need to formulate a doctrine of the nature of man. In the 
early nineteen thirties Niebuhr acted as a penetrating critic of the 
current views and cultures. This somewhat negative criticism in his works 
was countered by 1939 when a more positive alternative was offered, 
culminating in the publication ofJhe Nature and Destiny of Man. 
In 1939 he wrote in his journal: 
·'Is it possible to lead man out of social confusion into an ordered 
society if we do not know man a little better than either Marxians or 
liberals know him?' <15) 
And he began his Gifford Lectures in the spring of 1939 under the shadow of 
European war clouds with these words: 
Man has always been his most vexing problem. 
himself? < 16) 
How shall he think of 
The study continues with alternative possibilities, and reveals the 
contradictions inherent in any incomplete answer. For example, if man is 
unique and rational, then his greed and lust for power betray him. If man 
is merely the product of nature, and is unable to rise above circumstances, 
then this tells us nothing of man as a creature who seeks out God and who 
dreams of making himself like God. If man is essentially good, and all 
evil is due to concrete historical and social causes, then these causes are 
revealed on closer scrutiny to be the result of the inherent evil in men. 
Niebuhr is saying that theories about the nature of man which emphasise 
either his dignity or his misery, fail to do justice to the dualism within 
the nature of man. 
·The obvious fact is that man is a child of nature, subject to its 
vicissitudes, compelled by its necessities, driven by its impulses, and 
confined within the brevity of the years which nature permits its 
varied organic forms, allowing them some, but not too much, latitude. 
The other less obvious fact is a spirit who stands outside of nature, 
life, himself, his reason and the worla· (17) 
Early in this work Niebuhr expresses his impatience with the classial view 
of man that stresses the power of reason, that reason is to be separated 
from body, that reason is creative and that it can subdue man's evil 
impulses. He argues that reason has been corrupted in the Fall and that it 
guides men towards evil impulses. He descibes as an illusion the theory 
that there is an ethical dualism which implies that by reason alone man can 
transcend his selfish nature. He describes the liberal over-emphasis on 
man's creative potentialities, at the expense of man's destructiveness, as 
the "triumph of the modern classical view of man". <18) 
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It should be stated here that 'modern' classicism in this sense lacks the 
awareness of human tragedy which was a factor of Greek drama and which 
represented an awareness of evil even if there was no awareness of a 
solution. 
Niebuhr's positive alternative is that man is a unique mixture of spirit 
and nature, that he is in nature and that he transcends nature. This is 
the clue to the mystery of human personality. The spirit is limited by 
nature and is spiritualised. The human spirit reflects the image of God 
and stands outside the self and the world in its capacity for self-
transcendence. 
-:To understand himself, man must begin with a faith that he is 
understood from beyond himself, that he is known and loved of God and 
must find himself in terms of obedience to the divine will . (19) 
Now this 'high' estimate of human nature and human personality must be 
contrasted with the pessimism about human nature present in most Christian 
writing - from Paul onwards. Here the thrust of the argument is that man 
is a sinner, not because he is finite, or physical, or because his impulses 
are evil, but because he refuses to accept the role of 'creatureliness'. It 
is not so much a question of a rebellion between mind and spirit as a 
rebellion again~ God and a wrong use of freedom. 
~an is a sinner because he is betrayed by his very ability to survey 
the whole to imagine himself the whole~. <20) 
Again: 
The freedom of his spirit causes him to break the harmonies of nature 
and the pride of spirit prevents him from establishing a new harmony. 
The freedom of his spirit enables him to use the forces and processes 
of nature creatively; but his failure to observe the limits of his 
finite existence causes him to defy the restraints of both nature and 
reason <21) 
. 
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Niebuhr is here outlining his thesis which consists of an examination into 
the ambiguities of the dialectic of spirit and nature, and of freedom and 
finiteness. The resulting anxiety can rarely be overcome by a total faith, 
and so man attempts to resolve his anxiety by recourse to his own deeds 
thus pretending to be self-sufficient and triumphing over finiteness and 
human limitations. This is the essence of sin - and this is the common lot 
of mankind. 
Niebuhr examines the solution in terms of redemption and grace, but in an 
examination of the nature of man as it affects his political philosophy it 
is necessary to isolate what Niebuhr calls man's 'will to power' which 
takes the form, not merely of physical dominance and survival, but of the 
need for social prestige and recognition. His will to power rises above 
nature to the realm of man's spirit and becomes insatiable and limitless. 
Man is more than a physical creature, and his desire is for more than 
physical power. He then says that the tragic paradox is that when man has 
achieved political power it is never a guarantee of the security which he 
seeks. 
'The more man establishes himself in power and glory, the greater is 
the fear of tumbling from his eminence. The will to power is thus an 
expression of insecurity even when it has achieved ends which would 
seem to guarantee complete security. The fact that human ambitions 
know no limits must therefore be attributed to an uneasy recognition of 
man's finiteness, weakness and dependence, which become the more 
apparent the more we seek to obscure them. There ·is no level of 
greatness and power in which the lash of fear is not at least one 
strand in the whip of ambition~ <22) 
Thus we have come to a point where Niebuhr asserts a positive Christian 
position in the political debate. The dilemma of groups and of nations is 
directly related to the ambiguity within the Christian definition of the 
nature of man. The ambiguity consists of the relation of nature to spirit, 
of finiteness to the capacity for transcendence within man. The emergence 
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of power groups leads to corruption because groups reflect the egoism 
inherent in the nature of man, which in turn arises from the failure of man 
to accept his creatureliness. The solution therefore lies in the redemption 
of man's nature. This logical sequence is robbed of any hints of over-
simplification by the extent to which Niebuhr studied man, both as an 
individual and in groups, to isolate the realities both in personal 
behaviour and in political realities. In other words, his theology arose 
from extensive studies of the dilemma. 
This was the theme that characterised his mature theological writings and 
which was underlined and elaborated after World War 2. An example of this 
is an address he delivered in 1948 at the first world assembly of the World 
Council of Churches in Amsterdam entitled "The Christian Witness in the 
• Social and National Order. 
Delivered in the immediate aftermath of the 1939 -1945 tragedy, Niebuhr 
drew on his analysis of political alternatives to challenge the Church into 
act ion. He described the secular subsitutes for the Christian faith as 
destroying the sense of divine sovereignty and offering redemption of 
society without the need for repentance. He again isolated 'liberalism' 
and'Marxism' as culprits. Liberalism presented a view of man in which the 
concept of sinfulness is outmoded and replaced by a harmless egotism. The 
Marxist rebellion against the liberal culture he decribed as being even 
more erroneous and illusory. He blamed the corporate self-righteousness of 
these two movements for the tragedy of war. 
The vaunted virtues of each side are vices from the standpoint of the 
other side, and sins in the sight of God. The words of the Psalmist fit 
our situation exactly: 'The Heavens have raged and the people have 
imagined a vain thing. But He who sitteth in the Heavens shall laugh' 
CPs 2) God's derisive laughter is the justified divine judgement 
on the new and yet very old pride of modern man . C23) 
Niebuhr proceeds in this address to point out the areas where the Church 
has responded incorrectly to this dilemma. They are four in number. 
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First, he maintains that there is no form of injustice, either feudal or 
capitalist which has not at some time been sanctified by religious 
sentiment and therefore rendered more impervious to change. 
Secondly, a part of the church has feared involvement in the ambiguities of 
politics and declared them to be irrelevant to the Christian life. It has 
therefore abandoned mankind to its own destructive forces. 
Thirdly, he accuses part of the church of retreating into unhelpful 
sentimentality by insisting that the law of love is a simple possibility -
whereas the reality is that men find it very hard to love one another -
even within the churches. 
Fourthly, and most pointedly he accuses part of the church of retreating 
into a rigid legalism which he descibes as 'graceless'. He points out that 
the elaborate schemes for establishing a legal framework for justice and 
mercy have in themselves become instruments of sin. This is a polemic 
against the classical natural law theories still prevailing in many parts 
of the Church. 
It is in the course of this address that Niebuhr most succinctly describes 
the process of redemption which alone is the answer to the tragedies of 
modern man. Having stressed the negative aspects of the role of the church 
he moves to the substance of redemption. 
The situation in the collective life of mankind today is that we have 
made a shipwreck of our common life through the new powers and freedom 
which a technical civilisation has placed at our disposal .... It is the 
death which has followed on a vainglorious life of the nations. 
Without faith it is nothing but death. Without faith it generates 
despair. Without faith this confusion is the mark of the 
meaninglessness which follows the destruction of the simple system of 
life's meaning which we have had ourselves, our nation, and our culture 
at its centre. It is by faith in the God revealed in One who died and 
rose again that death can become the basis for a new life, that 
meaninglessness turns into meaning, that judgment is experienced as 
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grace. Our business is to mediate the divine judgment and grace, that 
nations, classes, states and cultures, as well as individuals, may 
discern the divine author of their wounds, that they may also know the 
possibility of a new and whole life· <24) 
Niebuhr is here speaking as a mature theologian, an informed political 
analyst, a student of history and, as we have commented before, as a 
distinguished churchman. 
One distinctive feature of Niebuhr's contribution to the debate about God 
and the World, or the Church and Politics is that he spoke with a knowledge 
of both. His theological insights were formidable, and perhaps no 
theologian of the twentieth century concerned himself as much as he did 
with the political realities around him and beyond him. For this reason 
alone - and for other reasons, Niebuhr deserves at tent ion. Many of the 
movements that he experienced before the war and since are those which have 
influenced our own society, and in dealing with the questions which arise 
when we consider the relation of the Gospel to the world, or the 
formulating of a social and political ethic, can be tackled using the 
resources which Reinhold Niebuhr has bequeathed to us. 
122 
1) Leaves from the Notebook of a Tamed Cynic p.62 
2) Ibid. p76 
3) Radical Religion Vol 1 No 4 1936 
4) Moral Man and Immoral Society (1932) p 44 
5) Ibid p 52 
6) Ibid p 63 
7) Reinhold Niebuhr and the Issues of our Time<Ed Harries) p 163 
8) Moral Man and Immoral Society p 164 
9) Ibid p 154 
10) Reflections.on the end of an Era 0934) p 193 
11> Ibid p 17 
12) Ibid p 14 
13) Radical Religion Vol 4 Nol p 3 
14) Ibid Vol 4 No 2 p 8 
15) Ibid 
16) The Nature and Destin .y of Man p1 
17> Ibidp3 
18 Ibid p 5 
19) Ibid p 15 
20) Ibid p 17 
21) Ibid p 17 
22) Ibid p 193 
23 ' Christian Witness in the Social and National Order'. Published in 
"The Essential Reinhold Niebuhr, Ed McAfee Brown (1986) p 95 
23) Ibid p 97 
123 
CHAPTER 6 THE STATE: 
So far, this thesis has attempted to describe the underlying theological 
and philosophical processes which have guided both Brunner and Niebuhr in 
their establishing of a Protestant Christian ethic. It has been a question 
of ascertaining the foundations of their thought. In doing this, we have 
briefly explored alternative ethical theories, and we have noticed how some 
traditions within Christianity have employed philosophical processes other 
than those which are specifically the product of biblical, and, in 
particular, New Testament insights. 
This has included, in particular, the examination of traditional Natural 
Law theories, which owe much to Stoic tradition. We have also looked at 
more contemporary ideas - such as thorough going existentialism. We have 
noted that the principat issue is the relationship of the concept of 
'reason', on the one hand, and 'revelation' on the other. We have also 
examined the concept of 'love', as the ultimate Christian determinant. Note 
has been taken of the debate which exists within the concept of revelation 
- that is, the debate about the existence of general revelation as well as 
special revelation. Finally, we have tried to take note of the contrast 
between Brunner and Niebuhr in the light of their very different 
geographical and political circumstances. 
Nevertheless, there has been until now considerable agreement between them. 
They both steer a course between Thomism, and the associated concepts of 
casuistry and natural law, and the thorough - going Barthian emphasis on 
Justification by Faith alone. There is warrant for claiming that while 
taking account of historical factors, with acknowledged flux and change, 
they have broadly been faithful to the Pauline, Augustinian and Lutheran 
line of tradition. It is for this reason that this thesis is aimed at 
demonstrating that the contribution of these two to the ethical debate 
within Christianity is valuable, and that it is as faithful to both 
historic tradition and contemporary circumstances as is possible. 
The thesis now aims to demonstrate how the principles which have been 
ascertained are applied in practice by Emil Brunner and Reinhold Niebuhr. 
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Ethics, by definition, has practical application, both in the sphere of 
personal morality and in the sphere of social and political institutions. 
Niebuhr and Brunner were both proli fie writers and both wrote about many 
different social and personal ethical issues. We clearly cannot deal with 
all of them, and what follows are examples of their practical application 
of moral principles to particular issues. In this chapter, we shall see 
what both had to say about the application of Christian ethics to the 
concept of the State. We shall see how both of them define the concept of 
'state', and what ethical principles underlie the various ideals and 
realities. The word 'ideal' is used here to describe the theory that any 
moral philosopher, Christian ethicist, or political philosopher will 
suggest an' ideal' form of state. As we explained in the first chapter, 
this exploration will, for reasons of space, be confined to a descriptive 
exercise, as opposed to a critical exercise. 
BRUNNER ON 'THE STATE': 
Brunner recognises the problem very clearly when he deals with this 
particular subject. In his work Justice and the Social Order he divides 
the book into two parts. The first deals with the establishing of 
principles relating to the concept of justice. The second part deals with 
.their practical application. In the opening words of the second part he has 
this to say: 
To ascertain principles is not the same thing as to apply them in 
practice. In this second part we are confronted with the 
multitudinousness of facts. Facts are not only multitudinous, but 
they are also complex, and multitudinousness and complexity make it 
impossible to define a single and convincing method of application 
even for principles which have been clearly and securely established 
(1) 
He even suggests in this section that it would be better for another 
discipline, other than theology, to apply these principles. However there 
is, as he admits, no discipline, sociological, political, or philosophical 
125 
which could on its own embrace the particularities of the Christian 
categories which prompt these theories. He therefore admits that ethical 
conclusions on practical issues are by definition 'tentative'. Brunner's 
recognition of this situation stems any criticism that he may be 
'obscurantist', in the way that Niebuhr described those who ignored 
disciplines other than theology, and which we examined in the first 
chapter. 
Only the order of God is infallible. Even human knowledge of the 
divine order is subject to error. How much more so its applications 
to the particular problems of the social order' (2) 
Brunner then bases his subsequent theories about the state on this concept 
of 'order' - or 'call'. He uses the word 'order' here, not as in his 
concept of 'orders in creation', the Lutheran idea which we examined in the 
chapter on Natural Law, but as in his concept of the divine 'order', or 
'call', which precedes all religious experience. It is this concept of 'the 
Call' which we examined in chapter 4 in the section devoted to Brunner's 
particular emphases. This is significant for two reasons. First, Brunner 
is demonstrating how basic theological concepts are at the heart of any 
formulation of ethical principles and practices. And secondly, remembering 
his emphasis on the 'personal' and the 'individual', he uses these concepts 
as valuable, indeed essential, weapons against totalitarianism. The 
argument runs thus. 
God calls man by name as an individual. This is the only infallible 
principle. Only the individual can hear the call of God, and only the 
individual is 'responsible' - or 'answerable'. Bearing in mind, then, the 
infallibility of the call of God, and bearing in mind the individuality of 
it from the human point of view, Brunner argues that to talk seriously 
about 'collective persons' is the way to the establishing of a totalitarian 
state. We should remember here that Brunner experienced totalitarianism in 
Europe in its most demonic form. 
He points out that totalitarianism reminds us that there is a just and an 
unjust order of the state itself. The centralising of tot ali tar ian power 
involves the absorbing of all other rights and institutions. 
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Totalitarianism means that organisation is imposed from above. He argues 
that the best form of state is that which is built up from below. He 
invokes a New Testament principle that institutions exist for man and not 
man for institutions. 
Already we can see that Brunner is not falling into the trap of identifying 
the state with an 'order of creation'. He is already taking into account 
the truth that the state can be just or unjust. The invocation of Paul to 
'honour the powers that be', does not, for Brunner, mean a blind acceptance 
of the rightness of any existing form of state. He argues this point in 
his Gifford Lectures given at St Andrews in 1948, and published in two 
volumes as Christianity and Civilisation. Writing about 'power' as a means 
of enforcing law and guaranteeing justice and freedom, he makes the point 
that human power and sovereignty is limited by the power and sovereignty of 
God. Also, he argues that the Christian conception of sin reveals the 
dangers inherent in power. Power is misused whenever it is used against 
the law of God, and contrary to His purposes. 
When St Paul deduces the power of the state from divine order and 
enjoins Christians to obey it, he is not thinking of the absolute 
sovereignty of state or monarch. The divine origin of the power of 
the state <exousia) is at the same time divine limitation. According 
to Paul, this limitation is given with the purpose of the state, which 
is peace and justice. <3> 
Using the concept of the 'call', Brunner proceeds in this work to develop 
its application to the concept of a just state. 
The individual is of the essence - but he conceded that individualism 
finds its own limitations. The individual is called to fellowship. 
He is called ~ love 1.Q_ love. <4> 
So existence in fellowship is based on man's relation to God. It is an 
implication of the Christian doctrine of the creation of man. However, man 
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in institutions becomes 'man in his place'. He then, in this passage lists 
the 'places' where man finds himself in fellowship. 
The first, and most important is in marriage. Secondly, in the family, and 
then the community. He regards the gregariousness of man in his social and 
intellectual and recreational life as significant as an example of man, as 
an individual responding to God's call, being in his place in fellowship 
and community. Beyond all these is the 'state'. This is the last place 
where man finds himself. 
The 'state' exists to perform that which cannot be performed by the family, 
the local community or by a circle of friends. For example, the state 
provides education to the extent that the family cannot provide it. The 
State supplements what the family should do. Similarly, Brunner 
acknowledges that the state has a responsibility for the welfare of 
children, but this is only as a last resort. Before the state, there is a 
host of communities, and intellectual intercourse, which act as resources 
for man to live his life in fellowship. 
He comments on this point on Aristotle's description of man. 
Aristotle's description of man as 'zoion polit~con' should be 'zoion 
koinonicon' - 'a being pre-destined for community' . (5) 
Applying this principle to definite functions of the state, Brunner argues 
that justice is antecedent to the state. 
As the individual is antecedent to marriage and the family, the family 
to the community and the manifold communal forms of economic, social 
and intellectual life - all these things are antecedent to the state, 
and the manner of their organisation are prior to the law of the state. 
(6) 
Given these premises- those of 'person', individuality, the 'call' and the 
subordination of the state to the individual - it is interesting to see 
the form that the state should take which, according to Brunner, is the 
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most consistent with the ethical principle. If totalitarianism, with its 
habit of imposing power from above is the worst that can be devised, then 
the bulwark against it is not democracy, but 'federalism'. Federalism is 
an example of a state, built up from below. As part of its definition, 
federalism implies the independence of those who join it, and that the 
whole which is formed never absorbs all the rights of the parts. Here 
Brunner quotes Rousseau in support of him. Federalism, he says, is always 
the negation of 
, ~ .... l'alienation totale de chaque associe de taus ses droits a toute la 
~ 
communi t e· <7) 
The idea is that this union of parts which are and which remain independent 
makes the supreme welfare of the whole, and an otherwise unattainable 
wealth of community, possible. 
We Swiss can best define federalism by our national existence, which 
is unparallelled in the European world of states, not by reason of its 
democracy, but by reason of its federalism· (8) 
Brunner uses a similar argument to confront the economic and industrial 
situation. He criticises the concentration of power within society, and the 
fact that groups have disproportionate power economically. 
·The credit system, combined with industrialisation, has produced an 
accumulation of economic power unknown in previous times: big business, 
mammoth corporations controlling billions of dollars and hundreds of 
thousands of men, capable of limiting their freedom in a large measure, 
dominating the economic life and welfare of whole nations, and 
influencing the state machinery in a dangerously high degree. By their 
more or less monopolistic character, they exert an almost state-like 
coercive power. (9) 
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In this, Niebuhr would agree with him. It was the substance of his 
criticism of the Ford Motor Company made in 1922 and quoted in the first 
chapter of this thesis. 
It is the negation of the individual - and therefore the removal from the 
effect of the Divine call - which Brunner sees as dangerous in concept. 
The state becomes more powerful as men become more evil. The more evil men 
are, the more they need the state, and the more demonic is the state likely 
to become. 
He sees the great divide of our century as the divide between 
totalitarianism and federalism. He does not exclude democracies from this 
danger. He states that many who imagine themselves to be democracies are 
in fact not immune from totalitarianism. Totalitarianism has nothing to do 
with constitutions- but with the idea of the 'omnicompetent' state- the 
turning of life itself into a 'state' affair. 
Many of the details of Brunner's thinking can be criticised, but the idea 
that the state is made for man, and not man for the state, and the idea 
that the only infallible thing is the 'order of God', and that this is to 
individuals, called to live in community, is a valuable starting point. 
To summarise so far, Brunner sees the best form of state to be a form of 
federalism. The reasons for this are that he sees federalism as a 
mechanism whereby the rights of its individual components are not destroyed 
in order to achieve the wholeness of it. It diversifies power and is 
therefore more likely to achieve justice, because too much power can 
distort justice. 
NIEBUHR ON 'THE STATE' 
Niebuhr's contribution to this subject is, as in many other instances, not 
identical but complementary to Brunner's. Brunner starts with the concept 
of the Divine Call, and with his emphasis on the individuality of man. 
Niebuhr's writing on the state- as opposed to his prolific writings on the 
subject of political institutions - is in the context of his exposition of 
the theme of "Man as Sinner". He therefore, like Brunner, emphasises the 
individuality of man - and then explores the distinction between the 
morality of man and the morality of society. Starting with his assumption 
that individual sin is typified by pride and egotism, and that strictly 
speaking only the individual is a moral agent, yet, group pride, which is 
to some extent an aspect of the pride of individuals, actually achieves a 
sort of authority over the individual and results in unconditioned demands 
by the group upon the individual. Thus when, for example, the state 
develops organs of will, it will seem to the individual to have become an 
independent centre of moral life, and man will be inclined to acquiesce in 
its claims of authority, even when these do not coincide with his own moral 
scruples. 
This is the manner in which Niebuhr justifies the need for a distinction 
between individual egotism and group pride. In his examination of the 
nature of the state, he starts from the point of human sin. We noted his 
emphasis on this distinction in the previous chapter when we examined his 
work Moral Man and Immoral Society. 
In this section we will examine what Niebuhr had to say about the State in 
his work The Nature and Destiny of Man. We shall see how he regarded the 
rise of fascism, and how he interpreted the concept of 'state' as portrayed 
by the Old Testament prophets, by St. Paul and by Augustine. 
He tackles the subject of individual and group egotism in this way: 
· The egotism of racial, national and socio-economic groups is most 
consistently expressed by the national state, because the state gives 
the collective impulses of the nation such instrument of power, and 
presents the imagination of individuals with such obvious symbols of 
its discreet collective identity, that the national state is most able 
to make absolute claims for itself, to enforce those claims by power 
131 
and to give them plausibility and credibility by the majesty and 
panoply of its apparatus. (11) 
He then argues that in any state, obedience is prompted by both the fear of 
power and reverence for majesty. He claims that those who believe that 
government rests solely on the consent of the governed, do not take into 
account fully the degree to which religious reverence for majesty is 
implicit in this consent. This can be observed by the degree of pageantry 
which is present in every form of state, frequently taking on militaristic 
forms and culminating in the immoderate and idolatrous manifestations of 
the modern tot ali tar ian state. Therefore, sinful pride and idolatrous 
pretension are an inevitable concomitant of the cohesion of large political 
groups. Niebuhr recognises that the particular features which comprise the 
nature of man, that is his capacity for self-transcendence and self-
criticism, which we noted early in this thesis, are not possessed in the 
same way by the group. The state is the organ of the group's will, rather 
than of its self-criticism. The instrument of self-transcendence is to be 
found in small groups within the state. He refers to these as a 'prophetic 
minority.' <12) 
Niebuhr then pitches the concept of the 'spiritual' nature of the majesty 
and panoply of state as its motivating force, against the concept of the 
need for survival. He concludes that both are possible. He quotes the 
first world war as an example of the confusion within nations as to whether 
they engaged in a struggle for survival or in a selfless effort to maintain 
transcendent and universal values. It is this confusion that can give rise 
to very dangerous conceptions of the state. The state can be organised in 
such a way as to give it a sense of infallibilty, and which makes valid its 
claims to have authority over everybody within it because it becomes the 
source of marality in itself. Bearing in mind that this book was published 
just before the outbreak of World War 2, it is interesting to note 
Niebuhr's comments. 
It is significant that even modern Germany, though it has constructed 
a primitive tribal religion which makes the power and pride of the 
nation a self-justifying end, nevertheless feels constrained to pretend 
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that its expected victory in Europe is desired as a triumph of a high 
type of <Aryan) culture over an allegedly inferior and decadent form of 
<Jewish or liberal) culture. (13) 
He then argues that it is the existence of the 'spiritual' awareness of the 
panoply of state that makes plausible many of the claims of the state, 
because it embraces a value more universal that its contingent self. 
However, its claim that it is itself the final and ultimate value, the 
cause which gives human existence its meaning, is one which no individual 
can plausibly claim for himself. Therein lies the danger - that the state 
claims to be God. The collective will is imposed on the individual and it 
• asks for the individuals unswerving loyalty, asserting that its necessities 
are the ultimate law of the individual's existence. 
This is a perceptive comment on the existence of totalitarianism. Niebuhr 
lived through those times when totalitarianism took on a most dangerous 
form. Like Brunner, he roundly condemned it. Brunner started with the 
concept of the individual answerability to the 'call', and Niebuhr started 
with the recognition of the tension between the existence of personal 
morality and group morality. In his case the tension was identified as the 
lack of ability of the group to exercise the same self-criticism that the 
individual is capable of. Both start with the individual. Both acknowledge 
that, theologically, the establishment of a Christian ethic which can be 
applied to the concept of 'the state', can only be found by examining the 
nature of the relationship between individual man and God, and by examining 
the Christian perspective of the nature of man himself. 
Niebuhr's particular theological interpretation of this lies, as we have 
said, within his view of man as sinner. This becomes clear as he comments 
further on the rise of fascist nationalism. 
'The relation of modern fascist nationalism to the insecurity and sense 
of inferiority of the lower middle classes is therefore significant. but 
it hardly can be denied that extravagant forms of modern nationalism 
only accentuate a general character of group life and collective 
egotism; and that specific forms of inferiority feeling for which this 
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pride compensates only accentuate the general sense of inferiority from 
which all men suffer. Collective pride is thus man's last, and in some 
respects most pathetic, effort to deny the determinate and contingent 
character of his existence. The very essence of human sin is in it. It 
can hardly be surprising that this form of human sin is also most 
fruitful of human guilt, that is of objective social and historical 
evil. In its whole range from pride of family to pride of nation, 
collective egotism and group pride are a more pregnant source of 
injustice and conflict than purely individual pride'". <14) 
It is worth comment here that Niebuhr, we remember, wrote this in America, 
far removed from the actual scene of European conflict. This makes his 
words even more telling, since in the same passage, while acknowledging 
that there are values which transcend a nation's immediate interests and 
that man does not wage war merely for its own sake, yet the claims of a 
struggle for, say, democracy, or freedom, are more absolute than the facts 
warrant. In fact, he says, in spite of state-transcending altruism, the 
facts are that the struggle is undertaken when survival is threatened. He 
also claims that neutral nations are not less sinful than belligerent ones 
in their effort to hide their partial interests behind their devotion to 
'civilisation'. 
Niebuhr then turns to scripture for justification of this theory. If the 
collective life of man is invariably involved with the sin of pride, what 
did the prophets have to say about this as they delivered their message to 
the nation? Bearing in mind, as we have seen earlier in this thesis that 
God calls man individually, and that the message to the church is for the 
world, Niebuhr singles out the prophets as those who have heard the call of 
God and then share it with the nation. He quotes Amos as his first source. 
Prophetic religion had its very inception in a conflict with national 
sel [-deification. Beginning with Amos, all the great Hebrew prophets 
challenged the simple identification between God and the nation, or the 
naive confidence of the nation in its exclusive relation to God . <15) 
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In this context he quotes Amos vii: 16-17: 11 Hear thou the word of the Lord. 
Thou sayest, prophesy not against Israel, and drop not thy word against the 
house of Issac. Therefore, thus says the Lord, Thy wife shall be a harlot 
in the city, and thy sons and daughters shall fall by the sword" ..... 
The prophets claimed that judgement would overtake, not only Israel, but 
also every other nation, including those who were used b'y God to excerise 
His judgement- ''the rod of my anger". 
From this point, Niebuhr charts the fundamental difference between a Judaic 
and Christian approach from what he calls the simple identification of 
morals and principles in the thought of Plato and Aristotle. Greek 
philosophy, he argues, does not have a vantage point from which to 
criticise this particular form of human pride, because such a vantage point 
does not exist within man himself. The conviction that collective pride is 
the final form of sin is only possible within the terms of a revealed 
religion where the voice of God is heard above all "human majesties." In 
this case the divine power is revealed in a way that nations are seen as "a 
drop of a bucket" <Is. xl: 15) 
Moving to the Christian era, Augustine, using his theory of the two cities 
- "the city of this world" and the "city of God" - is able to view, for 
example, the destruction of the Roman Empire as an example of the law of 
life in the "city of this world". He further blames its destruction on 
human pride. 
·But because the earthly 
possessors of all troubles, 
into wars, altercations 
city is not a good which acquits the 
therefore this city is divided in itself 
and appetites of bloody and deadly 
victories ..... and if it conquer it extols itself and so becomes its own 
destruction . (16) 
Thus further evidence is provided which suggests that prophetic 
Christianity and a qualified Judaism are the only sources of a secure 
vantage point with which to oppose the self glorification of nations. It 
must not, however, be ignored that on many occasions Christianity has, in 
Niebuhr's word, played the part of Court Chaplain to the pride of nations. 
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Niebuhr points out that Augustine, in a very qualified manner, identified 
that "City of God" with the historic church, and stripped of his 
qualifications the church embraced that teaching and became a state in its 
own right, every bit as powerful and as proud as the secular state which 
existed either alongside it, or in opposition to it. 
'The fact that human pride insinuated itself into the struggle of the 
Christian religion against the pride and self-will of nations proves 
how easily the pride of men can avail itself of the very instruments 
intended to mitigate it. The church, as well as the state, can become 
the vehicle of collective egotism. Every truth can be made the servant 
of sinful arrogance, including the prophetic truth that all men fall 
short of the truth.· < 17) 
So the notion of collective pride, the ultimate form of sin, is applied to 
the church itself. Most markedly it appears in church history where the 
leader of the Catholic church assumed 'kingly' roles, and also in the 
opposition to that where Luther dismisses the Pope as 'anti-Christ', 
whereas Kings rule by divine right. Protestantism, in its Lutheran 
interpretation, became an outlet for political arrogance within the new 
nation states emerging in Europe. The nation is God. And during modern 
history this has been a strong force for collective pride. In our century 
this reached new limits. Fascism in Europe arose against Christianity as 
well as within it. Thus the Nazis rejected Christianity because, in spite 
of its failings, it still was able to pass judgement on them. Thus although 
there are no nations that are free from pride, yet there are still some who 
are prepared to listen to God's judgement mediated to them through the 
Church. The worst feature of the totalitarian states of the west is they 
have have flourished within and against Christianity. 
SUMMARY 
To summarise Niebuhr's thinking so far one can say that the theological 
base for his views on the state arise from his thinking about 'man as 
sinner' - and the existence of collective sin and pride. Like Brunner, it 
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begins with the individual, but there is a greater emphasis on the notion 
of 'corporate' sin. Also, he uses his theory that man is self-
transcendent, and that he can view himself from outside himself, examining 
his own motives and behaviour. To support his views he quotes the Old 
Testament prophets, Augustine, Luther, and his observations of the rise of 
totalitarianism in his generation. 
The similarities between Brunner and Niebuhr here are striking. Brunner 
points us to the infallibility of the 'call', and Niebuhr points us to the 
indispensability of revelation as a means whereby man achieves a vantage 
point from which to mediate judgement. These are broadly very similar. 
Both depend upon revelation and not reason. Both start with the idea of 
the individual. Both share the same view of totalitarianism and both point 
to the same causes of it. Neither clings to a strictly Lutheran view of 
the state as a primordial order or to a narrow interpretation of Paul's 
writings on the state. Both are aware of historical developments and of the 
effect of the rise of dictatorships in Europe. Most importantly, both 
equip us with the tools to oppose unjust states and orders of community. 
Man in community comes after man in fellowship with God. It is from the 
'personal' to the corporate that they define their ethic in relation to the 
nature of the state. 
If the historic roots of Niebuhr's and Brunner's theological thinking are 
broadly similar, particularly in the concept of 'revelation' as a personal 
encounter, note must also be made of their differences. These lie in the 
question of the commitment of each of them to the whole question of 
'systematic theology'. We have noted that Niebuhr expressed impatience 
with the concept of systematic theology, whereas Brunner is more properly 
described as a systematic theologian as well as a Christian ethicist. 
Niebuhr was passionately interested in the social and political issues of 
his time, and wrote a great deal about these before he turned to serious 
theology. Richard Kroner summarises this: 
lf one compares him <Niebuhr) with men like Barth and Brunner, he 
appears to be rooted in the present moment, while they seem to be 
theoretical and academic dogmatists. <18) 
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It is certainly true that Niebuhr is more preoccupied than Brunner with the 
actual mechanisms of the state - the meaning of 'power', the political 
realities and social institutions. But it must not be forgotten that 
Brunner was also much more interested in people and social institutions 
than were many of his contemporary continental theologians. Here, as we 
have noted in this thesis, the difference is one of emphasis and style, 
rather than fundamentally theological. The conclusion remains that in 
their dealing with the nature of the state, they both reach very similar 
conclusions, although they use a different approach. What comprises their 
agreement is basically their view of revelation, and, in particular, their 
acceptance of revelation through encounter. as well as a 'general' 
revelation of God in Creation. 
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CHAPTER 7 THE PROBLEM OF WAR 
Inherent in any definition of the "State" is an understanding of the means 
whereby the state defends its own existence. If a state or a nation is 
threatened by an outside force, then it must, if it is to continue as a 
state, have the means to resist that threat. This raises the question of 
pacifism which the Christian ethicist is obliged to face. The problem is 
made more difficult if we consider that war can be viewed either as a 
concept in itself, or as a topical issue. It is clearly inappropriate to 
tackle the questions raised by a historical study of medieval warfare in 
the same way that we would tackle the questions raised by the possibilities 
of a full scale nuclear war. The differences are, first, that a historical 
reflection does not require the same form of attention as a topical 
problem, and, secondly, that there is a difference of scale between the two 
examples that make nonsense of a common theory. It may, or may not, be 
true that a thorough-going, radical pacifist may view each kind of 
situation in exactly the same way, but it is certainly true that many, 
while regretting and condemning the use of force in any situation, would 
wish to use completely different arguments in dealing with the question of 
modern and nuclear war. 
In this chapter, we shall again examine both Brunner's and Niebuhr's 
treatment of this question. In view of the command, "Thou shalt not kill", 
and the command, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself", it is 
important that we see how these two justified their "non-pacifist" views -
although Niebuhr consciously rejected his early pacifist stance in a way 
that Brunner did not have to. We shall see how the problem of war presents 
itself in a way that demands a conscious choice which for a Christian has 
to be both theologically honest and, at the same time, pragmatic. In view 
of the constant use of the 'love' ethic, which is central to the church's 
teaching, the world has a right to question just how that permits debate at 
any level. As we explained in the previous chapter, this examination will 
of necessity be descriptive, rather than critical. 
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BRUNNER ON PACIFISM 
Within the section entitled "The Acting Christian in the Acting State", in 
The Divine Imperative, there is a passage specifically dealing with the 
subject of pacifism, entitled "The Christian and Force - the Problem of 
War". (1} This, with the appropriate appendix, will be the principal 
source of this section. The dilemma is identified immediately. 
··t:or love's sake the possession of force by the State is necessary, 
although, in itself, the use of force is opposed to love... (2} 
Brunner then argues that, again, for love's sake' - in this instance that 
the existence of a State is good for the people - the reserves of force 
must be so great that people will feel that it not worth while their 
resisting it. To "moralise" the state consists in the fact that the state 
must keep its force 'latent', as far as is possible. In modern political 
terms this means that the reserves of force are for the deterrence of war 
and are defensive rather than offensive. Secondly,he recognises that there 
is an ethical difference between the use of force in the internal 
administration of the state- i.e. 
towards the outside world - i.e. 
points· to a need to distinguish 
the police force, and the use of force 
war. Thirdly, at this point, Brunner 
between the aims of ethics, and of 
preaching or political propaganda. A further distinction, and one referred 
to earlier, is that between war, as an abstract, and war, as a topical 
problem. These four points form the basis for much of Brunner's writings on 
the subject of war and pacifism. 
If only because of the effect of war on so many people, the problem is one 
of the most urgent and controversial in the whole field of ethics. Brunner 
carefully discusses the subject of war within the concept of the State. 
War, he says, supporting the aims and policies of a state, is essential to 
the nature of the state, provided there are no other means to protect its 
existence. If a state is not prepared to defend itself by force of arms, 
then it may just as well hand itself over to a more virile state, which, as 
a conqueror, will not hesitate to use violence. 
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To deny, on ethical grounds, this elementary right of the State to 
defend itself by war, simply means to deny the existence of the state 
itself. (3) 
He describes this as the justifiable idea behind the concept of the "just 
war". Thus he describes pacifism of the 'absolutist' kind, as practically 
anarchy - an Anabaptist Utopia. He is clear, that whoever affirms the 
State as a necessity must also affirm war as a contingent necessity -
because the force a state possesses is what alone can protect it against 
the force used by other states. 
Brunner has made it clear, early in his treatment of the subject, that the 
problem of war and the nature of the state go hand in hand. What justifies 
the former also justifies the latter in what he descibes as 'contingency'. 
Therefore, the call of God to live in community implies a call to defend 
that community. 
Brunner dismisses quickly the claim that war must be condemned because it 
is opposed to the 'command to love' contained in the Sermon on the Mount. 
He says that once we appeal to the Sermon on the Mount we must reject all 
forms of compulsion or coercion, 
force, or is the subject of 
even that which is exercised by a police 
legislation brought about by political 
processes. He calls this pacifism, 'radical' and 'fanatical', and opposed 
to the entire treatise on Ethics which'T.he Divine Imperative·' has argued. 
Having dismissed this fanatical form of pacifism, Brunner proceeds to 
consider a second form. This brings into play the concept of the 
'relative'- the 'more' or the 'less'. He quotes Heering, who in his book 
The Fall of Christianity agrees that the compulsory authority vested in the 
administration is a historical necessity, but that there can, within that, 
be a quantitative difference that can become a qualitative difference. 
However, Heering argues that war is such a quantum force that it can in no 
way be ethically justified. Brunner agrees that in the concept of the 
'relative', war represents a 'more' of this kind, and therefore presents 
itself as a complex ethical quest ion. But he argues that note must be 
taken of the resulting anarchy if 'might' is allowed to prevail. 
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''Where anarchy prevails, that is, where Might is right, the war of 
defence, as an emergency action, is the 'just' war.-- <4> 
Brunner further argues that it is wrong to use arguments that may have been 
valid when applied to war in the old sense, to support pacifism which is 
addressed to war at the present time. Pacifism should not be presented as a 
response to a timeless problem but as something which should be addressed 
to the problem as it is today. Here, Brunner is using the realities of 
history as relevant issues in moral decision making. This would correspond 
closely with Niebuhr's continuous emphasis on the realities of history, and 
is a further example of Brunner's defence against the criticism made of him 
that he was too dependent on traditional Natural Law theories. Brunner 
acknowledges that there are those who apply this theory of pacifism to war 
as it is today, and he says that it is important not to confuse this form 
of pacifism with the sentimental and radical forms of pacifism which he has 
criticised. However he states in this passage that as Protestant and 
Biblical Christians, we are under the obligation of affirming the necessity 
of the State, 
... and with this the necessity for the compulsion exercised by the 
State. This deprives us of the right to appeal to the Sermon on he 
Mount in support of our pacifism and to estimate the wars of the past 
from an ethical point of view. Only so do we gain the right to oppose 
war at the present day with all the more energy. (5) 
In examining what Brunner has to say aboyt war as a topical problem it is 
important to realise that his writings here are pre-nuclear. They are, 
nevertheless, valid and similar to many of the things that are said about 
nuclear war. In the realm of the 'more' and 'less', the wars experienced 
by Brunner, and anticipated by him, constitute a 'more', in the way that a 
nuclear war constitutes a 'more'. Brunner argues that the same word should 
not apply to the conflicts of the past and those of the present. Factors 
he cites include the use of national armies instead of mercenary armies, 
the economic inter-dependence of states, the use of mechanical and chemical 
means of warfare, the threat to civilian populations, the draining of the 
entire social and economic life of nations. In view of all this, he 
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argues, it is no longer possible to talk of "winning" a war. In modern 
warfare, all are losers, and there is no such thing as a 'non-combatant' 
population. He therefore roundly condemns the use of historical example to 
justify war as it is today. None of the themes which could, arguably, have 
justified historic conflicts apply to today's war theatre . 
. , The development of the technique of warfare, the heightening of war's 
intensity. and its enormous extension has led to a point where war has 
become race suicide. War has outlived itself. It has become so 
colossal that it can no longer exercise any sensible function. To 
expect to establish any just order by means of a world conflagration -
called war - has become political madness . (6) 
This is not an argument for pacifism in the sense that Brunner does not see 
pacifism as a timelessly valid argument. It is rather a realistic 
assessment of the problem in the light of historical circumstances. So 
far, we have seen that the problem of war is closely identified with the 
concept of State, and Brunner then proceeds, in this passage, to consider 
alternatives to the settling of conflicts. In pursuing the argument that 
war, because of its heightened technology, is no longer an option, he 
examines alternatives and parallels. His argument proceeds thus: 
There will always be conflicts between nations as long as men are still 
sinners. However, war can no longer be considered a way of engaging in 
these conflicts. The existence of human civilisation depends on the 
discovery of alternative means of settling conflict. Even brutal and 
coercive political means are not suicidal in the way that modern warfare 
is. From the point of view of history, every analogy that could be drawn 
between wars of the past, and war as a topical problem, have broken down. 
This is not only the result of technology, but it is also the result of the 
drawing together the nations of the world in ways which make the world much 
more of a cultural and economic unity. 
have as an objective interest the 
overrides purely national interests. 
Therefore the nations of the world 
abolition of war. This interest 
He cites the formation of the 
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European states as an example of the bringing together the people of 
different interests - and also he points to the painfulness of that 
process, which, he says, is not suicidal in the sense that modern warfare 
is. Theologically, Brunner reiterates the theme that there is a necessity 
for the most universal form of community to be inherent in the idea of he 
Divine creation, which lifts it far above all 'Utopian' theories. 
"To work resolutely towards the formation of this unity is today the 
only 'practical politics' worth the namee <7> 
Having acknowledged that conflict will exist between nations and 
communities as long as those nations and communities exist, and having 
ruled out war as a viable mans of settling them, and also as a means 
without any ethical justification at all, Brunner then addresses himself to 
the various possibilities. He admits that we have no idea what the 
substitute for war will be - but he asserts that ethical reflection is 
needed to meet the new facts with new forms of thought. Thus he argues 
that if, for example, a nation were to disarm, and render itself 
'defenceless', in the old meaning of that term, in order to prepare the way 
for a new form of 'security', such action would not be a sign of political 
folly, but of political wisdom, since it would demonstrate the possibility 
of a new way of political action. This is an argument for what today we 
would call unilateralism. It is based on an acknowledgement of historical 
facts and, what Brunner conceives as, political realism. 
He further states that in the new circumstances a conscientious and sane 
citizen is justified in not rendering a service to the state because, in 
his opinion, it is a politically useless action. He describes such a person 
as politically wise and he describes this decision as a response to the 
Command of God, not in the fanatical sense, but in the concrete sense of 
political responsibility. Brunner is arguing that both actions - unilateral 
disarmament and conscientious objection are responses to political 
realities, and therefore wise. 
145 
The emphasis by Brunner on the reality of the historical changes in the 
nature of war is the determining factor which is used to formulate his 
views on pacifism.He therefore examines the nature and the affect of this 
change. 
'When a new order is coming into being, and to shake off the shackles 
of the old order, the idea of order itself begins to waver, and this 
leads to hesitation about the ethical obligation of obedience to the 
State. An ethical right to revolution which can be expressed in 
general terms, does not exist; but the necessity does arise of making a 
new choice between the new order which is coming into being and the old 
order which is falling into decay.' (8) 
Brunner is careful to qualify this apparent justification of 'revolution'. 
But he claims that not even the Christian can evade this issue, and the 
'tragedy' of creating the new order is that the old order has to be 
abolished. His view that it is impossible to justify revolution on ethical 
grounds consists of his belief that it would elevate the idea of anarchy as 
a principle, and in so doing, would destroy the whole basis of morality. 
··But just as the duty of obedience to the State is always qualified by 
obedience to God's Command, so also it is qualified by the possibility 
that God intends to destroy the old order because it has degenerated 
into a sham. But only unavoidable necessity will avail to pr0tect this 
dangerous action from the reproach of rebellion against God'·. (9) 
To summarise Brunner's contribution to the subject of the problem of war, 
one must say that there is a noticeable degree of consistency of ideas and 
concepts. His view of pacifism, and, in particular, his dismissal of 
pacifism as a timelessly valid stance, is consistent with his view of 
creation. Man is created to live under God's command - and man is created 
to live in community. The State is a desirable form of community, 
extending the possibilities of the family, and it is a matter of love that 
the state defends its existence, by force if necessary, to repel force. 
Since the State is to be desired, and consistent with Brunner's views of 
creation, fanatical pacifism would lead to anarchy - which is a situation 
of disobedience to God's command. On the other hand, war has become for a 
variety of reasons an unrealistic way of settling conflict, and to disarm, 
or to refuse to obey the command to take up arms, is to express not so much 
an ethical principle, but a piece of political realism and wisdom. In that 
sense, pacifism is defended. Note is taken of the dangers that exist when 
one order replaces another, but Brunner is of the opinion that whatever 
damage that change may cause - it is preferable to a full scale global war, 
which he calls 'race-suicide'.There is, in this, a fine balance between the 
concept of the 'orders in creation' which we examined earlier in this 
thesis, and the reality of history. It is a good example of the fact that 
a moral theologian is, by definition, concerned with the real issues of 
society, and uses theological categories and principles within various 
social and political structures. 
NIEBUHR ON THE PROBLEM OF WAR AND PACIFISM: 
The pilgrimage of Reinhold Niebuhr which we examined in a previous chapter 
is exemplified in his treatment of the problem of war and of pacifism. In 
as much as this is a specific issue with profound ethical content, 
Niebuhr's tendency to be more of an 'organic' than a 'systematic' 
theologian becomes apparent. In examining his views on this subject there 
is much to choose from, and here we will look at his essay on 'Pacifism' 
which forms part of his work Christianity and Power Politics, (1940). 
In the same way that Niebuhr courted liberalism and Marxism in the 1930's, 
and then rejected them, so he courted pacifism in the 1920's. He served 
for a while as chairman of the Fellowship of Reconciliation. It is clear 
that he always respected pacifism as an ideal, and that he admired its 
principle of non-coercive love. But absolute pacifism he regarded in the 
same way as, what he describes as, the Roman Catholic view of a 'just war'. 
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These are, of course, very different from each other, but he suggested that 
both lacked the flexibility required to be useful in dealing with 
particular situations. 
The principai theological thesis from which he starts is that the Christian 
Gospel cannot simply be equated with the 'law of love'. The finality of 
Christianity is not that it can be proved that love is more adequately 
revealed here than anywhere else, but that Christianity measures the 
totality of human existence - which includes sin as well as love. The true 
norm is Christ - the second Adam, and that is love. But man, in striving 
for self realisation is involved in making the self the true end of 
existence. Every man is therefore a crucifier of Christ. 
rThe good news of the Gospel is not the law that we ought to love one 
another. The good news of the gospel is that there is a resource of 
divine mercy which is able to overcome a contradiction within our own 
souls, which we cannot ourselves overcome. This contradiction is that, 
though we know we ought to love our neighbour as ourself, there is a 
'law in our members which wars against the law that is in our mind,' so 
that, in fact, we love ourselves more than our neighbour.:: <10) 
Niebuhr then examines the concept of 'grace'. It is, he says, on the one 
hand, the power of righteousness which heals the contradiction in our 
lives, and on the other hand it is 'justification' - pardon rather than 
power. So, in the first instance Christ defines the possibilities of human 
existence, and in the second instance, forgiveness is given to men, despite 
the fact that they can never achieve the full measure of Christ. Christ is 
the 'impossible possibility'. So, the doctrine of grace and justification 
means that Christianity sees sin as a permanent factor in human history - a 
doctrine which has no meaning for the secularist. But Niebuhr also quotes 
many modern Christians who believe that there is a simple way out of the 
sinfulness of human history. Those who hold that Christianity is a 
challenge to men to obey the law of Christ do not understand that 
Christianity is a religion which deals realistically with the problem 
presented by the violation of the Christian law. Appeals to men to obey the 
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law of Christ - which means to love one another - and therefore which 
embraces pacifism as a contradiction to the law of love, have missed the 
point of the Christian Gospel, that it is concerned with the 
acknowledgement of sin, and the realisation that the problem of achieving 
justice in a sinful world is a very difficult task. 
In the profounder versions of the Christian faith the very utopian 
illusions, which are currently equated with Christianity, have been 
rigorously disavowed . <11> 
Therefore much pacifism is in fact a heresy, since it claims to be inspired 
by the Christian Gospel - the part of it which contains the law of love-
whereas in neglecting the doctrine of original sin, which is translated in 
man's efforts to evolve political strategies, it depends on a doctrine of 
faith in the goodness of man. This rejection of the 'pessimistic' view of 
human nature means a radical re-interpretation of the Christian faith. 
Niebuhr writes thus: 
They have reinterpreted the Cross so that it is made to stand for the 
absurd idea that perfect love is guaranteed a simple victory over the 
world, and have rejected all other profound elements of the Christian 
Gospel as 'Pauline' 
Gospel of Jesus'. 
accretions which must be stripped from the 'simple 
(12) 
As well as being heretical in its interpretation of the Gospel, it is also 
heretical in its observation of human behaviour. It does not match 
experience to say that if sufficient people were to become pacifists, then 
wars would cease. 
Therefore Niebuhr concludes that for the Church to refuse to espouse 
pacifism is not apostasy - as has been claimed - but a rejection of heresy 
based on an insufficient understanding of sin. 
It is relevant here to point out, in our comparison of Brunner with 
Niebuhr, that just as their conclusions are similar in the case of war and 
pacifism, their routes to these conclusions are different in exactly the 
149 
same way as they were different when dealing with the concept of 'the 
State'. Brunner approached his work on the state from the principle of the 
'call' or the 'order' of God. He then extended this to disclaim absolute 
pacifism on the basis that the State is that which must be protected 
because it is the result of God's call. Niebuhr approached both subjects 
from the principle of 'man as sinner' . In his dealing with the issue of 
the state he explored the tension between individual and group morality. 
Similarly, in his dealing with the issue of pacifism, he further examines 
the nature of sin, and sees the espousal of pacifism as a misinterpretation 
of the Christian faith - namely an ignoring of the power of sin. It is 
important that we realise that Niebuhr did not deny that man has a capacity 
for justice and love. He simply urged that his capacity for injustice must 
also be taken into account. This is important part of Niebuhr's thinking 
and serves as an example of the way in which he tended towards the 
'pessimistic' view of the nature of man. 
From this point he examines the ethic of Jesus and concludes that it is 
indeed uncompromising and absolute. He criticises those who, engaged in 
the relativities of the political scene, seek to justify themselves by 
claiming that Jesus was also dealing in relativities. To reduce the ethic 
to cover relative standards is to reduce it to a new form of legalism. As 
we saw in Niebuhr's dealings with the subject of love, the significance of 
the command 'to love your neighbour' is that it is not just another law -
but a law which transcends all other laws. 
Attempts to relativise involve the pacifist in, for example, distinguishing 
between two types of resistance. While they are forced to admit that no 
situation can be envisaged which makes all forms of resistance redundant, 
yet there must be a distinction between non-resistance and non-violent 
resistance. Apart from the fact that such a distinction can never be 
absolute, there is no evidence in Scripture for the doctrine of non-
resistance. An ethic can enjoin both non-violent resistance, and non-
resistance. But the truth is that such an ethic is not obeyed at any 
level - because of human sin. Resistance is a part of life, and the point 
of Niebuhr's refusal to distinguish between violent and non-violent 
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resistance - or, indeed, coercion - is part of his polemic against those 
who use a relative form of pacifism as an example of a high moral stance. 
This argument is developed in many ways. He says that the total ethic can 
be summarised in the two injunctions: 'Love your neighbour as yourself', 
and: 'Be not anxious for your life'. Anxiety is a response to the failure 
of a man to assert himself in his very existence. Perfect trust in the 
providence of God is an ideal that can never be realised because of the 
freedom that man has to view his life and to seek to better it. It is a 
root of sin. Likewise, to love one's neighbour as oneself is a command 
which the most saintly of people would never claim to have perfectly 
obeyed. Therefore to suggest that if nations lived according this high 
ethic so that wars would be unnecessary is, in fact, empty rhetoric. 
Further, this failure to recognise the contradiction between the law of 
love and the sin of man also leads to a misunderstanding of the concept of 
justice. It is because men are sinners that justice must be coerced and 
supported by law in order to avert anarchy or, indeed, tyranny. 
Governments must coerce - and there is a danger that they will coerce, not 
to achieve justice for its own sake, but to exercise power. 
Niebuhr applies this theory to specific situations. 
The refusal to recognise that sin introduces an element of conflict 
into the world invariably means that a morally perverse preference is 
given to tyranny over anarchy <war). If we are told that tyranny would 
destroy itself, if only we would not challenge it, the obvious answer 
is that tyranny continues to grow if it is not resisted. If it is to 
be resisted, the risk of overt conflict must be taken. The thesis that 
German tyranny must not be challenged by other nations because Germany 
will throw off its yoke in due time, merely means that an unjustified 
moral preference is given to civil war over international war. <13) 
The Gospel, Niebuhr asserts, is more than the law of love. It deals with 
the fact that men violate the law of love. It is a question of whether the 
grace of Christ is primarily a power of righteousness, or an assurance of 
151 
divine mercy. In this context he argues that you cannot understand the 
ethical teaching of Christ without taking into account the eschatological 
dimension. In this world morally right action does not guarantee a happy 
outcome. On the contrary, good people often suffer for their goodness. It 
is only in the Kingdom that the universe will be totally transparent to 
value. 
·the New Testament does not, in other words, envisage a simple triumph 
of good over evil in history. It sees human history involved in the 
contradictions to the end. That is why it sees no simple resolution of 
the problem of history. It believes that the Kingdom of God will 
finally resolve the contradictions of history; but for it the Kingdom 
of God is no simple historical possibility. The grace of God for man 
and the Kingdom of God for history are both divine realities and not 
human possibilitie~ ·-. <14) 
The law of love, which the pacifists claim to be the law of life, shows us 
that any action that falls short of the law of love is less than best. 
Therefore the various ways in which nations procure justice, and the 
various ways in which they use coercion in order to establish justice 
inevitably involve acts which are not primarily acts of love. Therefore we 
must see that any conflict which arises is not betwwen sinners and 
righteous people, but between sinners. In history vengeance has played a 
part in settlements made after wars, and it can be said that after a war, 
justice is never far from vindictiveness. He concludes that: 
'The pacifist argument on this issue betrays how completely pacifism 
gives itself to illusions about the stuff with which it is dealing in 
humsan nature. These illusions deserve particular censure, because no 
one who knows his own heart very well ought to be given to such 
illusions. <15) 
Niebuhr wrote this particular essay during the second world war, and he 
comments on the phenomenon of the rise of tyranny in Europe, which, he 
says, is the result of not discovering an international means of organising 
stability and justice. He also uses the principle of 'power' to describe 
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the dilemma. The balance of power is delicate - and a result of some form 
of justice, but, he says, a balance of power is inferior to a harmony of 
love. He uses the example of the family unit here. Women, he says, did 
not gain justice from men until they secured sufficient economic power to 
challenge male autocracy. Here he makes the point, in characteristic 
style, that 'There are Christian idealists today who speak sentimentally of 
love as the only way to justice, whose family life might benefit from a 
more delicate balance of power' •<16) 
The thesis here is that tyranny in nations is an extension of the tyranny 
which can exist in individuals. Also, there is no system of government 
that has 'right' completely on its side. Given that that is the case, he 
says that a simple Christian moralism is senseless and confusing. On the 
one hand it is senselessly uncritical to identify the cause of Christ with 
the cause of democracy, and on the other hand it is senseless when it seeks 
to correct this error by refusing to make any distinctions between relative 
values in history. 
"In its profoundest insights, the Christian faith sees the whole of 
human history as involved in guilt, and finds no release from guilt 
except in the grace of God. The Christian is freed by that grace to 
act in history, to give his devotion to the highest values he knows, 
and he is persuaded by that grace to remember the ambiguity of even his 
best actions". <17> 
Niebuhr concludes his essay by commending the Christian Church in its 
protection of pacifists and its appreciation of their testimony - even 
when, he says their testimony is marred by self-righteousness, because it 
does not proceed from a sufficiently profound understanding of the tragedy 
of human history. 
Richard Harries, commenting on Niebuhr's views on pacifism summarises it 
thus: 
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There are real differences in assessing the place of pacifism in the 
church, yet perhaps this is part of the tension we are meant to feel. For 
it is the legitimate desire of the pacifist to universalise the moral 
claims he experiences that troubles the non-pacifist, and rightly troubles 
him. For it brings to bear that absolute standard in the light of which 
our compromises are seen for what they are, and to which we are called to 
conform so far as we can under the conditions of sinful finite existence . 
<18) 
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CONCLUSION 
We set out in this thesis to demonstrate to what extent Christian Ethics 
can be viewed as being essential in theology, as opposed to its being an 
application of theology - or even a completely separate discipline that is 
nevertheless not in dispute with Christian theology. Although there are a 
variety of s:;Oi"utions, the division between them is defined by the extent to 
which Christian ethicists are dependent on categories and di plines 
outside Scripture. In other words, does the Christian Gospel contain 
within it an ethical system which is so different from other systems as to 
make it totally distinctive? 
A further quest ion which has been tackled is whether, if Christian ethics 
is distinctive, and different from any other system, is it applicable to 
those who do not espouse Christianity? 
This thesis has given a qualified ''yes" to both of these questions. On the 
one hand it has looked at the question of Natural Law theories that have 
been prevalent in the church's moral teaching for centuries, and on the 
other it has examined the 'ultra' Protestant teaching on Revelation and 
Justification by Faith. In the first case, Natural Law, the conclusion is 
that both Brunner and Niebuhr dismiss this as an answer, although they do 
not deny its existence and its influence on some form of natural morality. 
When they wrote, the Roman Catholic Church had not set itself the task of 
reforming its teaching on moral theology. After they wrote, and largely 
inspired by Vatican 2, the Roman Catholic position had radically altered. 
However, both would question the extent to which 'authority' in that church 
is valid as a means, either of imposing Natural Law theories, or of 
'enforcing' reform. Although authority is a secondary issue, it remains 
true that any law, natural or otherwise, has to be enforced, and in the 
case of a moral law, has to be binding on the conscience. In the second 
case, that of 'ultra-protestant' teaching, both agree that an ethical 
theory, which depends entirely upon Revelation, does not take account of 
any 'natural morality', or acknowledgement of relativities. 
If, on the one hand, Niebuhr and Brunner have dismissed traditional natural 
law theories, and on the other hand have dismissed the 'Barthian' position, 
it is valid to question whether they have a distinctive answer to the 
question of the moral dilemma, or whether their answer is a compromise 
between two unsatisfactory positions. 
This thesis has attempted to demonstrate that these two have, in fact, a 
distinctive and valuable contribution to make to the debate. Both start 
with an examination of the nature of man, and his relationship with God. 
In the case of Brunner, this is exemplified in his writing about the 
'Divine Human Encounter'. The transformation brought about by this 
encounter- this 'entering into a sanctuary', makes man's approach to moral 
questions and choices totally different. Acknowledging that outwardly, man 
is still 'erring, imperfect and weak', Brunner now sees him being subject 
to the call of God, which is an individual call, leading him to establish 
himself, as one who has been called, into community. This call is, for 
Brunner, the start of the study and application of ethics. The 'call' of 
God renders man's behaviour in community different. The community starts 
with the concept of family, and proceeds through various stages until it 
embraces the idea of 'state'. 
Niebuhr, in his examination of the nature of man, starts with the idea of 
'man as sinner'. Man, as individual, and man in community, behaves in a way 
which is continually tainted with sin. He sees man's approach to every 
moral question as being the approach of a sinner- and man's hope in this 
approach is defined by 'grace' and redemption. Specifically, Niebuhr points 
to 'pride' as an overriding sin, and its consequence, the achievement of 
power, a social danger. Nobody, says Niebuhr, willingly gives up power. In 
his rejection of an Aristotelean definition of man - that is a definition 
which exalts the power of reason- Niebuhr singles out the idea of 'self 
transcendent freedom.' Man has a unique capacity to stand outside himself, 
and examine his own motives and choices. In his treatment of the concept 
of 'imago Dei', Niebuhr agrees with Brunner along the lines of Augustine 
and Luther. Both take what is frequently described as a 'pessimistic' view 
of man - that is to say, a view of man as 'fallen' and therefore tainted 
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with sin. This is all the more remarkable in the case of Niebuhr, writing 
as he did in the midst of the American culture and the 'American Dream'. 
Both writers cited 'love' as the ultimate Christian determinate. They 
tested this against the concepts of law and justice. Niebuhr, as we saw, 
found Brunner wanting in his analysis of justice, and Brunner, in turn, 
used eschatological categories to define the nature of love. Niebuhr 
concentrated on the trancendent nature of love - transcendent, that is, 
over law. Brunner concentrated on the 'personal' and ' individual' aspect 
of love. Within this context they examined the nature of revelation, and 
Niebuhr supported Brunner in his dispute with Karl Barth on the question of 
the existence of 'general revelation'. 
However, the most important element of the thesis has been the need to keep 
their teaching - and in particular that of Emil Brunner - in the forefront 
of theological ethics. Niebuhr is, at the time of writing still popular -
Brunner less so. In comparing the two we ·can see that Niebuhr is not 
merely the American voice of Protestantism, but a theologian of 
international significance. Similarly, Brunner, who broke ranks with the 
main stream of the 'Zurich' School of theology early in his life, deserves 
to be read, because, although one of the foremost Lutheran theologians of 
his day, he ventured as a theologian into the world of ethics. 
Because their subject was ethics, and because this was for them not merely 
a matter of speculation, but a burning issue of faith, their personalities 
are apparent in their writings. Niebuhr portrays himself as the 'volcano' 
which Brunner described - continually aware of the flux and change of 
history. Brunner's writing is careful, measured and, on occasions, poetic. 
In terms of literature Brunner perhaps has the edge over Niebuhr. The 
important conclusion is that there were raised up these two eminent men 
tackling ethical issues, from within the heart of the Gospel, at the most 
turbulent period of world history. 
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